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SUCCESSIVE HABEAS CORPUS PETITIONS AND
SECTION 2255 MOTIONS AFTER THE
ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH
PENALTY ACT OF 1996: EMERGING
PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
RANDAL S. JEFFREY'
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 24, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA" or
"Act").2 One focus of the AEDPA was to restrict habeas corpus relief
available in the federal courts.' In addition to restricting such relief by
mandating further federal court deference to state court adjudications,
imposing a one-year period of limitation on filings,5 and establishing for
1. Staff Attorney in the Special Litigation Unit of the New York Legal Assistance
Group. Former pro se law clerk in the Staff Attorney's Office of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit (1995-97). J.D. Columbia 1994.
I would like to thank my fellow law clerks who clerked with me at the Staff Attorney's Office,
as well as the Office staff, where many of the issues raised in this Article were discussed. I
would also like to thank James S. Liebman and Randy Hertz, whose essential treatise,
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1998 & Supp. 1999), has
been invaluable both for my learning federal habeas corpus law in general and for purposes
of this Article in particular. In addition, I would like to thank the editors and staff of the
Marquette Law Review for their work in publishing this article. Finally, I would like to thank
Kerry McArthur for her continued support during the writing of this Article.
2. Pub. L. No. 104-132,110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
3. See id. § 101-107.
4. See id. § 105 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2255(d)). While prior to the enactment of the
AEDPA state court factual determinations generally entitled to a presumption of correctness,
see former 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), the Act strengthened the deference to factual determinations
and added deference to state court legal conclusions; see Williams v. Taylor, 120 S. Ct. 1495,
1518-23 (2000); LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 1, §§ 20.2c, at 747-55 & 30.2, at 1233-314;
Marshall J. Hartman & Jeanette Nyden, Habeas Corpus and the New Federalism After the
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 337, 355-
370 (1997); Kimberly Woolley, Note, Constitutional Interpretations of the Antiterrorism Act's
Habeas Corpus Provisions, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 414,432-40 (1998).
5. Section 101 of the AEDPA added subsection (d) to 28 U.S.C. § 2244, which
established a one-year "period of limitation" for § 2254 petitions; this period begins running
from the latest of the following four dates: (1) when "the judgment became final"; (2) when
"the impediment to filing an application [which prevented the applicant from filing] created
by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed"; (3)
when "the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the
right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to
cases on collateral review"; and (4) when "the factual predicate of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence." 28 U.S.C. §
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the first time special procedures for death penalty cases in qualified
jurisdictions,6 the AEDPA dramatically changed both the procedural
and substantive law governing second and successive ("successive")'
2244(d) (Supp. II 1997). In addition "a properly filed application for State post-conviction or
other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim" tolls the period of
limitation while it is pending. Id
Similarly, § 105 of the AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to add a para. 6. This established a
one-year "period of limitation" for § 2255 motions that begins running from the latest of the
following four dates: (1) when "the judgment of conviction becomes final"; (2) when "the
impediment to making a motion [which prevented the movant from filing] created by
governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed";
(3) when "the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on
collateral review"; and (4) when "the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could
have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence." 28 U.S.C. § 2255 para. 6.
The AEDPA made two other significant changes to habeas law. The Act changed the name
of the document required to appeal a district court's decision from a "certificate of probable
cause" to a "certificate of appealability" and extend the "certificate of appealability"
requirement to the § 2255 context. See Pub. L. No. 104-132 § 102 (amending 28 U.S.C. §
2253). The Act also allows a court to deny a petition on the merits even if not all of the
claims raised are exhausted. See id. § 104 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2)).
6. See Pub. L. No. 104-132 § 107 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266). So far, no court
has ruled that a state qualifies for the special death penalty procedures. See Ashmus v.
Calderon, 123 F.3d 1199, 1208 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that California does not qualify for the
special death penalty procedures and upholding a district court injunction against California
and its agents from attempting to invoke the special procedures in any state or federal
proceeding) rev'd, 523 U.S. 740 (1998) (holding that plaintiffs' action was not justiciable);
Scott v. Anderson, 958 F.Supp. 330,332 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (holding that Ohio does not qualify
for the special death penalty procedures); Satcher v. Netherland, 944 F. Supp. 1222 (E.D. Va.
1996) (holding that Virginia does not qualify for the special death penalty procedures), affd
in part, rev'd in part, 126 F.3d 561 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 933 (1997); Hill v.
Butterworth, 941 F. Supp. 1129 (N.D. Fla. 1996) (holding that Florida does not qualify for the
special death penalty procedures), remanded for reconsideration by 133 F.3d 783 (1997); cf
Booth v. Maryland, 112 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that the prisoners' action to declare
that Maryland does not qualify for the special death penalty procedures was barred by the
Eleventh Amendment), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 905 (1998). In any event, the AEDPA does not
include any special death penalty provisions governing successive applications. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2261-2266.
7. Prior to the AEDPA, the Supreme Court had distinguished "abusive" applications
from "successive" applications as follows:
A "'successive petition' raises grounds identical to those raised and rejected on the
merits on a prior petition." An "abusive petition" occurs "where a prisoner files a
petition raising grounds that were available but not relied upon in a prior petition, or
engages in other conduct that 'disentitle[s] him to the relief he seeks."'
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 319n.34 (1995) (citations omitted). The AEDPA collapses these
two types of applications under the general label "second or successive." See United States v.
Barrett, 178 F.3d 34, 43 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999); Esposito v. United States, 135 F.3d 111, 113 n.3 (2d
Cir. 1997) (per curiam). However, as under the law prior to the enactment of the AEDPA, at
least in the § 2254 context the AEDPA treats same claims differently from new claims. See
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applications.8 As to procedures, the AEDPA assigned the circuit courts
a unique "gatekeeping"9 function under which they must grant
authorization before a petitioner can even file a successive application in
a district court.'0 As to the substantive law, most significantly the
AEDPA: limited to only two the diverse reasons constituting "cause"
excusing a petitioner's failure to bring a claim in a prior application;
heightened the degree of prejudice that a petitioner must establish to
obtain relief based on a claim relying on newly discovered evidence; and
eliminated the miscarriage of justice exception for petitioners" who fail
to demonstrate both cause for failing to raise a claim in a prior petition
and prejudice from the failure to address the claim.
With the AEDPA now only a few years old, a number of issues have
emerged regarding both the procedures which the Act established and
how the Act changed the substantive standards governing successive
applications. This Article identifies these issues, surveys whether and
how courts have addressed them, comments on any such court decisions,
and suggests how these issues should be resolved. In surveying the case
law, this Article focuses on circuit court decisions, as these are the courts
that the Act charges with either granting or denying authorization to file
successive applications in the first instance." Furthermore, because of
the breadth of this topic, this Article does not attempt to explore each
issue in depth, but rather aims to highlight the range of issues and
explore only some of them in further detail.
infra Parts IV. B & C.
8. This Article uses the term "application" exclusively to describe both § 2254 habeas
corpus petitions filed by persons in custody pursuant to a state court conviction and § 2255
motions to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence filed by persons in custody pursuant to a
federal court conviction. This Article distinguishes these applications from § 2241 habeas
corpus petitions and other procedural vehicles that persons may use to challenge a judgment
of conviction; this Article refers to non-application vehicles as "actions." See infra Part II
(introductory text).
9. Although the AEDPA does not use either the term "gatekeeper" or "gatekeeping,"
courts and commentators have often used these terms to refer to the Act's circuit court
authorization provisions. See, eg., Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 657 (1996).
10. See infra Part HI.
11. This Article uses the term "petitioner" to refer to both § 2254 petitioners and § 2255
movants. See Pratt v. United States, 129 F.3d 54, 56 n.1 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S.
1123 (1998).
12. See infra Part IV.
13. By establishing the gatekeeping function, the AEDPA has forced circuit courts to
immediately confront a whole range of issues that district courts previously often avoided
when the claims in an application were meritless and could be denied on that basis. Thus,
these issues-such as the issue of which applications are successive-have become more
prominent.
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A number of interrelated themes that run throughout this Article
merit highlighting up front. It also bears mention that all of these
themes are connected by an overarching theme, namely the importance
of statutory interpretation. The changes that the AEDPA has brought
to successive application law are, after all, statutory. In this context, two
rules of statutory construction are particularly important. First,
although habeas law may not be criminal law, a similar "rule of lenity"
should apply when interpreting the AEDPA." Under this rule,
statutory ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the defendant or
petitioner.15 This rule is based on the proposition that "legislatures and
not courts should define criminal activity." 16 A second rule of statutory
construction is that a court need not strictly construe language that
would lead to a "patently absurd consequence[]."' 7 These two rules
provide some boundaries for interpreting the AEDPA's successive
application provisions.
One theme of this Article is that judicial interpretations of the
AEDPA's successive application provisions should be informed by the
law of habeas corpus as it existed prior to the enactment of AEDPA.
Although the AEDPA was enacted in order to restrict the availability of
habeas relief in federal courts, it also was enacted against the
background of already established successive application law. To the
extent that the AEDPA does not explicitly change successive
application law, or when the Act is ambiguous, the old law should be
preserved."
A second theme is that while on its face the AEDPA places
relatively simple and straightforward restrictions on successive
applications, in actuality the Act created a number of unanticipated and
complex problems. Procedurally, for example, by providing circuit
courts with a gatekeeping role for certain applications, the Act split the
preliminary responsibility over applications between the district and
14. Cf United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 517-18 (1992)
(applying the rule of lenity when interpreting a tax statute in the civil context as the statute
also has criminal applications).
15. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419,427 (1985).
16. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) ("[B]ecause of the seriousness of
criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral
condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts should define criminal
activity.").
17. Pub. Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470 (1989) (quoting
United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18,27 (1948)).
18. See Woolley, supra note 4, at 426 (arguing against purely technical readings of the
AEDPA).
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circuit courts, creating confusion over the new relationship between the
courts. Substantively, for example, the Act appears to preclude claims
that traditionally have been cognizable by replacing an equitable
remedy with strict statutory standards. 9 Some of these problems are
due to the Act's simple approach to such a complex area of the law.
Other problems, however, can only be explained as poor statutory
drafting.' For example, the Act amended 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to make it
more difficult for a petitioner to obtain authorization to file a successive
§ 2255 motion, but completely failed to restrict the relief available in a
district court if a petitioner does obtain authorization to file a successive
§ 2255 motion.2' Further examples of problems arise throughout this
Article.
A third theme of this Article is that the AEDPA must be interpreted
against a background of several constitutional provisions that protect
the rights of those incarcerated pursuant to criminal judgments and
which may curtail certain restrictions on successive applications. Four
provisions are particularly noteworthy: the Suspension of the Writ
Clause" specifically, and the Due Process,' Equal Protection, and
19. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,490 (1991) (noting that a federal court's ability
to hear a claim in a successive application "derives from the court's equitable discretion")
(citing Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1,17-18 (1963)).
20. A number of courts have taken note of the AEDPA's poor draftsmanship. See, e.g.,
Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997) ("All we can say is that in a world of silk purses
and pigs' ears, the [AEDPA] ... is not a silk purse of the art of statutory drafting."); Houchin
v. Zavaras, 924 F. Supp. 115, 117 (D. Colo. 1996) ("In view of the apparent contradiction [in
the AEDPA], it is unlikely that contemplation played any role at all [in its drafting]."). As an
example of poor drafting in the non-successive application context, the AEDPA appears to
be internally inconsistent on the issue of whether a district court may grant a certificate of
appealability. Compare Pub. L. No. 104-132 § 102 ("Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a
certificate of appealability.. .") (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)); see id. § 103 ("[T]he
district judge who rendered the judgment shall either issue a certificate of appealability or
state the reasons why such a certificate should not issue.") (amending FED. R. APP. P. 22(b)).
See, e.g., United States v. Eyer, 113 F.3d 470, 472-73 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting the ambiguity);
Lozada v. United States, 107 F.3d 1011, 1015-16 (2d Cir. 1997) (same); Lyons v. Ohio Adult
Parole Auth., 105 F.3d 1063, 1067-68 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1224 (1997);
Hunter v. United States, 101 F.3d 1565, 1574-75 (11th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (same), cert.
denied, 520 U.S. 1133 (1997).
21. See infra Part IV.E.2 (discussing how the AEDPA fails to mandate that district
courts enforce the substantive restrictions once a successive § 2255 motion is filed).
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it.").
23. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law. .. ").
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 ("No State shall... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."). The Supreme Court has applied Equal
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Cruel and Unusual Punishment' Clauses more generally." Certain
provisions of the AEDPA, as well as certain interpretations of the
AEDPA, may run afoul of these provisions. Certain attempts to limit
judicial authority to grant the writ may implicate separation of power
principles as well." While this Article does not explore whether
particular sections of the AEDPA violate any of these constitutional
provisions, it does recognize that the AEDPA should be interpreted so
as to avoid constitutional problems.?
A fourth theme is that both the AEDPA and the courts have tended
to simplify or ignore the very substantial differences between § 2254
petitions and § 2255 motions. Initially, the AEDPA's provisions, by
simply imposing restrictions similar to the § 2254 successive petition
restrictions on successive § 2255 motions, ignore the well-established
availability of § 2255 to raise claims based on a change in federal law
and therefore restrict claims which arguably should still be available.29
The AEDPA's provisions also treat successive § 2255 motions
substantially differently from § 2254 petitions. In particular, § 2255
incorporates certain authorization procedures applicable to § 2254
petitions without specifying which ones,' fails to mandate that district
Protection Clause protections to the federal government through the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,499-500 (1954).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."). See Triestman v. United States, 124
F.3d 361, 379 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 432 n.2 (1993)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting), for the proposition that the incarceration of an innocent person
may violate the Eighth Amendment).
26. In addition, one court has held that applying the AEDPA's successive application
provisions to a petition filed after the enactment of the Act does not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause. See Hatch v. Oklahoma, 92 F.3d 1012, 1014 (10th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); U.S.
CONsT. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.").
27. Provisions of the AEDPA are also subject to challenge under Article III of the
Constitution, which establishes the Supreme Court's authority. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, §§ 1,
2. For example, the Act's restriction on petitions for writs of certiorari was challenged in
Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996), on this ground. See infra Part I.A.
28. See, e.g., DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485
U.S. 568, 575 (1988) ("[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise
serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems
unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress."); see also Triestman,
124 F.3d at 377 ("It is both taken for granted and yet profoundly sound that we must
'construe a federal statute to avoid constitutional questions where such a construction is
reasonably possible.'" (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 162 (1974), and citing Cheek
v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 203 (1991) and Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366-67
(1974)).
29. See infra Part IV.C.1.a.
30. See infra Part III.A.
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courts enforce the substantive restrictions once an authorized successive
§ 2255 motion is filed," and fails to restrict same claims any more
severely than new claims.' This Article addresses these distinctions.
A fifth theme of this Article is that the changes that the AEDPA
brought to successive application law are all interconnected. For
example, how one provision of the Act is interpreted can and does affect
how other provisions can and should be interpreted. In addition,
although this Article discusses the procedural and substantive changes
separately, the new procedural requirements and substantive restrictions
ultimately cannot be separated. Thus, this Article has frequent internal
cross-references when the issue at hand touches on other issues.
A final note is that while this Article focuses on circuit court
decisions, the Supreme Court will ultimately decide many of the issues
engendered by the AEDPA in general, and its successive application
provisions in particular.3 What the Supreme Court has to say in these
decisions will influence how lower courts resolve issues in a variety of
contexts. So far, the Supreme Court has issued several significant
opinions concerning the habeas amendments of the AEDPA. All of
these decisions affect the procedure and substance of successive
applications and warrant discussion before continuing with the bulk of
this Article.
A. Felker v. Turpin
In Felker v. Turpin,34 the Supreme Court held that the AEDPA did
not revoke the Court's jurisdiction to review a circuit court decision
denying a motion for authorization to file a successive application 5
Although the Court acknowledged that the AEDPA did prohibit its
review through the usual certiorari process,3 the Court held that review
through a habeas petition directly filed in the Court remained
available.37 While under this procedure a petitioner who files a habeas
31. See infra Part IV.E.2.
32. See infra Part IV.B.2.
33. Although the AEDPA prohibits the Supreme Court from reviewing authorization
decisions by writ of certiorari, the Court can review such decisions through petitions filed
directly in the Court. See infra Parts L.A & HI.I.2.
34. 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
35. Id. at 661.
36. See id. at 657 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E)).
37. See id. at 660; see also id. at 666 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that the Supreme
Court retained jurisdiction to review circuit court authorization decisions through 28 U.S.C. §
1254(2) (review of interlocutory orders), 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (the All Writs Act), and 28 U.S.C. §
2000]
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petition in the Court is not directly appealing an authorization decision,
such a petitioner is able to obtain Supreme Court review of the
authorization decision in this manner.' This aspect of the Felker
decision is significant because the Court declined to read past the literal
language of the Act to find an implied revocation of its original
jurisdiction, an approach suggested by both the respondent and an
amicus.39
The Court in Felker further held that, at least as applied to petitions
brought by state prisoners, the AEDPA's substantive restrictions on
successive applications do not violate the Suspension of the Writ
Clause.' In reaching this conclusion, the Court provided some guidance
to lower courts addressing successive application issues. In particular,
the Court quoted McCleskey v. Zant,4' a leading pre-AEDPA successive
application case, which described abuse of the writ law as an "evolving
[doctrine] ... controlled by historical usage, statutory developments,
and judicial decisions," and found that the Act's restrictions were "well
within the compass of this evolutionary process."42
This second aspect of the Court's decision is significant because it
sanctioned certain AEDPA restrictions on successive applications.
Perhaps more importantly, however, the Court situated the AEDPA
2241 (original writ of habeas corpus); id. at 666-67 (Souter, J., concurring) (same).
38. See iL at 666 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that "in the exercise of our habeas
corpus jurisdiction, we may consider earlier gatekeeping orders entered by the court of
appeals to inform our judgments and provide the parties with the functional equivalent of
direct review.").
39. See Resp. Br. at 20, 1996 WL 272387; Amicus Curie Br. at 28-29, 1996 WL 277110
(submitted by 54 Members of Congress).
40. See Felker, 518 U.S. at 664.
41. 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
42. Felker, 518 U.S. at 664 (quoting McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 489). The Court's full
description of the successive application restrictions was as follows:
The new restrictions on successive petitions constitute a modified res judicata rule, a
restraint on what is called in habeas corpus practice "abuse of the writ." In
McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991), we said that 'the evolving doctrine of abuse
of the writ refers to a complex and evolving body of equitable principles informed
and controlled by historical usage, statutory developments, and judicial decisions.'
Id at 489. The added restrictions which the Act places on second habeas petitions
are well within the compass of this evolutionary process, and we hold that they do
not amount to a "suspension" of the writ contrary to Article I, § 9.
Felker, 518 U.S. at 664 (quoting McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 489).
Many circuit court decisions have quoted or cited Felker's language describing the AEDPA.
See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 124 F.3d 1328, 1329 (10th Cir. 1997); Reeves v. Little, 120
F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); In re Sims, 111 F.3d 45, 46 (6th Cir. 1997) (per
curiam); Camarano v. Irvin, 98 F.3d 44,45 (2d Cir. 1996).
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within a larger evolutionary process in which history, statute, and
judicial decisions all play a role. This implies that any interpretation of
the AEDPA's successive application provisions should take the two
other aspects of habeas law, history, and judicial decisions, into account.
B. Lindh v. Murphy
In Lindh v. Murphy,43 the Supreme Court held that the non-death
penalty provisions of the AEDPA do not apply to applications filed
before the enactment of the Act." The Court reached this decision by
applying its retroactivity analysis laid down in Landgraf v. USI Film
Products.4 The court found that since the death penalty provisions of
the Act explicitly apply to pending applications, by negative implication
Congress did not intend for the non-death penalty provisions to apply to
then-pending applications." This decision essentially divided the world
of habeas applications into those filed before the Act, which are
governed completely by pre-AEDPA law, and those filed after the Act,
which are generally governed by post-AEDPA law.47 At this point, it
should be noted that this Article only explores the AEDPA's provisions
as applied to applications which are completely governed by post-
AEDPA law."
43. 521 U.S. 320 (1997).
44. Id. at 336-37.
45. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
46. See Lindh, 521 U.S. at 326-31.
47. Under the Landgraf analysis, certain provisions of the AEDPA may be inapplicable
to some applications filed after the AEDPA was enacted. See 511 U.S. 244. Most notably, a
number of circuits have held that the Act's one-year period of limitation does not apply to
applications filed within one year of the enactment of the Act. See Brown v. Angelone, 150
F.3d 370,374 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v. Flores, 135 F.3d 1000, 1004-05 (5th Cir. 1998);
Bums v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 110-12 (3d Cir. 1998); Calderon v. United States Dist. Court,
128 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Simmonds, 111 F.3d 737, 746 (10th Cir.
1997); Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 866 (7th Cir. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320
(1997).
48. Thus, this article does not address the issue of whether the AEDPA's successive
application provisions should apply to cases in which the prior application or applications
were either adjudicated or filed before the AEDPA was enacted. For instance, the dissenting
judges in the Fourth Circuit's decision in In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1200 (4th Cir. 1997) (Hall,
J., dissenting), subscribed to the view that, under Landgraf, the successive application
provisions of the AEDPA should not apply when a first § 2255 motion was filed before the
enactment of the AEDPA. Similarly, the Third and Sixth Circuits have held that the
successive application provisions do not apply when a petitioner filed a first application prior
to the enactment of the AEDPA and applying the Act's provisions to the current application
would preclude the petitioner from obtaining relief that would be available under pre-
AEDPA law. See In re Minarik, 166 F.3d 591,599-602 (3rd Cir. 1999) (limiting this holding to
the substantive, not the procedural, requirements of the AEDPA); In re Hanserd, 123 F.3d
2000]
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Lindh is significant in two respects. First, this case illustrates that in
the rapidly changing area of post-AEDPA habeas law, the Supreme
Court may resolve an issue in a manner completely contrary to how the
lower courts had addressed the issue.49 Thus, the myriad of issues
discussed below remain open to some extent until the Supreme Court
definitely resolves them. Second, by holding that Congress did not
intend for the non-death penalty provisions of the AEDPA to apply to
pending applications, the Supreme Court avoided the issue of whether
the AEDPA's successive application substantive restrictions in the
§ 2254 context are merely jurisdictional restrictions.
C. Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal
In Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal,/ the Supreme Court held that a
petitioner's competency claim raised in a fifth petition was not
successive when the petitioner's first three petitions were dismissed for
failure to exhaust state court remedies and the court declined to rule on
the competency claim when presented in the petitioner's fourth petition
because the claim was not yet ripe. 1 The Court reached this conclusion
as the petitioner had properly raised the competency claim in his fourth
petition, and the district court should have ruled on that claim when it
became ripe, namely after the other claims in that petition were
adjudicated.2 In addition, the Court held that it had jurisdiction to
review the circuit court's decision that authorization was unnecessary
because the underlying petition was not successive. 3 The Court
reasoned that, in such situations, the AEDPA's restrictions on review of
circuit court authorization decisions were inapplicable because when the
922, 933-34 (6th Cir. 1997); cf. United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 34, 48-49 (1st Cir. 1999)
(considering but not deciding this argument); Burris v. Parke, 95 F.3d 465, 468-69 (7th Cir.
1996) (holding that the AEDPA does not apply to an application filed after the enactment of
the AEDPA and the first application was filed prior to the AEDPA when this would
"mousetrap" the petitioner). But see Mancuso v. Herbert, 166 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 1999)
("We conclude that the AEDPA applies to a habeas petition filed after the AEDPA's
effective date, regardless of when the petitioner filed his or her initial habeas petition and
regardless of the grounds for dismissal of such earlier petition.").
49. Prior to the Court's Lindh decision, many circuit courts had rejected the negative
implication reasoning that the Supreme Court accepted. See, e.g., Lyons v. Ohio Adult Parole
Auth., 105 F.3d 1063, 1067 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1224 (1997); Lindh, 96 F.3d at 861-
63, rev'd, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Reyes v. Keane, 90 F.3d 676, 679 (2d Cir. 1996) amended by 118
F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 1997).
50. 523 U.S. 637 (1998).
51. See id. at 645-60.
52. See id. at 643-60.
53. See id.
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underlying petition is not successive, then the restrictions do not apply.'
Initially, the Court's decision in Stewart is important because it
recognizes that the AEDPA's use of "second or successive" is not to be
read literally.5 Instead, the Court considered, in determining whether
an application is successive, the more flexible considerations of whether
the prior application was dismissed "for technical procedural reasons"
and whether the petitioner failed to "receive an adjudication of his
claim. "56 In addition, the Court established that it could review a circuit
court's decision that an application is not successive if the application is
in fact not successive.
D. Williams v. Taylor
In Williams v. Taylor,5' the Supreme Court held that the AEDPA's
bar on evidentiary hearings, when the petitioner has "failed to develop
the factual basis of [his] claim[s] in State court proceedings," requires
that a petitioner be at fault for not developing the claim through some
lack of diligence.5' This case is important for interpreting the AEDPA
because the Court looked both to pre-AEDPA law, as well as to
consistency with other provisions of the AEDPA, in interpreting the
Act's "failed to develop" standard. 9
E. Williams v. Taylor
On the same day that it issued its first Williams decision, the
Supreme Court issued a second Williams v. Taylo decision concerning
the AEDPA. In this second decision, the Court interpreted the
AEDPA's provision that prohibits federal courts from granting habeas
corpus relief on a claim previously adjudicated on the merits by a state
court, unless the state court adjudication "involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States.n6' The Court held that, under this
standard, a federal court can grant relief on a claim if the state court,
while identifying the proper legal principal applicable to the claim,
54. See iL
55. But see idL at 646-650 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 650 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 645.
57. 120 S. Ct. 1479 (2000).
58. Id. at 1487-89 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)).
59. See id. at 1488-89.
60. 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000).
61. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1997).
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"unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." 12
This case resolved a major issue raised by the AEDPA, namely the
standard of deference that state courts must provide to state court legal
interpretations of federal law.
F. Slack v. McDaniel
Most recently, in Slack v. McDaniel,6 the Supreme Court decided
two issues raised by the AEDPA. First, the Court held that the
"certificate of appealability" requirement, which replaced the
"certificate of probable cause" requirement for appealing a district court
denial of a habeas petition, applies to appeals commenced after the
enactment of the AEDPA, even if the application was filed prior to the
enactment of the AEDPA." Second, the Court held that petitioners can
obtain a certificate of appealability to appeal a district court's denial of a
petition on procedural grounds upon a showing that reasonable jurists
would find it debatable as to whether the petition stated a valid claim
and whether the district court made a proper procedural ruling.6' The
Court also held that, under pre-AEDPA law, a petition that follows a
petition dismissed for failure to exhaust state court remedies is not
considered successive, even if the subsequent petition raises claims not
raised in the petition dismissed for failure to exhaust.6
The Court's decision in Slack is important because the Court again
looked to habeas corpus law in effect prior to the enactment of the
AEDPA in interpreting the Act. In particular, the Court examined the
standard for granting the pre-AEDPA certificate of probable cause in
formulating the standard for granting the post-AEDPA certificate of
appealability, rather than simply strictly adhering to the literal language
of the certificate of appealability provision.6 In addition, in ruling that
the certificate of appealability requirement applies to applications
appealed after the enactment of the AEDPA, even when the application
was filed in district court prior to the enactment of the AEDPA, the
Court again demonstrated a willingness in this area of the law to reach a
decision contrary to the majority of the circuit courts.6
62. Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1523.
63. 120 S. Ct. 1595 (2000).
64. See id. at 1602-03.
65. See id. at 1603-04.
66. See id. at 1604-06.
67. See id. at 1603.
68. See id. at 1607 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing circuit court cases contrary to the
Court's holding).
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With the background of this Article presented, a brief summary of
the remainder of the Article is in order. Part II of this Article focuses
on the threshold question in successive application adjudication, namely
whether the application at issue actually is a successive application. In
order to answer this question, Part II first explores some procedural
vehicles that may be used to challenge judgments of conviction but
which are neither § 2254 petitions nor § 2255 motions. Part II then
explores various procedural scenarios in which a petitioner has filed
multiple actions, and for each scenario, asks whether the current action
is actually a successive application. Next, Part II explores situations in
which a petitioner has brought a prior § 2254 petition or § 2255
application, but that prior application should not count for successive
application purposes. Finally, this Part notes the issue of what standard
of review a circuit court should use to review a district court finding on
whether an application is successive.
Part III explores an assortment of procedural issues which have
arisen or will arise in federal court adjudication of successive
applications under the AEDPA's successive application provisions.
Specifically, Part I considers the following issues: (1) to what extent
the § 2255 successive application provision incorporates the procedures
governing the authorization of successive § 2254 petitions; (2) how
district courts should dispose of successive applications which lack
proper circuit court authorization; (3) whether the respondent must
plead that an application is successive; (4) whether proper circuit court
authorization is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a successive
application in district court; (5) whether a respondent can consent to
authorization; (6) whether a circuit court must rule within thirty days of
filing a successive authorization motion; (7) whether a circuit court may
authorize only certain claims or must authorize the entire application;
(8) where a petitioner should file an application if it is unclear whether it
is successive; and (9) what avenues are available, and their scope, for
petitioners to challenge an authorization motion decision.
Part IV briefly focuses on the substantive standards governing how
circuit courts should adjudicate authorization motions. Part IV first
discusses what constitutes a prima facie showing necessary for a circuit
court to grant authorization. Part IV explores the standards governing
claims that have been previously raised in an application. This Part then
explores the standards governing new claims, with particular emphasis
on problems that have arisen in the § 2255 context. Part IV continues
by addressing the issue of whether a circuit court should consider
defenses not referenced in the AEDPA's successive application
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provisions when adjudicating an authorization motion. Finally, Part IV
touches on the standards governing a successive application in a district
court if the circuit court does grant authorization.
II. WHAT IS A SUCCESSIVE APPLICATION?
Whether a § 2254 habeas corpus petition or a § 2255 motion to
vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence is a "second or successive"
application is the threshold and most important consideration in post-
AEDPA successive application law.69 A petitioner may file a non-
successive application directly in the appropriate district court without
authorization and may raise in the application a full range of challenges
to her or his conviction." However, a petitioner may only file a
successive application in the district court after he or she has first
obtained authorization from a circuit court to file the application, and
may only obtain authorization under severely restricted circumstances.
Thus, the question of whether an application is successive determines
both the court in which the petitioner should first present his or her
claims and, in most cases, whether a court will ever consider the merits
of the claims.
Despite its importance, the AEDPA does not define "second or
successive, 71 or otherwise provide any indication as to its meaning.
Furthermore, the legislative history of the Act does not reveal any intent
of Congress for this phrase to have a particular meaning. Because the
AEDPA does not offer any guidance, the question of what constitutes a
successive application has fallen to the judiciary. Before addressing this
69. Although the issue of whether an application was abusive or successive was
important under pre-AEDPA law, this was not necessarily the threshold issue. Under pre-
AEDPA law courts could and did deny applications without conclusively resolving whether
an application was abusive or successive in those cases in which the court could more easily
deny the application for other reasons, such as a lack of merit. See infra Part II.B.
70. Of course, a district court may fail to reach the merits of a claim in a non-successive
application when the claim is barred by certain procedural defenses. See infra Part II.B.7-9.
71. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b) (passim), 2255 para. 8. Almost all of the circuit courts have
noted that the AEDPA does not define "second or successive." See, e.g., United States v.
Barrett, 178 F.3d 34, 42-43 (1st Cir. 1999); In re Taylor, 171 F.3d 185, 187 (4th Cir. 1999);
Carlson v. Pitcher, 137 F.3d 416, 418 (6th Cir. 1998); In re Cain, 137 F.3d 234, 235 (5th Cir.
1998); Pratt v. United States, 129 F.3d 54, 60 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1123 (1998);
Galtieri v. United States, 128 F.3d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Scott, 124 F.3d 1328,
1329 (10th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); Reeves v. Little, 120 F.3d 1136, 1138 (10th Cir. 1997);
Martinez-Villareal v. Stewart, 118 F.3d 628,633-634 n.7 (9th Cir. 1997); In re Gasery, 116 F.3d
1051, 1052 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); Christy v. Horn, 115 F.3d 201, 208 (3d Cir. 1997);
Chambers v. United States, 106 F.3d 472, 474 (2d Cir. 1997); Benton v. Washington, 106 F.3d
162, 163 (7th Cir. 1996); Camarano v. Irvin, 98 F.3d 44,45-46 (2d Cir. 1996).
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question, this Article will develop some useful terminology.
For purposes of this analysis this Article draws a distinction between
"actions" and "applications." An "application" is defined narrowly as
either a § 2254 petition or a § 2255 motion. An "action" is defined
broadly as any challenge to a judgment of conviction; this includes §
2254 petitions, § 2255 motions, and any other procedural vehicles used
to challenge a conviction. Under these definitions, actions in general
can be divided into applications (§ 2254 petitions and § 2255 motions)
and non-applications (all other procedural vehicles). Although these
are not established definitions, this Article adopts them as a convenient
way to discuss successive application law.
With these definitions in mind, there are two circumstances in which
an action is not a successive application: (1) the present action is a "non-
application"; and (2) every prior action either (a) was not, or should not
have been treated as, an application, or (b) was an application, but for
some other reason should not be counted for successive application
purposes. The first section of this Part explores those situations in
which either the present or every prior action is not an application. The
second section explores those situations in which the prior application
should not count for successive application purposes.
A. Whether Both the Present and the Prior Actions are Applications
The AEDPA's restrictions on successive actions, by their terms, only
apply to "second or successive habeas corpus application[s]" and to
"second or successive motion[s]."' Thus, for these restrictions to apply
to an action, the present action must be an application and the
petitioner must have previously filed an application. This latter
requirement follows from the ordinary definitions of "second" and
"successive. "73  Conversely, when the present action is not an
application, or is the petitioner's first application because the previous
actions were not or should not have been treated as applications, then
the successive application provisions do not apply to the present action.
While these may seem like simple propositions, in practice they can
encompass quite complicated scenarios. Before exploring these
scenarios, this Article first presents a number of alternate procedural
vehicles which are not applications.
72. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b) (passim), 2255 para. 8.
73. The American Heritage Dictionary defines "second" as "Coming next after the first
in order, place, rank, time, or quality," and "successive" as "Following in uninterrupted order,
consecutive." American Heritage Dictionary 1629,1793 (3d ed. 1992).
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1. Alternative Procedural Vehicles
This section discusses a number of actions which petitioners may file
in an attempt to collaterally attack their convictions which are neither §
2254 petitions nor § 2255 motions. Almost all of these actions are used
to challenge federal judgments of conviction. This is so because federal
law authorizes a variety of post-conviction procedures to challenge a
conviction, just as the laws of many states establish a variety of vehicles
for making post-conviction challenges. However, federal law generally
only authorizes one procedural vehicle for petitioners seeking to
challenge a state court judgment of conviction in federal court, namely a
§ 2254 habeas corpus petition. With this consideration in mind, this
section now briefly presents the alternative actions and describes their
use and scope.
a. Rule 35 Motions
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 authorizes a district court to
correct or reduce a sentence in three circumstances: (1) on remand from
a court of appeals;7' (2) on the government's motion, if the defendant
has provided substantial assistance in investigating or prosecuting
another person;75 and (3) on the defendant's motion, if filed within seven
74. Rule 35(a) provides:
CORRECTION OF A SENTENCE ON REMAND. The court shall correct a sentence that
is determined on appeal under 18 U.S.C. 3742 to have been imposed in violation of
law, to have been imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing
guidelines, or to be unreasonable, upon remand of the case to the court-
(1) for imposition of a sentence in accord with the findings of the court of appeals; or
(2) for further sentencing proceedings if, after such proceedings, the court
determines that the original sentence was incorrect.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a).
75. Rule 35(b) provides:
REDUCTION OF SENTENCE FOR SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE. If the Government so
moves within one year after the sentence is imposed, the court may reduce a
sentence to reflect a defendant's subsequent, substantial assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of another person, in accordance with the guidelines
and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994
of title 28, United States Code. The court may consider a government motion to
reduce a sentence made one year or more after the sentence is imposed if the
defendant's substantial assistance involves information or evidence not known by
the defendant until one year or more after sentence is imposed. In evaluating
whether substantial assistance has been rendered, the court may consider the
defendant's pre-sentence assistance. In applying this subdivision, the court may
reduce the sentence to a level below that established by statute as a minimum
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days of the imposition of the sentence.76 Each section of Rule 35 has a
specific and limited scope. A district court only has authority to correct
a sentence pursuant to Rule 35(a) after a remand, and the authority may
be limited to carrying out the mandate of the circuit court.' Only the
government, not a petitioner, can make a Rule 35(b) motion.78 Finally,
while a Rule 35(c) motion authorizes a petitioner to seek relief, a
petitioner must make such a motion within seven days of the imposition
of the sentences and relief is limited to instances of clear error.80
In addition, the former Rule 35, which applies to proceedings in
which the offense was committed prior to November 1, 1987,81 (1)
authorizes courts to correct an illegal sentence at any time or a sentence
imposed in an illegal manner within 120 days after the sentence becomes
final,8 and (2) authorizes defendants to move for the reduction of a
sentence within 120 days after the sentence becomes final' Although
the former Rule 35 is substantially broader than the present Rule 3 5,. it
sentence.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b).
76. Rule 35(c) provides that "[tihe court, acting within 7 days after the imposition of
sentence, may correct a sentence that was imposed as a result of arithmetical, technical, or
other clear error." FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(c).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Pimentel, 34 F.3d 799, 800 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam)
(holding that, when a circuit court limits the scope of a remand, a district court only has
authority to examine the limited issues), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1102 (1995).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Early, 27 F.3d 140, 141 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1027 (1994).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Abreu-Cabrera, 64 F.3d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that
the seven-day period is jurisdictional, and citing cases).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Colace, 126 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir. 1997).
81. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 35, advisory committee note; see also, e.g., United States v.
Eatinger, 902 F.2d 1383,1384 (9th Cir. 1990).
82. The Former Rule 35(a) provided: "The court may correct an illegal sentence at any
time and may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner within the time provided herein
for the reduction of sentence." Id.
83. The Former Rule 35(b) provided:
REDUCTION OF SENTENCE. A motion to reduce a sentence may be made, or the
court may reduce a sentence without motion, within 120 days after the sentence is
imposed or probation is revoked, or within 120 days after receipt by the court of a
mandate issued upon affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or
within 120 days after entry of any order or judgment of the Supreme Court denying
review of, or having the effect of upholding, a judgment of conviction or probation
revocation. The court shall determine the motion within a reasonable time.
Changing a sentence from a sentence of incarceration to a grant of probation shall
constitute a permissible reduction of sentence under this subdivision.
Id.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Furman, 112 F.3d 435,438 (10th Cir. 1997).
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does not apply to those petitioners who committed offenses after
November 1, 1987.
b. Rule 36 Motions
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 authorizes a district court to
correct "[c]lerical mistakes" in a criminal judgment "at any time." ' This
Rule is of extremely limited scope. It simply allows a court to modify
the written judgment to truly reflect the oral judgment, 6 as the oral
judgment, rather than the written judgment, is legally binding on the
defendantf
c. Section 3582 (c) (2) Motions
Section 3582(c)(2) of Title eighteen of the United States Code
authorizes a court to modify a term of imprisonment which it previously
imposed pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines when the
sentence is based on a guideline that was lowered after sentencing.s
Furthermore, the modification must be consistent with the policy
statements of the guidelines." This means that the guidelines must
85. FED. R. CRIM. P. 36 states: "Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of
the record and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by
the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court orders." Id.
86. See United States v. Werber, 51 F.3d 342, 348 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Rule 36 covers only
minor, uncontroversial errors" and may not be employed to correct a defendant's sentence
when "those corrections [are] aimed at remedying an error of law, not an error of
transcription."); United States v. Daddino, 5 F.3d 262, 264-65 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that
Rule 36 does not apply when the oversight is by the district court itself); United States v.
Ferguson, 918 F.2d 627, 630 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that Rule 36 is limited to "correction of
clerical errors, oversights, and omissions"); United States v. Guevremont, 829 F.2d 423, 426
(3d Cir. 1987) (holding that Rule 36 is limited to correcting clerical mistakes and does not
apply to errors by the court); United States v. Kaye, 739 F.2d 488, 491 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating
that Rule 36 applies only to clerical errors, not to judicial errors).
87. See, e.g., Werber, 51 F.3d at 347.
88. Section 3582(c) provides, in relevant part:
MODIFICATION OF AN IMPOSED TERM OF IMPRISONMENT. The court may not
modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that... (2) in the
case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a
sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o), upon motion of the defendant or the Director of the
Bureau of Prisons, or on its own motion, the court may reduce the term of
imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent
that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).
89. See id.
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specify that the relevant guideline is retroactively applicable,' and the
court that adjudicates the motion must consider certain specified factors
before making a modification." Petitioners apparently may file an
independent action for relief directly under this section.'
d. Section 2241 Petitions
It is well established that federal prisoners may file habeas corpus
petitions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge a variety of
circumstances relating to their conditions of confinement. For example,
prisoners may bring § 2241 petitions to challenge the type of their
detention,' prison disciplinary actions.' the denial of good time credits,95
computation of their sentence by prison officials?9 parole decisions,'
extradition orders," and deportation orders.' These challenges to
conditions of confinement do not, however, challenge judgments of
convictions.
Federal prisoners may also use § 2241 to challenge their federal
custody resulting from a conviction and sentence imposed by a federal
court if a § 2255 motion is "inadequate or ineffective. "'00 However, a §
90. See U.S.S.G. § BLI.1O.
91. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).
92. See United States v. Ono, 72 F.3d 101, 102 (9th Cir. 1995) (describing a § 3582(c)(2)
as "a step in the criminal case"); United States v. Argitakos, 862 F.2d 423, 424 (2d Cir. 1988)
(per curiam) (noting that the defendants brought motions pursuant to § 3582(c)).
93. See, e.g., Boudin v. Thomas, 732 F.2d 1107,1112 (2d Cir. 1984).
94. See, e.g., McIntosh v. United States Parole Comm'n, 115 F.3d 809, 811-12 (10th Cir.
1997).
95. See, e.g., id.
96. See, eg., Mieles v. United States, 895 F.2d 887, 888 (2d Cir. 1990) (declining to
decide whether a petitioner may raise an error in a sentence computation claim in a § 2241
petition).
97. See, e.g., Gambino v. Morris, 134 F.3d 156,160 (3d Cir. 1998).
98. See, e.g., Then v. Melendez, 92 F.3d 851, 852 (9th Cir. 1996).
99. See, e.g., Galaviz-Medina v. Wooten, 27 F.3d 487, 491-92 (10th Cir. 1994), cert
denied, 513 U.S. 1086 (1995).
100. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 para. 5. Before § 2255 was enacted in 1948, federal prisoners could
challenge their convictions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See, e.g., Hill v. United States, 368 U.S.
424, 427 (1962) (noting that § 2255 "was intended simply to provide in the sentencing court a
remedy exactly commensurate with that which had previously been available by habeas
corpus in the court of the district where the prisoner was confined"); United States v.
Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952) (discussing the relationship between § 2255 and § 2241).
However, § 2255 supplanted § 2241 as the general method to challenge federal convictions,
leaving § 2241 available only when the § 2255 motion is inadequate or ineffective:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241] on behalf
of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section,
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2255 motion is not inadequate or ineffective simply because a court has
denied such a motion.1 1 Furthermore, prior to the enactment of the
AEDPA, § 2241 relief was rarely available to challenge a judgment of
conviction, as a § 2255 motion was generally an adequate and effective
remedy.' 2 The AEDPA, however, by substantially restricting relief
available under § 2255 may engender a revival of § 2241. This type of
relief is discussed in more detail below.'O'
e. Alternative Writs
The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651,"°4 authorizes federal courts to
entertain petitions for writs of error coram nobis and, perhaps, petitions
for writs of audita querela. Under contemporary law, the writ of error
coram nobis is available for petitioners to challenge their convictions if
they are no longer in custody,"~ as neither § 2255 nor § 2241 relief is
available to such persons."° Petitioners may use this writ to challenge
"errors 'of the most fundamental character." ''  The writ of audita
querela traditionally was available to "remedy a legal defect in or
defense to the underlying judgment."' However, it is unclear whether
this writ is still available to challenge a criminal judgment"' 9
shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief,
by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him
relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective
to test the legality of his detention.
28 U.S.C. § 2255 para. 5.
101. See, e.g., Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753,756 (6th Cir. 1999) (per curiam); United
States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 34, 50 (1st Cir. 1999); In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 n.5 (4th Cir.
1997); Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164, 166 (10th Cir. 1996); Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 1160,
1162 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 982 (1988); McGhee v. Hanberry, 604 F.2d 9, 10-11
(5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
102. See Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 376-77 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that
courts had not defined "the scope and meaning" of when a § 2255 motion is inadequate or
ineffective); LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 1, § 41.2b, at 1567-74.
103. See infra Part IV.C.I.a.
104. Section 1651(a) provides: "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of
Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions
and agreeable to the usages and principals of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
105. See United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1954) (holding that the All
Writs Act authorizes courts to grant writs of error coram nobis when a person is no longer in
federal custody); see also, e.g., Foont v. United States, 93 F.3d 76,78-79 (2d Cir. 1996) (same).
106. See, e.g., Telink, Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 42,45 (9th Cir. 1994).
107. Morgan, 346 U.S. at 512 (quoting United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 69 (1914)).
108. United States v. Reyes, 945 F.2d 862, 866 (5th Cir. 1991).
109. See id. at 865 (declining to decide whether a writ of audita querela is ever available
to challenge a criminal conviction); United States v. Holder, 936 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1991)
(declining to decide whether the writ of audita querela is still available); United States v.
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f. Section 1983
Section 1983 of Title forty-two of the United States Code provides a
vehicle for those whose constitutional rights have been violated by state
actors to seek legal redress.1 Although a prisoner may attempt to use §
1983 to challenge a state judgment of conviction, claiming that her or his
incarceration is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court has held that
§ 1983 may not be so employed."1 Furthermore, a petitioner may not
use § 1983 to challenge state action leading to his or her conviction if the
success of the action would undermine the constitutionality of the
conviction.' Thus, § 1983 is unavailable to petitioners to challenge a
criminal judgment of conviction.
g. Section 2106 Appellate Review
Section 2106 of Title twenty-eight of the United States Code
authorizes an appellate court to "affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or
reverse" a judgment "lawfully brought before it for review. 13  The
Ayala, 894 F.2d 425, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (declining to decide whether a writ of audita querela
is ever available to vacate a criminal conviction); United States v. Kimberlin, 675 F.2d 866,
869 (7th Cir. 1982) (assuming that the writ of audita querela would be available if "necessary
to plug a gap in the system of postconviction remedies," but casting doubt that such a gap
exists).
110. Section 1983 provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
111. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,488-90 (1973).
112. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,486-87 (1994).
113. Section 2106 provides in full:
The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, modify,
vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully
brought before it for review, and may remand the case and direct the entry of such
appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be
had as may be just under the circumstances.
28 U.S.C. § 2106.
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Supreme Court has held that this provision provides it with the
appellate authority to vacate and remand to lower federal courts cases
properly before it.114 The Second Circuit has further held that § 2106
authorizes a circuit court to remand an appeal properly before it, even if
the district court lacked jurisdiction over the original action which was
properly appealed to the circuit court."5
The Second Circuit's reading of § 2106 opens up the possibility that
this provision may provide petitioners with an expansive equitable
remedy to challenge illegal judgments of conviction. Specifically, a
petitioner may file in district court an action under which relief is not
available, such as a Rule 35 or 36 motion, appeal the denial of the
motion, and then on appeal press the circuit court to exercise it
authority under § 2106 to vacate the illegal criminal judgment and
remand for further proceedings. It cannot be assumed, however, that
the Second Circuit or other courts would countenance such procedures
in the future.
h. Rule 60(b) Motions
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes
district courts, upon a motion by a party, to relieve the party from a
previously entered judgment under certain circumstances, including
newly discovered evidence and "any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment.""116  Thus, Rule 60(b) is a potential
mechanism for petitioners whose first application is denied to seek to
raise additional issues without filing a second application. In addressing
this issue, the Ninth Circuit has held that, generally, a Rule 60(b) motion
seeking relief from a judgment denying an application must be treated
as a successive application."7  However, the court left open the
possibility that a Rule 60(b) motion seeking relief from the denial of an
application might be proper in some circumstances.
114. See Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 166 (1996) ("[W]e believe that this Court has
the power to remand to a lower federal court any case raising a federal issue that is properly
before us in our appellate capacity." (emphasis added)).
115. In United States v. Burd, on appeal from a district court grant of a Rule 36 motion,
the Second Circuit held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the Rule 36
motion, but remanded under its § 2106 authority to the district court to enter a new sentence
that was not illegal. 86 F.3d 285, 288-89 (2d Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Minor, 846
F.2d 1184, 1187 (9th Cir. 1988) (recognizing § 2106 as source of circuit court authority to
remand to the district court for resentencing).
116. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
117. See Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 1998).
118. See id.
[Vol. 84:43
SUCCESSIVE HABEAS CORPUS PETITIONS
2. Various Procedural Scenarios
As discussed in the previous section, a petitioner may challenge a
judgment of conviction by filing any number of actions which are
neither § 2254 petitions nor § 2255 motions. This section discusses
whether a current action is a successive application based upon whether
the current and the prior actions are either applications or non-
applications. This is accomplished by presenting a number of
procedural scenarios which survey the variety of circumstances under
which an action may come before a court.
It should be noted at this point that, as a practical matter, it is often
unclear from an abbreviated record, which often accompanies an
authorization motion, what prior relief a petitioner has sought.
Although court orders and docket sheets may list an action as a § 2254
petition or a § 2255 motion, only the papers actually filed by the
petitioner can truly reveal what relief the petitioner previously sought.
Thus, in order for a court to properly determine whether an application
is successive, the court must have before it a sufficient record of the
petitioner's current and all prior actions.
a. The Current Action is not an Application and Seeks Non-Application
Relief
The most obvious scenario in which the successive application
provisions of the AEDPA should not apply to an action is when the
petitioner is not bringing the present action as an application and the
action seeks relief which falls within the scope of one of the alternate
procedural vehicles discussed above. In such cases, the successive
application provisions do not apply to the action, regardless of how
many prior applications the petitioner might have brought, simply
because the action is not an application and thus cannot be a successive
application.' Although the filing of successive non-application actions
may burden both the respondents who must reply to these actions and
the courts which must adjudicate them, the AEDPA simply did not
address these available procedural vehicles.
119. See Gray-Bey v. United States, 209 F.3d 986, 990 (7th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)
(holding that a petitioner does not need circuit court authorization to file a § 2241 petition);
Valona v. United States, 138 F.3d 693, 694-95 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the AEDPA's
successive application provisions do not apply to a petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2241); In re Cain, 137 F.3d 234, 236-37 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that the AEDPA's successive
application provisions do not apply to a petition challenging the administration of a sentence
rather than the validity of the conviction or sentence).
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Furthermore, the fact that these alternative procedural vehicles are
available does not generally provide petitioners with a basis for avoiding
the AEDPA's successive application restrictions, since most of these
vehicles only provide relief in very specific and limited circumstances.
Thus, a petitioner may only file a Rule 35 motion within seven days of
the imposition of the sentence. A Rule 36 motion is only available to
modify a written judgment to conform to the oral judgment. A
petitioner may only get relief through a § 3582(c)(2) motion when her or
his original sentence was based on Guideline which has been amended
by a retroactively applicable Guidelines amendment. Finally, a
petitioner may not even bring a § 1983 complaint to challenge a criminal
conviction.
The other actions discussed above, while also of limited scope, may
allow petitioners to obtain relief in some situations in which the
petitioner would be otherwise precluded by the successive application
provisions of the AEDPA. Section 2241, as touched on later, may be
available to federal petitioners to raise certain fundamental claims
otherwise precluded by the Act's successive application provisions."'
The writs of error coram nobis and audita querela may play such a role
as well.121 Section 2106, as employed by the Second Circuit, also has the
potential to provide circuit courts broad authority to review criminal
judgments when a petitioner is precluded from bringing a successive §
2255 motion. A Rule 60(b) motion also might provide a mechanism to
raise claims after an initial application is denied. However, the AEDPA
successive application restrictions simply do not apply to these actions,
and they thus remain available to the full extent as before the enactment
of the AEDPA.
b. The Current Action is Filed as an Application but does not Seek
Application Relief
Another relatively obvious scenario occurs when a petitioner labels
an action as a § 2254 petition or a § 2255 motion, but the action seeks
120. See infra notes 336-38 and accompanying text.
121. See United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 34, 54-57 (1st Cir. 1999) (discussing a claim
brought under the All Writs Act); In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 608 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating,
in dicta, that if relief is not available under § 2241, then relief is not available under the All
Writs Act); Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 380 n.24 (2d Cir. 1997) ("It is possible
that these remedies might be deemed available if their existence were necessary to avoid
serious questions as to the constitutional validity of both § 2255 and § 2244-if, for example,
an actually innocent prisoner were barred from making a previously unavailable claim under
§ 2241 as well as § 2255.").
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relief that is unavailable under those provisions. In such a situation, the
court adjudicating the action should construe the action as what it
actually is, for example a Rule 36 motion or a § 3582 Guidelines motion.
Once the court properly construes the action as a non-application, then
the action is no longer an application and the successive application
provisions of the AEDPA do not apply.
c. The Current Action is not Filed as an Application but Seeks
Application Relief
Prior to the AEDPA, when a petitioner filed an action under a
provision other than § 2254 or § 2255, relief was unavailable to the
petitioner under that provision, and relief was potentially available
under § 2254 or § 2255, district courts routinely construed the
petitioner's action as a § 2254 or a § 2255 application,m often without
notice to the petitioner. Courts construed these actions as applications
to benefit petitioners-rather than denying an action because the
petitioner used the wrong label in describing the action, these courts
provided petitioners with the opportunity to properly present their
claims in an application.
While this procedure when followed without providing a petitioner
notice and an opportunity to amend or withdraw the application was
problematic prior to the enactment of the AEDPA, it is even more so
now. First, if a court does construe an action as an application, then the
petitioner will be completely precluded from subsequently raising any
claim not in the application that the petitioner could have raised at the
time that the court construed the action as an application. Second,
given the AEDPA's restrictions on applications, a petitioner challenging
his or her conviction may purposely file one of the non-application
122. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 646, 648 (3d Cir. 1999); Adams v.
United States, 155 F.3d 582, 583 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam); 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 591, at 425 (2d ed. 1982) ("Of course labels are not
decisive, and a petition for habeas corpus filed in the sentencing court can and should be
treated as if it were a motion under § 2255.").
123. See Miller, 197 F.3d at 648; Adams, 155 F.3d at 583 (noting that this procedure
"harmlessly assisted the prisoner-movant in dealing with legal technicalities").
124. Prior to the enactment of the AEDPA, courts may have had some discretion to find
that a prior court's erroneous construction of an action as an application constituted cause for
the petitioner's failure to raise other claims at that time. See LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note
1, § 28.3c(4)(a), at 1189 (describing the following as a circumstance in which a petitioner may
establish cause: "Unlawful, unfair, or dilatory actions.., of the federal court(s) involved in
the earlier petition... discouraged or prevented the petitioner from raising the claim in the
earlier petition.").
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procedural vehicles discussed above to avoid these restrictions. In such
cases, the petitioner has intentionally labelled the action as a non-
application, and is entitled to have the court rule on it as such.
The Second Circuit was the first circuit court to recognize the
potential prejudice to petitioners that occurs when a district court
construes an action not filed as an application, as an application. In
order to avoid this prejudice, the court adopted a rule that, when a non-
§ 2255 action is filed, a district court should not construe the action as a
§ 2255 motion unless either the petitioner agrees to this construction or
the petitioner is offered an opportunity to withdraw the action instead
of having it so construed."' The Third Circuit subsequently followed the
lead of the Second Circuit.126 This approach is entirely reasonable, as it
prevents a petitioner from being denied the opportunity to file an
application simply because a court construed an action not filed as an
application, as an application."
d. The Current Action is an Application
Finally, the current action may be labeled as an application and seek
relief available as an application. Once it is established that the present
action in an application, the next step is to resolve whether it is a
successive application. This means that the petitioner has filed at least
one prior action which was properly considered as an application. For
matters of simplicity, this discussion will be limited to cases in which a
petitioner has filed only one prior action. However, if the petitioner has
filed a number of prior actions, this analysis can be applied to each of
them.
3. The Prior Action was not an Application and Sought Non-Application
Relief
Another relatively straightforward procedural scenario occurs when
the petitioner's prior action was not brought as an application and did
not seek relief available only under § 2254 or § 2255. In other words,
125. See Adams, 155 F.3d at 584. The Second Circuit left open the possibility that this
procedure need not be followed if the law is such that such a construed action does not count
for successive motion purposes. See id.
126. See Miller, 197 F.3d at 646, 652. The Sixth Circuit indicated that district courts
might want to follow a similar procedure before construing actions as § 2254 petitions. See id.
at 652 n.7.
127. In the Miller and Adams cases, the courts tolled the period of limitations because
the petitioners had been prejudiced by the district court's construing of their motions as §
2255 motions. See Miller, 197 F.3d at 652-53; Adams, 155 F.3d at 584 n.2.
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the petitioner's prior action was a proper non-application action. In
such cases, the present application is not successive because the
petitioner did not bring a prior application."
4. The Prior Action was an Application but Sought Relief Unavailable
Under § 2254 or § 2255
A variation of the above procedural scenario occurs when a
petitioner's prior action was either filed as, or construed as, a § 2254
petition or § 2255 motion, but sought relief unavailable under either of
those sections. In other words, either the petitioner erroneously filed
the prior action as a § 2254 petition or a § 2255 motion, or a court
erroneously construed the action as such an application. In this
situation, the present petition is not successive because the prior action
should not have been treated as an application.29 Given the confusion
over the various available procedural vehicles, especially for prisoners
who often proceed pro se, a petitioner's label of the prior action should
not be decisive as to whether the action actually was an application.
Furthermore, ruling on the petitioner's present application when the
prior application should not have been an application does not raise
abuse of the writ concerns.
5. The Prior Action was not an Application but Sought Relief
Unavailable Under the Action and Available Under § 2254 or § 2255
Another variation on this series of scenarios occurs when a
petitioner filed her or his prior action as something other than an
application, and the district court construed the action as a § 2254
petition or a § 2255 motion because relief was only available under one
of those provisions. In such situations, the prior action should count for
successive application purposes only if the petitioner was provided with
notice and an opportunity to amend or withdraw the action before the
128. The Second Circuit, for example, has held that an application is not successive
when the prior action or actions sought relief only available under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, reasoning
that since § 2241 and § 2255 offer relief for distinct types of claims and a § 2255 motion can
raise claims which could not be brought in prior § 2241 petitions, filing a § 2255 motion
subsequent to a § 2241 petition does not raise abuse of the writ concerns. See Chambers v.
United States, 106 F.3d 472,474 (2d Cir. 1997).
129. The Second Circuit, for example, has held that an action filed as a § 2255 motion
but which sought relief available under § 2241 but not available under § 2255 should not
count for successive application purposes even though the petitioner had labeled the action as
a § 2255 motion, reasoning that it is routine for courts to construe prisoner actions based on
the relief sought in the action rather than hold the prisoner to the label used. See id. at 475.
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court ruled on the action.
The Fifth Circuit has adopted a contrary approach. In one case,
even though the petitioner claimed that the district court had construed
his prior action raising a Bailey claim' 3° as § 2255 motion over his
objections, the court held that the petitioner had "exercised his first §
2255 motion" such that any subsequent motion was successive."' This
approach, however, should not be followed.
Under this scenario, if the court which ruled on the prior action
provided the petitioner with notice and an opportunity to withdraw the
application prior to construing the application as an action, then the
current application is successive. When provided with a choice, the
petitioner opted to pursue the § 2254 petition or § 2255 motion.
However, if the court failed to provide notice and an opportunity to
withdraw before construing the action as an application, then the action
should not count for successive application purposes. The petitioner
may have filed the original action under a mistake of law as to the
proper vehicle for relief, not realizing that the claim or claims raised
sought relief available under § 2254 or § 2255, and that all claims not
brought in the application probably would be forfeited. Because
counting such an action would prejudice the petitioner by denying the
petitioner the opportunity to raise all of his or her claims, such actions
should not count as prior applications. This is simply a retroactive
application of the rule announced by the Second and Third Circuits that
non-applications actions should not be construed as applications with
proper notice.32
6. The Prior Action was an Application and Sought Relief Available
Under § 2254 or § 2255
This final scenario occurs when both the present and the prior
actions have been brought as applications and properly seek application
relief. In such situations, the AEDPA's successive application
provisions generally apply as the present action is an application and the
prior action was also an application. However, the present application
still may not be successive. Namely, it may be that the prior application
130. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
131. In re Tolliver, 97 F.3d 89,90 (5th Cir. 1996) (by the court).
132. See supra Part II.A.2.c. While the Third Circuit held that it would not apply this
rule retrospectively to actions filed prior to the enactment of the AEDPA, the court further
noted that this would not prejudice petitioners because the court had previously held that the
provisions of the AEDPA would not apply in such circumstances. See United States v. Miller,
197 F.3d 644, 652 (6th Cir. 1999).
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was dismissed for procedural reasons unrelated to the merits of the
application or that the petitioner did not have the opportunity to
present all of her or his claims in the prior application such that the prior
application should not count for successive application purposes. The
- next section considers under what circumstances a prior application
should not count.
B. Whether the Prior Application Should Count for Successive
Application Purposes
In addition to those situations where the previous action was not
actually an application, there are several situations where an application
is not successive, even when the prior action was an application. In
other words, although the petitioner did previously file an application,
the prior application should not count for successive application
purposes. Ultimately, this Article concludes that a prior application
should not count for successive application purposes if the petitioner did
not have an opportunity to raise all of the then-available claims in the
application.
In determining whether an application is successive there is some
temptation to read the statute literally: an application is successive
whenever a petitioner has attacked the same conviction in a prior
application.'33 However, as discussed below, such a literal reading fails
to appreciate the established understanding of successive applications
under pre-AEDPA law. There is no indication that Congress intended
to supersede this established meaning rather than incorporate it into its
undefined term "second or successive." Furthermore, the Supreme
Court recognized that the literal reading of "second or successive" could
not be correct in its Stewart decision, finding that the suggested literal
reading would result in implications "far-reaching and seemingly
perverse."13M
It may also be tempting to find that a prior application counts for
successive application purposes only if the court adjudicating the prior
application rendered a decision "on the merits" of the petitioners
claims. 3' Prior to the enactment of the AEDPA, both § 2244 and Rule
133. Even this modestly literal interpretation reads into the term "second or successive"
the requirement that an application attack the same conviction as the prior application. See
infra Part II.B.1.
134. Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637,644 (1998).
135. See LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 1, § 28.3b, at 1167.
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9(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases and the Rules
Governing Section 2255 Proceedings stated that a court could dismiss a
subsequent application if the prior application had been decided "on the
merits. "'3 However, as discussed in the section on procedural defaults,
it may be that a claim need not be disposed of on the merits for the.
application to count for successive application purposes.137 In addition,
in the same claim context, the AEDPA replaced the "on the merits"
language from § 2244 with the question of whether a claim was
"presented" in a prior petition."3
The Seventh Circuit is the only circuit so far which has attempted to
establish a general rule for determining when a prior application should
count for successive application purposes. The court initially found that
a first application need not necessarily be decided on the merits for the
subsequent application to be successive. 39 In reaching this decision, the
court looked to the preclusion doctrine, reasoning that, as in civil
litigation, there are circumstances in which a court does not reach the
merits of an application, but nonetheless, subsequent applications
should be precluded."4  With this context, the Seventh Circuit
established the rule that applications returned under Rule 2(e) of the
136. The former § 2244 provided as follows:
When after an evidentiary hearing on the merits of a material factual issue, or after a
hearing on the merits of an issue of law, a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court has been denied by a court of the United States or a
justice or judge of the United States release from custody or other remedy on an
application for a writ of habeas corpus, a subsequent application for a writ of habeas
corpus on behalf of such person need not be entertained by a court of the United
States or a justice or judge of the United States unless the application alleges and is
predicated on a factual or other ground not adjudicated on the hearing of the earlier
application for the writ, and unless the court, justice, or judge is satisfied that the
applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately withheld the newly asserted
ground or otherwise abused the writ.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (emphasis added).
Rule 9(b) provided, and still provides, in the context of same claim successive applications:
"A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege new
or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the merits ... ' Rule
Governing Section 2254 Cases 9(b) (emphasis added). The Rule further states, "a second or
successive motion may be dismissed if the judge finds that it fails to allege new or different
grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the merits...." Rule Governing
Section 2255 Proceedings 9(b) (emphasis added).
137. See infra Part II.B.8.
138. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (as amended) ("A claim presented in a second or successive
habeas corpus application .... ") & (b)(2) (same).
139. See Benton v. Washington, 106 F.3d 162,164 (7th Cir. 1996).
140. See id.
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Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases or dismissed for failure to exhaust
remedies do not count for successive application purposes, but that
applications disposed of in any other manner "presumptively" count.141
The First Circuit has come close to establishing a rule as to which prior
applications should count for successive application purposes. While
declining to fully define successive applications, the court stated that the
definition of successive application generally encompasses the abuse of
the writ doctrine, meaning that a petitioner's claim is successive if it
properly could have been raised in the prior petition.42
In contrast to the Seventh Circuit, and more similar to the First, this
Article concludes that whether a prior application should count for
successive application purposes depends upon whether the petitioner
had the opportunity to raise all of the then-available claims in the prior
application. This Article arrives at this conclusion by examining various
ways that district courts may dispose of applications and considering
whether such applications should count. This section first explores the
issue of whether a prior application must challenge the same judgment
of conviction as the current application to count as a successive
application. Second, this section explores whether applications
dismissed under the various dispositions provided for in the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases and the Rules Governing Section 2255
Proceedings should count. Third, this section examines whether
applications dismissed under the various procedural defenses should
count. Finally, this section explores certain unique situations in which a
petitioner's first application necessary could not raise all then-available
claims.
1. Challenging a Different Judgment
The AEDPA is silent as to whether an application is successive only
when the petitioner challenges the same judgment of conviction in the
present application as in his or her prior application, and no circuit court
has yet held that this is a requirement.43  However, the only
interpretation of the Act's successive application provisions that is
141. See id. at 165.
142 See United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 34,45 (1st Cir. 1999).
143. The Second Circuit has indicated that an application is not successive when the
petitioner challenges a different judgment of conviction in the present application as in his or
her prior application, but did not clearly so hold. See Liriano v. United States, 95 F.3d 119,
122 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Liriano's § 2255 motion is clearly a 'second or successive motion' within
the meaning of § 2255; it raises claims concerning the same conviction to which his prior
§ 2255 motion was addressed.").
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consistent with the law prior to the enactment of the AEDPA and with
the federal rules governing applications, is that a prior application
challenging a different judgment of conviction should not count for
successive application purposes." As under post-AEDPA law, the pre-
AEDPA statutes and Rules were also silent as to whether a prior
application must have challenged the same judgment to make the
present application successive. While not in the statutes or Rules, courts
have read this requirement into the law,145 and nothing in the AEDPA
or its legislative history suggests that the Act changed this.
Furthermore, the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases and the Rules
Governing Section 2255 Proceedings themselves require that a
petitioner file separate applications to challenge either more than one
judgment or the judgments of more than one court." s  Given this
requirement, it would be unfair to apply the successive application
provisions to someone who simply followed these rules. Finally, not
having such a requirement would completely preclude a petitioner from
raising claims challenging a second conviction if the petitioner had
collaterally challenged a prior conviction, which could suspend the writ
as to the latter application. Based on the above reasons, prior
applications that challenged different judgments should continue to not
count for successive application purposes.
2. Dismissals for Failure to Pay the Filing Fee
In order to file a § 2254 petition, a petitioner must either pay a five
dollar filing fee or obtain a waiver of the fee. 47 Thus, if a petitioner fails
144. See LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 1, § 28.3b, at 1163-72.
145. See id at 1164 (stating that a petitioner does not abuse the writ when the prior
application attacked a different judgment and citing cases).
146. See Rule Governing Section 2254 Cases 2(d); Rule Governing Section 2255
Proceedings 2(c).
147. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914 ("The clerk of each district court shall require the parties
instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in such court.., to pay a filing fee of $150,
except that on application for a writ of habeas corpus the filing fee shall be $5."); 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a)(1) states:
[A]ny court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or
defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without
prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that
includes a statement of all assets such prisoner [sic] possesses that the person is
unable to pay such fees or give security therefor."
Id. In contrast, a federal prisoner may file a § 2255 motion without paying any fee because
such a motion is considered, for certain purposes such a paying a filing fee, to be a post-
judgment motion in the already filed criminal case. See Rule 3 of the Rules Governing § 2255
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to either pay this fee or obtain a fee waiver, then the district court
should dismiss the petition without considering any of the claims in the
petition. Because a petition dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee
should not be considered to have been filed, it should not count for
successive application purposes.
The Seventh Circuit has held that a petition dismissed for failure to
pay the required filing fee does not count for purposes of determining
whether an application is successive." In reaching this conclusion, the
court reasoned that such a petition should be returned under Rule 2 of
the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, and thus never technically
"filed." '149 Because the previous petition should not have been filed, the
court reasoned that the subsequent petition is actually the first to be
filed by the petitioner.1 The Seventh Circuit's result is certainly
correct.
A dismissal for failure to pay the filing fee presents the strongest
case for not counting a prior application challenging the same judgment
as a first application for purposes of the AEDPA's successive
application provisions. Furthermore, this example illustrates that simply
because a petitioner has submitted a prior application does not by itself
mean that a present application is successive. Once this proposition is
accepted, then some standard must be developed to distinguish between
prior applications that count and those that do not count for successive
application law. Further examples help develop this standard.
3. Rule 2 Dismissals
Rule 2 of both the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases and the
Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings authorizes a district court to
return an "insufficient" application to a petitioner."' In particular, a
Proceedings. Thus, the analysis of dismissals for failure to pay the filing fee is only applicable
in the § 2254 context.
148. See Benton v. Washington, 106 F.3d 162,164-65 (7th Cir. 1996).
149. See id.; infra Part II.B.3.
150. See Benton, 106 F.3d at 165.
151. Rule 2(e) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides as follows:
RETURN OF INSUFFICIENT PETITION. If a petition received by the clerk of a district
court does not substantially comply with the requirements of rule 2 or rule 3, it may
be returned to the petitioner, if a judge of the court so directs, together with a
statement of the reason for its return. The clerk shall retain a copy of the petition.
Rule 2(d) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings provides as follows:
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court may return an application if it fails to substantially comply with
the requirements of either Rule 2 or Rule 3 of the § 2254 Rules or the §
2255 Rules, as applicable. These Rules specify several requirements: (1)
the application must name the proper respondent; (2) the application
must be in the proper form; (3) the application must specify the grounds
for relief; (4) the application must be legible; (5) the application must be
signed; and (6) the application may only challenge one judgment of
conviction or the judgments of one court. 2 If an application does not
RETURN OF INSUFFICIENT MOTION. If a motion received by the clerk of a district
court does not substantially comply with the requirements of rule 2 or rule 3, it may
be returned to the movant, if a judge of the court so directs, together with a
statement of the reason for its return. The clerk shall retain a copy of the motion.
152. Rule 2(a)-(d) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides as follows:
(a) APPLICANTS IN PRESENT CUSTODY. If the applicant is presently in custody
pursuant to the state judgment in question, the application shall be in the form of a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which the state officer having custody of the
applicant shall be named as respondent.
(b) APPLICANTS SUBJECT TO FUTURE CUSTODY. If the applicant is not presently
in custody pursuant to the state judgment against which he seeks relief but may be
subject to such custody in the future, the application shall be in the form of a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus with an added prayer for appropriate relief
against the judgment which he seeks to attack. In such a case the officer having
present custody of the applicant and the attorney general of the state in which the
judgment which he seeks to attack was entered shall each be named as respondents.
(c) FORM OF PETITION. The petition shall be in substantially the form annexed to
these rules, except that any district court may by local rule require that petitions
filed with it shall be in a form prescribed by the local rule. Blank petitions in the
prescribed form shall be made available without charge by the clerk of the district
court to applicants upon their request. It shall specify all the grounds for relief
which are available to the petitioner and of which he has or, by the exercise of
reasonable diligence, should have knowledge and shall set forth in summary form
the facts supporting each of the grounds thus specified. It shall also state the relief
requested. The petition shall be typewritten or legibly handwritten and shall be
signed under penalty of perjury by the petitioner.
(d) PETITION TO BE DIRECTED TO JUDGMENTS OF ONE COURT ONLY. A petition
shall be limited to the assertion of a claim for relief against the judgment or
judgments of a single state court (sitting in a county or other appropriate political
subdivision). If a petitioner desires to attack the validity of the judgments of two or
more state courts under which he is in custody or may be subject to future custody,
as the case may be, he shall do so by separate petitions.
Rule 2(a)-(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings provides as follows:
(a) NATURE OF APPLICATION FOR RELIEF. If the person is presently in custody
pursuant to the federal judgment in question, or if not presently in custody may be
subject to such custody in the future pursuant to such judgment, the application for
[Vol. 84:43
SUCCESSIVE HABEAS CORPUS PETITIONS
substantially comply with these requirements, then the court which
receives the application may return it rather than file it." Because such
relief shall be in the form of a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence.
(b) FORM OF MOTION. The motion shall be in substantially the form annexed to
these rules, except that any district court may by local rule require that motions filed
with it shall be in a form prescribed by the local rule. Blank motions in the
prescribed form shall be made available without charge by the clerk of the district
court to applicants upon their request. It shall specify all the grounds for relief
which are available to the movant and of which he has or, by the exercise of
reasonable diligence, should have knowledge and shall set forth in summary form
the facts supporting each of the grounds thus specified. It shall also state the relief
requested. The motion shall be typewritten or legibly handwritten and shall be
signed under penalty of perjury by the petitioner.
(c) MOTION TO BE DIRECrED TO ONE JUDGMENT ONLY. A motion shall be limited
to the assertion of a claim for relief against one judgment only of the district court.
If a movant desires to attack the validity of other judgments of that or any other
district court under which he is in custody or may be subject to future custody, as the
case may be, he shall do so by separate motions.
Rule 3 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides as follows:
(a) PLACE OF FILING; COPIES; FILING FEE. A motion under these rules shall be
filed in the office of the clerk of the district court. It shall be accompanied by two
conformed copies thereof. It shall also be accompanied by the fee prescribed by law
unless the petitioner applies for and is given leave to prosecute the petitioner in
forma pauperis ....
(b) FILING AND SERVICE. Upon receipt of the petitioner and filing fee, or an order
granting leave to the petitioner to proceed in forma pauperis, and having ascertained
that the petition appears on its face to comply with rules 2 and 3, the clerk of the
district court shall file the petition and enter it on the docket in his office. The filing
of the petition shall not require the respondent to answer the petition or otherwise
move with respect to it unless so ordered by the court.
Rule 3 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings provides as follows:
(a) PLACE OF FILING; COPIES. A motion under these rules shall be filed in the
office of the clerk of the district court. It shall be accompanied by two conformed
copies thereof.
(b) FILING AND SERVICE. Upon receipt of the motion and having ascertained that
it appears on its face to comply with rules 2 and 3, the clerk of the district court shall
file the motion and enter it on the docket in his office in the criminal action in which
was entered the judgment to which it is directed. He shall thereupon deliver or
serve a copy of the motion together with a notice of its filing on the United States
Attorney of the district in which the judgment under attack was entered. The filing
of the motion shall not require said United States Attorney to answer the motion or
otherwise move with respect to it unless so ordered by the court.
153. See Rule Governing Section 2254 Cases 2(e); Rule Governing Section 2255
Proceedings 2(d).
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an application should not be filed, an application which is returned
under Rule 2 should not count for successive application purposes.
The Seventh Circuit has held that an application dismissed under
Rule 2 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases does not count as a
first application for successive application purposes." In reaching this
decision, the court noted that Rule 2 provides that the court should
return applications which are insufficient, rather than filing them. The
court thus reasoned that a subsequent application is better understood
as an amended application curing the insufficiency in the original
application rather than as a separate, second application."'
The Seventh Circuit reached the proper conclusion. As with
applications dismissed by a district court for failure to pay the filing fee,
an application dismissed under Rule 2 should not be considered to have
been "filed.'01 6 Because the first application should not be considered
filed, it should not count for successive application purposes.
Furthermore, when a court dismisses an application under Rule 2, the
petitioner has not had an opportunity to present the claims in the
petition to the court. Finally, allowing the refiling of a petition returned
pursuant to Rule 2 raises no traditional abuse of the writ concerns. For
these reasons, an application dismissed pursuant to Rule 2 should not
count for successive application purposes.
4. Rule 4 Dismissals
Rule 4 of both the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases and the
Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings authorizes a district court to
summarily dismiss an application prior to ordering a response from the
respondent." A court may dismiss an application under Rule 4 when it
154. See Benton v. Washington, 106 F.3d 162, 164-65 (7th Cir. 1996).
155. See id.
156. Even if a court actually files an application disposed of as insufficient under Rule 2,
the application should not be considered to have been filed because the court erred when it
filed rather than returned the application.
157. Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings provides, in relevant part:
"If it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the
petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge shall make an order for its
summary dismissal and cause the petitioner to be notified." Id.
Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings provides, in relevant part:
INITIAL CONSIDERATION BY JUDGE. If it plainly appears from the face of the
motion and any annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the case that the
movant is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge shall make an order for
its summary dismissal and cause the movant to be notified.
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is plain from the application, any annexed exhibits and, for § 2255
motions, any prior proceedings that the petitioner is not entitled to
relief.' Because a Rule 4 dismissal is simply an immediate ruling on an
application, this dismissed application should count for successive
application purposes to the extent that the application had been
dismissed after the respondent filed a reply and the court conducted a
hearing.
1 59
No circuit court has yet addressed the issue of whether an
application summarily disposed of under Rule 4 should count as a first
application under AEDPA successive application law. Nonetheless, it is
clear that such a dismissal should count as if it were a non-summary
dismissal. Prior to the AEDPA, an application dismissed under Rule 4
could count for abuse of the writ purposes."' Furthermore, in contrast
to a Rule 2 dismissal, a Rule 4 dismissal, even though summary, clearly
is a final ruling on the application. In fact, a Rule 4 dismissal is a ruling
that the application so obviously lacks merit that the proceeding should
not continue. In this light, a Rule 4 dismissal should have the same
effect as a dismissal after the respondent files a reply and the court
conducts a hearing.
5. Dismissals Without an Evidentiary Hearing
Rule 8 of both the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases and the
Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings authorizes a district court to
dispose of an application without holding an evidentiary hearing." A
158. See Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases 4; Rule 4(b) of the Rules
Governing Section 2255 Proceedings.
159. Because the question of whether an application disposed of after the respondent
has filed an answer and the court has conducted a hearing should count for successive
application purposes depends on the basis for the disposition of the application, when a court
disposes of an application pursuant to Rule 4 the question of whether such an application
counts depends on the basis of the disposition as well.
160. See McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994) ("[S]hould a defendant's pro se
petition be summarily dismissed [under Rule 4], any petition subsequently filed by counsel
could be subject to dismissal as an abuse of the writ.").
161. Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Proceedings states:
DETERMINATION BY COURT. If the petition is not dismissed at a previous stage in
the proceeding, the judge, after the answer and the transcript and the record of state
court proceedings are filed, shall, upon a review of those proceedings and of the
expanded record, if any, determine whether an evidentiary hearing is required. If it
appears that an evidentiary hearing is not required, the judge shall make such
disposition of the petition as justice shall require.
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court may dismiss an application under Rule 8 if, based on the record
filed in the proceeding, the court determines that an evidentiary hearing
is not required."2 As with a Rule 4 dismissal, a Rule 8 disposition should
count for purposes of successive application law to the same extent as if
the application were dismissed after a hearing.
No circuit court has yet addressed the issue of whether an
application disposed of without an evidentiary hearing should count as a
first application under AEDPA successive application law. However,
there are a number of reasons for finding that a hearing is not necessary
for the first application to count. As with a Rule 4 dismissal, a Rule 8
disposition generally is a ruling on the substance of the application. In
fact, applications are routinely denied without an evidentiary hearing.
This was so even before the enactment of the AEDPA, when a formal
hearing was not required for an application to have been considered
dismissed on the merits.'6 Thus, a Rule 8 disposition should have the
same effect as if it were a dismissal after an evidentiary hearing.
6. Withdrawn Applications
Although neither the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases nor the
Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings contain a rule governing the
withdrawal of filed applications, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which courts may apply in § 2254 and § 2255 proceedings,'" do contain a
Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings states:
DETERMINATION BY COURT. If the motion has not been dismissed at a previous
stage in the proceeding, the judge, after the answer is filed and any transcripts or
records of prior court actions in the matter are in his possession, shall, upon a review
of those proceedings and of the expanded record, if any, determine whether an
evidentiary hearing is required. If it appears that an evidentiary hearing is not
required, the judge shall make such disposition of the motion as justice dictates.
162- See Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases; Rule 8(a) of the Rules
Governing Section 2255 Proceedings.
163. See, e.g., Whitlock v. Godinez, 51 F.3d 59, 61-63 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 852 (1995); Larson v. United States, 905 F.2d 218, 221 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Leiby, 820 F.2d 70, 73 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. Romano, 516 F.2d 768, 771 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994 (1975).
164. See Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases ("The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, to the extent that they are not inconsistent with these rules, may be applied,
when appropriate, to petitions filed under these rules."); Rule 12 of the Rules Governing
Section 2255 Proceedings ("If no procedure is specifically prescribed by these rules, the
district court may proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules, or any
applicable statute, and may apply the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Federal
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procedure for withdrawing an action. Specifically, Rule 41(a) authorizes
a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss an action either through filing a notice
of dismissal, by stipulation, or by order of the court.' 1 The Rule further
provides that a voluntary dismissal is without prejudice, unless the
document effectuating the dismissal specifies otherwise.'6 Based on the
preclusive effect of a withdrawn application under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, a withdrawn application should not count for successive
application purposes unless the order effectuating the withdrawal
specifies that it is with prejudice.
The Seventh Circuit, the first circuit court to address whether a
withdrawn application counts as a first application for successive
application purposes, has held that an application which is withdrawn
when it is evident that it will be denied on the merits does count.67 The
court reasoned that holding otherwise would allow a petitioner to thwart
the successive application provisions by filing an application,
withdrawing the application when it is clear that the petitioner will not
obtain relief, and then filing a new application at a later date.'6 The
court cited both pre-AEDPA and post-AEDPA law in support of its
conclusion. 69 While the Seventh Circuit subsequently held that an
application was not successive when two prior applications had been
withdrawn,70 in so holding the court noted that the petitioner had not
conceded defeat in either of the two prior withdrawals, such that the
case fell outside of its prior holding.7  The Tenth Circuit also found an
application not successive when a prior application had been withdrawn,
adopting the Seventh Circuit's standard for determining when such a
withdrawn application counts.' 2
The Seventh Circuit's approach to whether a withdrawn application
Rules of Civil Procedure, whichever it deems most appropriate, to motions filed under these
rules.").
165. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) & (2).
166. See id.
167. See Felder v. McVicar, 113 F.3d 696, 698 (7th Cir. 1997).
168. See id
169. See id (citing Hurd v. Mondragon, 851 F.2d 324,329 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that a
district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a motion to withdraw a petition));
Spann v. Martin, 963 F.2d 663, 672-73 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that a district court abused its
discretion when it granted a motion to withdraw a petition without prejudice); Neal v.
Gramley, 99 F.3d 841, 846 (7th Cir. 1996) (denying a motion to defer an appellate decision),
cert denied, 522 U.S. 834 (1997). As demonstrated by the descriptions of the cases cited by
the Seventh Circuit in Felder, they do not exactly support the court's holding in Felder.
170. See Garrett v. United States, 178 F.3d 940, 943 (7th Cir. 1999).
171. See id. at 942-43.
172. See Haro-Arteaga, 199 F.3d 1195,1197 (10th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
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counts for successive application purposes is flawed because it is
inconsistent with the federal rules. As noted, Rule 41(a), the only
federal rule which authorizes a voluntary dismissal of a civil action,
clearly states that such dismissals are without prejudice unless otherwise
specified in the document effectuating the dismissal. A dismissal
without prejudice means that the petitioner is not precluded from filing
a subsequent application just as if the first application had not been
filed." The Seventh Circuit, however, failed to consider Rule 41(a)
when reaching its decision.
Instead of the Seventh Circuit's approach, it is recommended that a
voluntarily withdrawn application does not count for successive
application purposes unless the document effectuating the withdrawal
specifically states that the withdrawal is with prejudice. Under this
approach, the subsequent court would look to the order of dismissal in
the prior action to determine whether the current application is
successive. This approach properly tracts the Rules of Civil Procedure.
In addition, this approach replaces the Seventh Circuit's subjective
standard for determining whether a subsequent application is successive
with an objective standard under which the petitioner will know at the
time that the original application is withdrawn whether or not a
subsequent application will be precluded. As to the Seventh Circuit's
apparent concern that not counting a withdrawn application for
successive application purposes will allow petitioners to abuse the writ
by withdrawing an application if, during the course of the proceeding, it
becomes apparent that the petitioner will not prevail, Rule 41(a) does
not allow a petitioner to withdraw an application when the motion is
made after service or the filing of an answer without a court order.Y
Thus, if the court considering a motion to withdraw decides that the
petitioner is being abusive, the court could rule that the petitioner can
only withdraw the application with prejudice. This would prevent the
petitioner from being able to withdraw the application and then refile a
different application at a later time without the successive application
provisions applying.
This is the first situation considered in which a petitioner has
actually "filed" an application that should not count for successive
173. See infra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
174. See FED. R. CIv. P. 41(a)(2) ("Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this
subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs insistence save upon
order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper .... Unless
otherwise specified, a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice.").
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application purposes. This is significant because it demonstrates that
the standard for determining whether a prior application should count
as a first application for successive application purposes is not simply
whether the petition was properly filed, satisfying Rules 2 and 3 of the
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases and the Rules Governing Section
2255 Proceedings, but rather how the court disposed of the application
after it was filed. Thus, it is essential for a court deciding whether the
prior application counts to consider the court order dismissing the prior
application.
7. Dismissals for Failure to Exhaust State Court Remedies
Both before and after the enactment of the AEDPA, habeas corpus
law generally has required a § 2254 petitioner to exhaust available state
court remedies before bringing a claim in federal court.75 Furthermore,
the Supreme Court in Rose v. Lundy76 held that a district court must
dismiss a petition containing at least one unexhausted claim, but that the
petitioner can either "resubmit [the] petition with only exhausted claims
or exhaust the remainder of their claims" and refile the entire petition.'7
Thus, the Court provided petitioners with two options after a district
court determines that a petition is not completely exhausted.
Seven circuits have held that a petition dismissed without prejudice
for failure to exhaust state court remedies does not count for
determining whether a subsequent application is successive. 8 In
addition, the Supreme Court assumed this without a detailed analysis in
its decision in Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal.9 The Second Circuit was
175. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (prior to the AEDPA, and as amended). The exhaustion
requirement serves the principle of comity, allow'ng state courts to adjudicate and, if
necessary, correct any federal constitutional errors before a federal court will disturb a state
court conviction. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,515 (1982).
176. 455 U.S. 509.
177. Id. at 520.
178. See Carlson v. Pitcher, 137 F.3d 416, 420 (6th Cir. 1998); McWilliams v. Colorado,
121 F.3d 573, 575 (10th Cir. 1997); In re Gasery, 116 F.3d 1051, 1051 (5th Cir. 1997); Christy v.
Horn, 115 F.3d 201, 208 (3d Cir. 1997); Benton v. Washington, 106 F.3d 162, 165 (7th Cir.
1996); In re Turner, 101 F.3d 1323, 1323 (9th Cir. 1996); Dickinson v. Maine, 101 F.3d 791, 791
(1st Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Camarano v. Irvin, 98 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1996); see also
LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 1, § 28.3b, at 1170-71 & n.37.
179. See 523 U.S. 637, 644 (1998) ("[N]one of our cases... have ever suggested that a
prisoner whose habeas petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies, and who
then did exhaust those remedies and returned to federal court, was by such action filing a
successive petition."). The Supreme Court held that a petitioner's current claim was not
successive even though the petitioner has filed three previous petitions that had each been
dismissed for failure to exhaust state court remedies. See id.
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the first circuit to reach this conclusion, and also has provided the most
thorough analysis of the issue. Since all of the other circuits which have
addressed the issue have reached the same conclusion as the Second
Circuit, some simply relying on the Second Circuit's decision without
further analysis,O that court's reasoning will be presented.
In reaching its decision, the Second Circuit initially noted that the
AEDPA eliminated the requirement that a previous claim be decided
"on the merits" for a petitioner to be precluded from raising the same
claim in a subsequent petition. According to the court, this omission
provided some support for finding that a petition dismissed for failure to
exhaust state court remedies counts for purposes of successive
application law."' However, the court declined to adopt this
construction based on three factors: this construction would constitute a
drastic change in habeas law not envisioned by the AEDPA; this
construction is inconsistent with the abuse of the writ doctrine both
prior to the enactment of the AEDPA and as presented in Felker, and
this construction is inconsistent with the doctrine of res judicata.'
First, the Second Circuit reasoned that if the successive petition
requirements were to apply to petitions filed after a first petition had
been dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state court
remedies, rather than being "well within the compass of the revolving
doctrine of abuse of the writ,"'" such a change in habeas law would
constitute an "unjustifiabl[e] deviat[ion]" from the exhaustion doctrine
developed by the Supreme Court."s As noted, the Court in Rose held
that a petitioner may refile a petition dismissed for failure to exhaust all
claims either excluding the unexhausted claims or including all of the
claims after the unexhausted claims have been exhausted.'8 Counting a
dismissed petition as a first petition for successive application purposes
would preclude a petitioner from taking advantage of either option
180. See Dickinson, 101 F.3d at 791 (relying on the reasons stated in Camarano to reach
its decision); In re Turner, 101 F.3d at 1323 (simply citing Camarano without providing any
reasons for reaching its decision).
181. See Camarano, 98 F.3d at 46; see supra note 178 and accompanying text.
182 See Camarano, 98 F.3d at 46.
183. Id. (quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996)).
184. Id.
185. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Zant cited Rose for the
proposition that a petitioner risks abuse of the writ if the petitioner proceeds with exhausted
claims in a first petition and then waits until a second petition to raise unexhausted claims,
implying that the McCleskey Court subscribed to the view that a petitioner does not risk
abuse if he or she follows the options provided for in Rose. 499 U.S. 467, 488-89 (1991).
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allowed by Rose."6
Second, the Second Circuit noted that prior to the enactment of the
AEDPA, a number of circuits have held that a 'second" petition
submitted subsequent to a dismissal without prejudice for failure to
exhaust state court remedies of a "first" petition generally was not
considered to be barred as either a successive or an abusive petition;"s
one of these courts had reached this conclusion by specifically noting
that this result was compelled by Rose.' The Second Circuit further
found that allowing a subsequent petition in such situations does not
raise either finality or comity concerns."
Third, the Second Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's description
of the abuse of the writ doctrine as a "modified res judicata rule" to
support its conclusion."l Under res judicata, a dismissal without
prejudice does not bar a subsequent action raising the same claim."'
186. If a petition dismissed for failure to exhaust counted for successive application
purposes, then a petitioner who exhausted the unexhausted claims after the dismissal would
be completely precluded from raising any of these claims in a subsequent petition. See 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) ("A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application
under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be dismissed."). A
petitioner who filed a petition raising only exhausted claims after a dismissal for failure to
exhaust would face the same result. Only if the petitioner were able to amend the original
petition to include only exhausted claims would this result be avoided, and then the claims
brought after exhaustion, rather than being subject to abuse of the writ standards, would be
completely precluded.
187. See Camarano, 98 F.3d at 46 (citing Woods v. Whitley, 933 F.2d 321, 322 n.1 (5th
Cir. 1991) (disregarding the first petition, which had been dismissed without prejudice, for
abuse of the writ purposes); Hamilton v. Vasquez, 882 F.2d 1469, 1473 (9th Cir. 1989)
(holding that a petition neither presented a successive claim, because the prior petition had
been dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies, nor abused the writ);
Jones v. Estelle, 722 F.2d 159, 168-69 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (stating that, under Lundy,
"dismissal of a mixed petition does not create a hurdle of writ abuse on petitioner's return"),
cert denied, 466 U.S. 976 (1984)); see also Hendricks v. Zenon, 993 F.2d 664, 672 (9th Cir.
1993) (noting that a second habeas petition could not be construed as abusive if it raised the
unexhausted claims brought in the prior petition which had been dismissed without
prejudice).
188. See Jones, 722 F.2d at 168-69.
189. See Camarano, 98 F.3d at 46.
190. Id at 47 (quoting Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996)); see also McCleskey v.
Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 486 (1991) (noting that the former 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) "establishes a
'qualified application of the doctrine of res judicata,'" quoting S. REP. No. 1979, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3664)).
191. See Camarano, 98 F.3d at 47 (citing 9 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 2327, at 398 ("[A] dismissal without
prejudice under subdivision (b) [involuntary dismissal], although a final termination of the
present action, does not bar a second suit." (citations omitted)) and Arnold Graphics Indus.,
Inc. v. Indep. Agent Ctr., Inc., 775 F.2d 38,41 (2d Cir. 1985)).
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Thus, the Second Circuit found that the claim preclusion doctrine
supported the finding that a dismissal without prejudice should not bar a
subsequent petition."
Two additional reasons for finding that a petition dismissed without
prejudice for failure to exhaust state court remedies should not bar a
subsequent petition should also be noted. First, a contrary holding
would raise serious constitutional concerns that the AEDPA successive
application provisions suspend the writ of habeas corpus.', In
particular, precluding a petitioner who brings unexhausted claims in a
first petition which is dismissed for failure to exhaust from raising any of
the claims from the first petition ever again could unconstitutionally
suspend the writ by completely precluding a petitioner from raising
certain claims.' Thus, the AEDPA is best interpreted as not counting a
petition dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state court
remedies for successive application purposes in order to avoid potential
constitutional problems. 95 A second reason for not counting a petition
dismissed because of unexhausted claims is the fact that the AEDPA
addressed the exhaustion doctrine in other provisions," suggesting that
the Act is not intended to modify the practice as established by Rose v.
Lundy.
Finally, it must be noted that the general rule which these seven
circuits have adopted need not be categorical. The Supreme Court in
Rose provides a petitioner who files a petition containing unexhausted
claims with two options: omit the unexhausted claims, or exhaust those
claims and refile the petition. However, a petitioner may pursue a third
option, namely filing a new petition that contains claims not advanced in
the petition that was dismissed without prejudice. Because such a
petitioner has failed to follow either of the two options presented in
192. See id. at 46-47.
193. While, as noted, the Supreme Court in Felker held that § 2244(b) was a
constitutional restriction on the writ, there is no indication in the opinion that the Court
considered whether the restrictions are constitutional as applied to the present context. In
fact, the Supreme Court in Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal recognized that its decision in Felker
was no bar to finding that certain applications are not successive under the AEDPA. See
Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. at 644.
194. See Camarano, 98 F.3d 44, 46 ("To foreclose further habeas review in such cases
would not curb abuses of the writ, but rather would bar federal habeas review altogether.").
195. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
196. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (as amended) (requiring that state court remedies be
exhausted, unless the state expressly waives exhaustion, for a petition to be granted, but
allowing a petition to be denied on the merits even though the petitioner failed to exhaust
state court remedies).
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Rose, at least the new claims could be considered successive."m The
Supreme Court recently resolved this issue in the pre-AEDPA context,
holding that a petitioner can raise any claim in a petition subsequent to
a petition dismissed for failure to exhaust remedies."" Only the Sixth
Circuit has considered this issue in the post-AEDPA context, holding
that a petitioner may raise new claims in a petition filed after the prior
petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust without the new petition
being successive.' 99 In so holding, the court reasoned that since the
AEDPA's goal was to ensure that petitioners were able to file only one
petition, a petitioner could raise any available claim in that one petition
regardless of whether a prior petition had been dismissed for failure to
exhaust.' ° As to the other circuit courts, although under the Second
Circuit's formulation no petition dismissed for lack of exhaustion would
count for successive application purposes, the holdings of some of the
other circuits have been more limited."0 Still, there is no° reason to
doubt that the Supreme Court will not apply its rule in the pre-AEDPA
context to the post-AEDPA context as well.'
8. Dismissals as Procedurally Barred
A district court may deny a claim raised in an application if the claim
is procedurally barred. A court may so deny a claim in the § 2254
context when the claim was procedurally defaulted in state court' and
197. Whether raising claims not raised in an original petition dismissed for failing to
exhaust state court remedies should be considered successive may depend upon whether the
prior dismissal was without prejudice to filing another petition generally, or was limited to
being without prejudice to filing a petition raising the same claims.
198. See Slack v. McDaniel, 120 S. Ct. 1595,1604-06 (2000).
199. See Carlson v. Pitcher, 137 F.3d 416,420 (6th Cir. 1998).
200. See id.
201. Compare Camarano v. Irvin, 98 F.3d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that a petition
dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust does not count); McWilliams v. Colorado,
121 F.3d 573, 575 (10th Cir. 1997) (same) with Dickinson, 101 F.3d at 791 (holding that a
petition was not successive when the petitioner claimed to have exhausted state court
remedies after the prior petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust); In re Turner, 101 F.3d
1323, 1323 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that a petition is not successive when it raises the same
claims that were previously dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust); Benton v.
Washington, 106 F.3d 162, 164 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a claim renewed after exhaustion
is not successive). See also Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 644 (1998) (stating
that no case has held that a petition is successive when a petitioner returns to federal court
after exhausting state court remedies).
202. See Slack, 120 S. Ct. at 1605 ("[W]e do not suggest that the definition of second or
successive would be different under AEDPA.").
203. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
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in the § 2255 context when the claim was not raised on direct appeal.2
In both contexts, a court may only reach the merits of the claim if the
petitioner demonstrates either cause for the default and prejudice or
that a miscarriage of justice will result from the failure to consider the
claim. 5 A court may also deny a claim as barred in the § 2255 context
when the claim was raised on direct appeal, in which case a court
generally may not consider the claim unless there has been an
intervening change in law, or the petitioner relies on newly discovered
evidence.6 In both of these situations, a claim denied as procedurally
barred is not technically decided "on the merits" because the bar
prevents the court from considering the merits of the claim.
Nonetheless, a denial of an application based on a procedural bar
should count as a prior application for successive application law.'
The Second Circuit was the first court to address the issue of
whether an application in which the claims are denied as procedurally
barred counts for determining whether a subsequent application is
successive. The court held that such applications count, based on the
fact that such a disposition counted for successive application purposes
prior to the enactment of the AEDPA, and the AEDPA strengthened
successive application law.' This decision makes sense. In the context
of same-claim applications, a number of circuits had characterized the
denial of a claim on a procedural grounds as a determination "on the
merits." '" Because a procedural default denial is on the merits, the
claim would be successive if the petitioner raises it again. In the context
of new-claim applications, however, at least one circuit has indicated
that a claim found to be procedurally barred has not been decided on
the merits; that court then held that a prior decision on the merits is not
a prerequisite to finding a present petition to be abusive, so that
204. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982).
205. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,494-95 (1991).
206. See Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 342 (1974); LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra
note 1, § 41.7e, at 1610-11.
207. It should be noted a court may deny an application by finding that some claims are
procedurally barred and the other claims are without merit. Presumably, such an application
would count for successive application purposes. Thus, this Article only discusses the
situation in which a court denies all of the claims in the first application as procedurally
barred.
208. See Carter v. United States, 150 F.3d 202,205-06 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
209. See the following cases cited in Carter, 150 F.3d at 205: Hawkins v. Evans, 64 F.3d
543, 546-47 (10th Cir. 1995); Bates v. Whitley, 19 F.3d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam);
Shaw v. Delo, 971 F.2d 181, 184 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 927 (1993); Howard v.
Lewis, 905 F.2d 1318, 1322-23 (9th Cir. 1990).
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procedurally barred claims still trigger abuse of writ analysis." ' This
difference in how courts have treated procedurally barred claims in the
same-claim and new-claim contexts may be based on the fact that, prior
to the AEDPA, the same-claim successive law required that a prior
decision be "on the merits," whereas the new-claim abusive law did not.
Regardless of whether a decision that a claim is procedurally barred
can be characterized as a decision "on the merits," such a decision
should count for successive application purposes. As noted, such
decisions counted under pre-AEDPA law, and it is doubtful that the
AEDPA would make it easier for petitioners to raise a claim in a
successive application. Furthermore, because a petitioner is not
precluded from raising other then-available claims in an application
even if some claims are barred, the petitioner would have the
opportunity to raise those claims at that time, and raising them at a
subsequent time would be abusive.
9. Dismissals as Premature
Generally, a petitioner cannot file a § 2255 motion if her or his direct
appeal is pending or if another post-conviction motion is pending. In
such circumstances, the § 2255 motion is premature and a court should
dismiss it as such.
The Seventh Circuit has held that a § 2255 motion returned because
motions filed pursuant to Rules 32 and 35 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure were pending should not count for successive
application purposes.21' In reaching this decision, the court simply noted
that the petitioner whose prior motion was returned had not yet had his
one full and fair opportunity to collaterally attack his conviction.212 This
decision, which is similar to the situation in which a petition is dismissed
for failure to exhaust state court remedies, is proper; in both situations,
no court addressed the merits of the claims in the original application
because the petitioner filed the application too early. Furthermore, this
rule should apply to any situation in which a prior § 2255 motion was
dismissed as premature.
210. See Macklin v. Singletary, 24 F.3d 1307, 1314 (11th Cir. 1994) ("[I]t is not a
prerequisite to application of the abuse of the writ doctrine that the petitioner has had a prior
petition adjudicated on the merits instead of having it denied or dismissed on procedural
default grounds."), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1160 (1995).
211. See O'Connor v. United States, 133 F.3d 548,550 (7th Cir. 1998).
212. See kL
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10. Dismissals as Untimely
Prior to the enactment of the AEDPA, Rule 9(a) of the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases and the Rules Governing Section 2255
Proceedings authorized district courts to dismiss applications as
untimely.213 The Act, however, established a general one-year period of
limitations on the filing of applications.214 Because dismissals as
untimely were uncommon prior to the enactment of the AEDPA,215
there is little precedent as to whether an application dismissed under
Rule 9(a) makes a subsequent petition successive.216 However, it is
likely that this issue will become more prominent as more applications
are dismissed under the strict period of limitation and as courts
considering any subsequent attempt to file an application face the issue
of whether the application is successive.
To the extent that a dismissal of an application as untimely is
analogous to a dismissal for failure to meet the statute of limitation
under a general civil case,217 such a dismissal should count for successive
application purposes. In the civil context, an action dismissed as barred
by the statute of limitations has preclusive effect.218 Furthermore, a
petitioner would have his or her full opportunity to raise all of the then-
available claims at that time-unfortunately for the petitioner, however,
all such claims would be untimely.
Counting an application dismissed on the period of limitation
grounds as a first application actually might not have any practical affect
on petitioners. Petitioners may only file applications after the one year
period of limitation in three circumstances. Two of these circumstances,
the date on which the Supreme Court has newly recognized a right and
213. See Rule Governing Section 2254 Cases 9(a); Rule Governing Section 2255
Proceedings 9(a).
214. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
215. See Calderon v. United States Dist. Court, 128 F.3d 1283, 186 (9th Cir. 1997)
("Prior to AEDPA's enactment, state prisoners had almost unfettered discretion in deciding
when to file a federal habeas petition."); LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 1, § 24.2, at 922-25
(noting that courts rarely deny applications based on delays of less than 15 years).
216. Given the fact that prior to the AEDPA it was unusual for an application to be
dismissed as time barred, it was even more rare for a court to be faced with a subsequent
application after a prior application was dismissed as time barred.
217. See Millar v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that the period of
limitation is not jurisdictional).
218. See PRC Harris, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 700 F.2d 894, 896 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing FED. R.
Civ. P. 41(b), which provides that only certain enumerated dismissals are not considered
dismissals on the merits, while holding that a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is an
adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata), cert denied, 464 U.S. 936 (1983).
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made it retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review and the
date on which new facts could have been discovered, 19 are both
situations under which the AEDPA explicitly authorizes the filing of a
successive application. The third circumstance, when an
unconstitutional state-created barrier to filing an application is
removed,' might also constitute cause justifying the filing of a
successive application. Thus, in many instances in which the petitioner
is able to file past the initial one year period of limitation, the petitioner
should have grounds to have authorization granted to file a successive
application.
11. First Petition Necessarily Could not Raise all Claims
Finally, there is a narrow but important category of cases in which a
petitioner files a first application properly raising claims brought in a
habeas action, the district court rules on the merits of these claims, but a
subsequent application nonetheless should not be subject to the
AEDPA's successive application restrictions. This category includes
situations when the law itself forces a petitioner to file multiple
applications in order to assert the full range of challenges to a
conviction.
In this context, the Tenth Circuit has held that an application raising
a claim of excessive appellate delay does not count for successive
application purposes." The court reached this conclusion based on the
fact that, by its nature, a properly brought claim of excessive appellate
delay excludes the unexhausted claims challenging the underlying
judgment of conviction. ' Thus, the court found that the decision on the
initial petition was similar to a dismissal for failure to exhaust state court
remedies, which does not count for successive application purposes.'
The Tenth Circuit has also held that a successful § 2255 motion
raising a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to file
an appeal from a criminal conviction does not count for successive
application purposes.24 The court reasoned that, since the success of the
motion simply puts the petitioner in the same position as if the
petitioner had filed a timely notice of appeal, the success of the § 2255
219. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(C) & (D), 2255 para. 6(3) & (4).
220. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(B), 2255 para. 6(2).
221. See Reeves v. Little, 120 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
222. See id.
223. See &L
224. See United States v. Scott, 124 F.3d 1328,1330 (10th Cir. 1997) (per curiarn).
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motion should similarly allow the petitioner to have her or his one
chance to collaterally attack his or her sentence as if the first § 2255
motion had not been filed.' The court also noted that, as in a petition
claiming undue appellate delay, a petitioner is unable to bring certain
substantive challenges to a judgment of conviction in a motion alleging
that the trial counsel failed to file a notice of appeal."6 The Fourth and
Seventh Circuits subsequently adopted the Tenth Circuit's holding.m
The First Circuit, however, has to the contrary, held that a § 2255
motion raising a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure
to file an appeal from a criminal conviction counts for successive
application purposes because the petitioner could have raised other
claims in the first motion.' In this circumstance, the majority view
appears to be the more sound position, as a full appellate opportunity
certainly can shape the nature of the claims raised on collateral review,
such that petitioners should have the full opportunity to litigate a § 2255
motion subsequent to their direct appeal.
Another unique situation is when a petitioner's first application was
successful and resulted in an amended sentence. In this context, the
Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits have all held that the successive
application provisions do not apply to those claims challenging aspects
of the sentence amended.29 Although the Second Circuit did not so
rule, this holding could be extended to allow a petitioner to raise any
claim in a first challenge to an amended judgment of conviction.m The
Fourth and Seventh Circuits, however, have indicated that an
application challenging an amended sentence is successive to the extent
that it raises claims concerning the amended sentence."1
Finally, the Ninth Circuit has held that the AEDPA's successive
application provisions do not apply to an application raising a
competency claim even though a federal court had reached the merits of
a previous application' 2 In reaching this decision, the court first noted
225. See id. at 1329.
226. See id. at 1329-30.
227. See In re Goddard, 170 F.3d 435, 437-38 (4th Cir. 1999); Shepeck v. United States,
150 F.3d 800, 801 (7th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
228. See Pratt v. United States, 129 F.3d 54, 62-63 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S.
1123 (1998); see also In re Goddard, 170 F.3d at 438-41 (Wilkins, J., dissenting).
229. See In re Taylor, 171 F.3d 185, 187 (4th Cir. 1999); Walker v. Roth, 133 F.3d 454,
455 (7th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); Esposito v. United States, 135 F.3d 111, 113-14 (2d Cir.
1997); Galtieri v. United States, 128 F.3d 33, 37-38 (2d Cir. 1997).
230. See LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 1, § 28.3b, at 918.
231. See Walker, 133 F.3d at 455 n.1; In re Taylor, 171 F.3d at 187-88 & n.*.
232. See Martinez-Villareal v. Stewart, 118 F.3d 628 (9th Cir. 1997), affd, 523 U.S. 637
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that since the nature of competency claim is such that it cannot be raised
in an initial application challenging a conviction, a petitioner who wishes
to both attack her or his conviction and raise a competency claim must
file two applications.z3 Rather than reading the AEDPA to prohibit
petitioners from pursuing both claims, the court held that a petitioner
may raise the full range of claims by not subjecting an application raising
a competency claim to the successive application provisions.' The
Ninth Circuit's decision was subsequently affirmed by a decision of the
Supreme Court, which, as noted above, was the Court's first
acknowledgment that the AEDPA's second and successive provisions
cannot be read iteraly.25
All of these above situations demonstrate that the AEDPA's
successive application restrictions must be read flexibly. Such flexibility
allows equitable considerations in successive application law prior to the
enactment of the AEDPA to reemerge in post-AEDPA law.z  This is
accomplished when courts use equitable principles in determining
whether an application actually is successive within the meaning of the
Act.
C. Circuit Court Standard of Review
A final issue in determining whether an application is successive, and
one not yet addressed by any circuit, is under what standard a circuit
court should review a district court decision regarding whether an
application is or is not successive. Prior to the AEDPA, there was some
disagreement as to whether a circuit court would review a district court
determination that an application was abusive for an abuse of discretion
or de novo.' 7 The AEDPA, however, appears to make the issue of
(1998).
233. See Stewart, 118 F.3d at 633-34.
234. See id. But cf id. at 635 (Nelson, J., specially concurring) (stating that the
successive application provisions preclude the petitioner from raising the competency claim,
but that the provisions suspend the writ in such circumstances).
235. See Stewart, 523 U.S. at 642; supra Part I.C (discussing the Court's decision in
Stewart).
236. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,490 (1991).
237. Compare Macklin v. Singletary, 24 F.3d 1307, 1313 (11th Cir. 1994) (reviewing
abuse of the writ decisions de novo), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1160 (1995) with Campbell v.
Blodgett, 997 F.2d 512,516 (9th Cir. 1992) (reviewing abuse of the writ decisions for an abuse
of discretion), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1215 (1994) and Williams v. Groose, 979 F.2d 1335, 1337
(8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (same). This discrepancy may be due to circuit courts reviewing
a district court's decision that an application is subject to dismissal for abuse of the writ de
novo, whereas they review a district court's decision to dismiss an application that is subject
to dismissal for an abuse of discretion. Cf Macklin, 24 F.3d at 1312-13 (discussing the
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whether an application is successive to be one of law reviewed de
novo. 2
III. AUTHORIZATION PROCEDURAL ISSUES
The AEDPA dramatically and fundamentally changed the manner
in which the federal judiciary adjudicates successive § 2254 petitions and
§ 2255 motions by requiring that a circuit court play a role in this
adjudication before a district court considers an application. This
requirement reverses the traditional relationship between district courts
and circuit courts under which a circuit court only considers most issues
after a district court first considers the issue. The radicalness of this role
reversal should not be underestimated.239 Furthermore, because this
relationship is novel and untested, unanticipated procedural problems
with this structure have already and will continue to arise.
One major reason that the AEDPA's authorization procedures are
producing procedural difficulties is that the Act only requires circuit
court authorization for a limited class of applications. As extensively
discussed in Part II, when a petitioner seeks to file an application, often
times it is by no means obvious whether the application is non-
successive, and not requiring circuit court authorization, or successive
and requiring such authorization. While some courts must determine
this threshold question of whether the application is successive and
requiring authorization, whether authorization is required determines
which court a petitioner should go to in the first instance. This makes
successive application procedures especially complicated.
This Part explores a full range of procedural issues that have arisen
under the AEDPA's successive application authorization requirements.
This Part first addresses to what extent the successive application
provisions of § 2255 incorporate the successive applications procedures
which apply to § 2254 petitions. This Part then explores four related
issues: how a district court should dispose of unauthorized successive
applications, whether respondents bear the burden of pleading that an
application is successive, whether proper authorization is a jurisdictional
requirement, and whether a respondent may consent to authorization.
This Part then explores the Act's mandate that circuit courts adjudicate
standard of review of a district court's dismissal for abuse of the writ).
23& See Graham v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 762,772 (5th Cir. 1999).
239. See Allen Ellis et al., It's not too Late Part II: Filing Second and Successive 2255
Motions under the New Habeas Corpus Reform Law, CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb. 1997 at 16-17
(stating that the AEDPA "creates a truly unique and bizarre procedure").
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authorization motions within thirty days of their filing. Next, this Part
addresses the issue of whether a circuit court may grant authorization
only as to certain claims in an application or if instead it must grant
authorization for an entire application. This Part then explores the issue
of in which court a petitioner should file an application if it is unclear
whether the application is successive. Finally, this Part explores the
scope of review of the denial of an authorization motion that a
petitioner may obtain in the circuit court which denied authorization, in
the Supreme Court, and in the appropriate district court.
A. To What Extent Does § 2255 Incorporate the § 2254 Provisions?
Before discussing the various procedural issues that the AEDPA's
authorization provisions have produced, the question of to what extent §
2255 incorporates the provisions governing successive § 2254 petitions
must be addressed. This is an issue because the Act, rather than
including the authorization procedures that apply to successive § 2255
motions in its amendments to § 2255, instead amended § 2255 to refer to
the successive § 2254 petition procedures without specifically stating
which procedures are incorporated.
The procedures for granting authorization to file successive § 2254
petitions are found at the amended § 2244(b)(3), which contains five
subsections providing as follows: subsection (A) requires a petitioner to
move in a circuit court for an authorization order before filing a
successive application; subsection (B) provides that a three-judge circuit
court panel will decide the motion for an authorization order; subsection
(C) provides that a circuit court may only grant authorization if the
application makes a prima facie showing that is satisfies the successive
application requirements; subsection (D) imposes on circuit courts a
thirty-day time limit on adjudicating an authorization motion; and
subsection (E) restricts review of an authorization motion decision.
Rather than mirror the authorization procedures governing § 2254
petitions, § 2255 as amended provides that "[a] second or successive
motion must be certified as provided in section 2244 by a panel of the
appropriate court of appeals to contain" either "newly discovered
evidence" or "a new rule of constitutional law."2  In addition to what
may be a relatively minor inconsistency of using the term "certify" while
§ 2244 uses the term "authorize," this provision fails to specify exactly
which provisions of § 2244 are incorporated into § 2255.
240. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 para. 8.
2000]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Surprisingly, circuits courts generally have not considered the issue
of to what extent § 2255 incorporates the successive authorization
provisions in § 2244.1 The Second Circuit is one exception: it has held
that § 2255 incorporates subsections (D) and (E).242 In reaching this
holding, the court reasoned that because § 2255 did not specify which
subsections in § 2244 it incorporated, it could be assumed that Congress
intended for § 2255 to incorporate all of the subsections governing
successive application authorization.24'3 Aside from the Second Circuit,
the other circuits have not addressed to what extent § 2255 incorporates
the procedures governing successive § 2254 application authorization
motions. This silence is indicative of circuit court failure to appreciate
the difference between the successive application provisions governing §
2254 petitions and § 2255 motions.
Despite the Second Circuit's decision that § 2255 incorporates all of
the procedural subsections of § 2244, it is questionable whether § 2255
incorporates more than subsections (A), (B), and (D) of § 2244(b)(3).
Subsection (A), which requires a petitioner to move for authorization
prior to filing a successive application, appears to be redundant of the
requirement in § 2255 that a successive motion be certified by a panel of
the appropriate circuit court. Thus, it is of little consequence whether §
2255 incorporates this subsection. Subsection (B) merely specifies that a
three-judge circuit court panel must rule on an authorization motion.
Because this procedure is not specified in § 2255 and is an authorization
procedure, it is reasonable to find that § 2255 incorporates this
subsection.'"
The question of whether § 2255 incorporates subsection (C) of §
2244(b)(3) is especially problematic. Section 2255 requires that a circuit
241. Cf United States v. Villa-Gonzalez, 208 F.3d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir. 2000) (per
curiam) (stating that § 2255 incorporates the procedures in § 2244, without further
discussion); LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 1, § 41.7d, at 395 (1997 Supp.) ("[Section 2255, as
amended] appears to adopt the same procedure for section 2255 cases as applies to successive
state-prisoner habeas corpus petitions.").
242. See Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 367 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Galtieri v.
United States, 128 F.3d 33,36 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that § 2255 incorporates subsection (D)
of § 2244); Liriano v. United States, 95 F.3d 119, 121 n.1 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that, as the
standard for certification in subsection (C) is not included in § 2255, § 2255 apparently
incorporates this subsection).
243. See Triestman, 124 F.3d at 367. As the incorporation of other subsections was not
at issue in the case, the Second Circuit's specific holding was limited to finding that § 2255
incorporated subsections (D) and (E).
244. It should be noted that it would have been much easier for the AEDPA simply to
have included the words "three-judge" in its amendment to § 2255 itself rather than through
having § 2255 incorporate § 2244(b)(3)(B).
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court certify that a successive motion "contain" newly discovered
evidence or a new rule of constitutional law. Subsection (C), by
contrast, requires that a successive application make a "prima facie
showing" that it satisfies the substantive successive application standards
in order for a circuit court to grant authorization. These provisions
appear to be in conflict!" If the prima facie showing requirement
elaborates on the requirement in § 2255 that a successive § 2255 motion
"contain" new evidence or a new rule of constitutional law, then § 2255
may incorporate subsection (C). However, if the prima facie
requirement is more stringent than the "contain" requirement, then §
2255 should not incorporate this subsection because § 2255 has its own
substantive standard for granting authorization.!
Subsection (D) of § 2244(b)(3), which imposes a thirty-day time limit
on deciding authorization motions, is not in § 2255 and does not conflict
with the express requirements of § 2255. Thus, it appears that § 2255
incorporates this subsection. Finally, subsection (E) restricts review
after a circuit court has made an authorization decision. Because this
subsection governs post-authorization procedures, it appears to fall
outside the purview of § 2255's mandate that successive § 2255 motions
be "certified as provided in section 2244," and thus might not be
incorporated by § 2255. These considerations implicate complex
questions of statutory construction which will not be fully explored here;
instead, it can simply be noted that these issues deserve a more rigorous
circuit court analysis.
B. How Should District Courts Dispose of Unauthorized Successive
Applications?
Perhaps the first procedural issue which courts faced after the
enactment of the AEDPA was how district courts should dispose of
successive applications filed in district court without proper circuit court
authorization. While the AEDPA's successive application provisions
applied to applications filed immediately after its enactment,24 7
245. The Seventh Circuit, however, has "conclude[d] that the difference in wording is
immaterial." Bennett v. United States, 119 F.3d 468, 469 (7th Cir. 1997). As with other
provisions of the AEDPA that are poorly drafted, it is unclear whether the statute
intentionally uses two different terms.
246. See infra note 366.
247. Because the Supreme Court did not decide until June 23, 1997 that the non-death
penalty provisions of the AEDPA do not apply to applications pending at the time of the
Act's enactment, see Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), some courts additionally applied
the successive application authorization provisions to applications pending at the time of the
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petitioners continued to file successive applications in the district courts
without first seeking the required circuit court authorization. This was
not surprising, since petitioners, especially those proceeding pro se,
could hardly have been expected to be immediately familiar with the
AEDPA's authorization procedures.'s Thus, after the AEDPA was
enacted district courts continued to receive successive applications even
though the applications lacked authorization.
Unfortunately, courts which confronted the issue of what to do with
an unauthorized successive application often sua sponte disposed of the
applications while overlooking two issues which should have been
addressed first. The first preliminary issue is whether respondents bear
the initial burden of asserting that an application is successive. The
second is whether proper circuit court authorization is a jurisdictional
prerequisite for district court consideration of a successive application.
Only after these two issues are resolved should the question of how
district courts should dispose of unauthorized successive applications be
considered. This Article, however, discusses this last question first
because courts considered this issue first. The two following sections
will then discuss the pleading and jurisdictional issues.
The Second Circuit was the first circuit court to address the issue of
how a district court should dispose of a successive application filed
without proper authorization. In Liriano v. United States,249 the court
held that when a petitioner files a successive application in a district
court without authorization, the district court should transfer the
application to the appropriate circuit court. The court held that such a
transfer could be effectuated under the statutory authority of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1631, which authorizes courts to transfer civil actions and appeals in
order to cure a lack of jurisdiction when such a transfer is in the interests
of justice."1 The Second Circuit further held that after an application is
AEDPA's enactment. By contrast, other courts have held that at least some aspects of the
successive application provisions do not apply when the prior application was filed prior to
the enactment of the AEDPA when this would have an adverse consequence. See cases
discussed supra notes Part L.A-F.
248. See Liriano v. United States, 95 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1996) ("The filing [in district
court] will almost invariably reflect ignorance concerning the new procedural requirements of
§ 2244(b)(3), rather than an effort to circumvent those requirements.").
249. Id.
250. See id at 123.
251. See idt The complete text of § 1631 is as follows:
Transfer to cure want of jurisdiction. Whenever a civil action is fied in a court as
defined in section 610 of this title or an appeal, including a petition for review of
[Vol. 84:43
SUCCESSIVE HABEAS CORPUS PETITIONS
transferred to the circuit court, the circuit court should notify the
petitioner that he or she must file an authorization motion in the circuit
court within forty-five days of the notice 52 The court continued by
holding that, for purposes of the one-year limitation period, the filing
date of the application would be the date that it was initially filed in
district court as provided for by § 1631.2" In a later decision, the Second
Circuit held that district courts cannot circumvent the AEDPA's
gatekeeping provision by adjudicating, on the merits, unauthorized
successive applications.24
The few other circuits which have addressed the issue of how a
district court should dispose of an unauthorized successive application
have either followed the Second Circuit's approach or adopted
alternatives. The Sixth and Tenth Circuits fall into the former category,
holding that district courts should transfer unauthorized successive
applications to the appropriate circuit court, and that such applications
are deemed filed on the date that the petitioner originally filed in district
court.5 The Tenth Circuit further adopted the Second Circuit's
procedure of notifying petitioners, whose applications have been
administrative action, is noticed for or filed with such a court and that court finds
that there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interests of justice,
transfer such action or appeal to any other such court in which the action or appeal
could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed, and the action or appeal
shall proceed as if it had been filed or transferred on the date upon which it was
actually filed or noticed for the court from which it is transferred.
28 U.S.C. § 1631 (1994).
252. See Liriano, 95 F.3d at 123. The Second Circuit noted that, if the petitioner did not
file an authorization motion within 45 days of the notice informing the petitioner of the need
to file an authorization motion, then the court would enter an order denying authorization.
Id. The court also noted that such an order would not preclude the petitioner from filing a
subsequent authorization motion; however, if the petitioner did file a subsequent motion, he
or she could not take advantage of the earlier district court filing date for limitation period
purposes. Id. at 123 n.2. While stating that a petitioner who does not file an authorization
motion within the 45 day deadline could file another authorization motion, the Second Circuit
did not address the possibility that a petitioner may be barred from raising certain claims in a
subsequent authorization motion because the claims could have been raised previously,
namely within the 45 days provided to the petitioner to file the initial authorization motion.
See infra Part I.C.I.e & 2.a. If this is the case, then a petitioner's failure to file an
authorization motion within 45 days would have the same effect as if the court denied
authorization. See infra Part III.I.l.c (discussing the standards governing successive
authorization motions). However, a court could style an order denying authorization for
failure to file the authorization motion to be without prejudice to renewal to avoid this result.
253. See Liriano, 95 F.3d at 123 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1631).
254. See Corrao v. United States, 152 F.3d 188,191 (2d Cir. 1998).
255. See In re Sims, 111 F.3d 45, 47 (6th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); Coleman v. United
States, 106 F.3d 339, 341 (10th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
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transferred to the circuit court, that they need to file an authorization
motion with the court in order for the court to consider granting
authorization.' The Seventh Circuit, by contrast, has treated a
petitioner's notice of appeal from the denial of an unauthorized
successive application as a motion for authorization filed in the circuit
court.m The court reasoned that this procedure was an efficient way to
deal with unauthorized successive applications.m The Seventh Circuit
also declined to allow the petitioner to file additional papers to support
his authorization motion because the court could reach a decision based
on the papers already filed. 9 The First Circuit has indicated that district
courts can either dismiss or transfer unauthorized successive
applications.w
Although the procedures adopted by the various circuits may at first
seem like effective solutions to the problem of unauthorized successive
applications, they are theoretically problematic and have practical
shortcomings. This section first addresses the procedure followed by the
Second, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits, and then that of the Seventh Circuit.
The procedure of transferring an unauthorized successive
application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631 is a misapplication of § 1631. A
successive application filed in district court without authorization has
been filed in the correct court; the problem with such an application is
not that it should have been filed in a different court, but rather that it
was filed without authorization. Furthermore, when a district court
transfers an unauthorized application to a circuit court, the circuit court
does not even render a decision on the application. Instead, the circuit
court requires the petitioner to file an authorization motion and then
256. See Coleman, 106 F.3d at 341.
257. See Nunez v. United States, 96 F.3d 990, 991-92 (7th Cir. 1996). The Tenth Circuit
has also treated petitioners' notice of appeal from the denial of an unauthorized successive
application as a motion for authorization filed in the circuit court. See Lopez v. Douglas, 141
F.3d 974, 976 (10th Cir. 1998) (per curiam); United States v. Gallegos, 142 F.3d 1211, 1212
(10th Cir. 1998) (per curiam); Pease v. Klinger, 115 F.3d 763, 764 (10th Cir. 1997) (per
curiam). However, it appears that the Tenth Circuit's general rule is that established in
Coleman, namely that district courts should transfer unauthorized successive applications.
258. See Nunez, 96 F.3d at 991 ("Treating an appeal in these circumstances as a request
for authorization will speed cases to decision with a minimum of paperwork....").
259. See id. at 991-92. The Seventh Circuit left open the possibility that, if it were
unclear whether authorization should be granted based on the papers that the petitioner has
already filed, then the petitioner would be given an opportunity to present further material.
See id. at 992.
260. See Pratt v. United States, 129 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1123
(1998); see also United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 34, 41 n.1 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that
transferring "may be preferable [to dismissal] in some situations").
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rules on the authorization motion, if filed. Under this procedure, if the
circuit court denies an authorization motion filed after the transfer, no
court ever makes a ruling on the application filed in the district court,
which essentially disappears. 2
From a more practical perspective, the procedure of transferring
unauthorized successive applications may prevent circuit courts from
reviewing district court determinations that an application is successive.
In particular, when the circuit court receives a transferred application, it
simply requires the petitioner to file an authorization motion without
providing the petitioner with an opportunity to raise the argument that
the district court erred in finding that the application is successive in the
first place. Furthermore, when no authorization motion is filed after an
application is transferred it is unlikely that the circuit court will
independently review whether the application is really successive before
denying authorization.26
Another practical problem that may occur if a district court transfers
an unauthorized successive application to a circuit court is that a
petitioner may raise claims in the subsequent authorization motion filed
in the circuit court that he or she did not raise in the original application
filed in the district court' m Such circumstances may put a circuit court
in a dilemma as to which claims it should consider when deciding
whether to grant authorization: only those in the authorization motion,
only those in the original application, or all of the claims. Technically,
the only claims before the court are those presented in the authorization
motion. However, a petitioner should only be able to take advantage of
the earlier filing date for claims raised initially in the district court.
Thus, it may be that a circuit court should only consider those claims in
the authorization motion, and only use the earlier filing date for claims
261. Similarly, if a petitioner were to file a successive application, rather than an
authorization motion, directly in the circuit court, it would be appropriate for the circuit court
to transfer it to the district court. See FED. R. APP. P. 22(a) ("If [a § 2254 and, possibly, a §
2255 application is] made to a circuit judge, the application must be transferred to the
appropriate district court."); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241(b) ("[A]ny circuit judge may decline to
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus and may transfer the application for
hearing and determination to the district court having jurisdiction to entertain it.").
262. It does not appear that a petitioner would be able to appeal an order transferring
an application pursuant to § 1631. See, e.g., Ukiah Adventist Hosp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n,
981 F.2d 543, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that a § 1631 transfer order was not appealable,
and citing other circuits), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 825 (1993); see also 15A CHARLES A.
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.MILLER, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 3914.12, at 724-
25.
263. A pro se prisoner who does not understand the authorization procedures is most
likely to raise new claims in an authorization motion.
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originally filed in the district court.
Treating a notice of appeal from the denial of an unauthorized
successive application as an authorization motion is an even more
troublesome procedure. This procedure does have the advantage of
preventing a petitioner from raising additional claims in his or her
authorization motion by simply treating the claims raised in the original
application as those that the petitioner raises in the authorization
motion. However, this procedure unfairly disadvantages petitioners by
failing to provide them with an opportunity to support their
authorization motions. Establishing a prima facie showing that one is
entitled to relief in an authorization motion requires substantially more
documentation than is required to file an application in the district
court. Without providing a petitioner with notice and an opportunity to
file supporting documents, a circuit court essentially deprives a
petitioner of the ability to present a proper authorization motion.
Admittedly, circuit courts could allow a petitioner an opportunity to
present material if it is unclear whether authorization should be
granted. '  However, the problem of challenging a district court's
determination that an application is successive remains as the circuit
court may not rule on whether the district court erred in denying the
application for lack of authorization, an issue which ordinarily would be
up for review in the appeal.
Instead of requiring district courts to transfer unauthorized
successive applications or treating notices of appeal from the denial of
unauthorized successive applications as requests for authorization, the
following recommended alternative appears to be more sound. A
district court should dismiss an unauthorized successive application
without prejudice to renewal upon the petitioner's obtaining proper
authorization.y The court should further provide the petitioner with
any documents necessary to file an authorization motion in the circuit
court, or give the appropriate circuit court notice of the petitioner's
application so that the circuit court can forward the proper papers to the
petitioner. Under this procedure, a petitioner could file an
authorization motion in the appropriate circuit court and, if
authorization is granted, renew the originally filed application in the
264. See supra note 259.
265. Cf. Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 1998) (Kleinfeld, J.,
concurring) (stating that the district court properly dismissed an unauthorized successive
application and that the circuit court should have simply affirmed the dismissal rather than
consider the appeal as an authorization motion).
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district court. Furthermore, if the petitioner does renew the originally
filed application, the application should be considered to have been filed
on the date that it was initially filed so as to preserve the earlier filing
date for period of limitations purposes.
Although this alternative procedure is not perfect, it best follows the
structure established by the AEDPA. One advantage of this procedure
is that it allows a petitioner to challenge a district court decision that an
application is successive. Specifically, a petitioner whose application is
dismissed without prejudice could simply appeal the district court
dismissal to the circuit court and argue that the district court erred
because the application is not successive. Another advantage of this
procedure is that it avoids the anomalous situation of an application
being transferred to a circuit court but then never actually ruled on.
One disadvantage of this procedure is that it is potentially more time
consuming and more burdensome on petitioners because it requires the
filing of an authorization motion in a circuit court and then if
authorization is granted, renewal of the application back in district
court. However, this is precisely the structure established by the
AEDPA, and procedural convenience should not be followed when
improper.
C. Must the Respondent Plead that an Application is Successive?
When a petitioner files an application in district court which may be
successive, the first procedural question that the court should resolve is
whether it can sua sponte inquire into whether the application is
successive, or if instead the respondent bears the burden of pleading
that the application is successive. If the court can sua sponte inquire into
whether an application is successive and its inquiry reveals that the
application is successive, then the court can immediately act on the
application without allowing the proceeding to continue. However, if
the court cannot raise this issue sua sponte, then even if the application
is clearly successive the court must direct the respondent to reply to the
application, assuming that the application should not be disposed of for
other reasons pursuant to either Rule 2 or Rule 4 of the Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases or the Rules Governing Section 2255
Proceedings. After the respondent has filed a reply, the court would
then consider whether the application is successive only if the
respondent has so pled in its reply.
Prior to the enactment of the AEDPA, it was clear that the defense
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of abuse of the writ was an affirmative defense which could be waived.2
In fact, the Supreme Court had held that the burden generally was on
the respondent to plead abuse of the writ, including documenting the
petitioner's prior application or applications. 7 In addition, although the
Supreme Court had not reached this issue, it appears that it was the
respondent's burden to plead that an application was successive as
well.26 In this respect, abuse of the writ was similar to other affirmative
defenses in habeas corpus law, such as exhaustion and procedural
default, that place purely procedural restrictions on petitioners and that
can be waived in certain circumstances. 269  Nonetheless, although the
Supreme Court had clearly stated that respondents bear the burden of
pleading abuse of the writ, a number of circuit courts had held under
pre-AEDPA law that a district court may raise this defense sua sponte
so long as the court provides the petitioner with notice and an
opportunity to be heard prior to ruling on the defense.'O No circuit court
266. See, e.g., Burris v. Farley, 51 F.3d 655,658 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing McCleskey v. Zant,
499 U.S. 467,477 (1991)).
267. See McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 494 ("[T]he government bears the burden of pleading
abuse of the writ. The government satisfies this burden if, with clarity and particularity, it
notes petitioner's prior writ history, identifies the claims that appear for the first time, and
alleges that petitioner has abused the writ."). The rule that a respondent must plead abuse of
the writ originates in Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948). See also Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1963). In Price, the Supreme Court adopted the pleading rule
because requiring pro se prisoners to plead cause for not raising a claim earlier would be an
imposition, and the government is in the best position to raise this defense. 334 U.S. at 291-
93. This pleading rule also ensures that the court deciding whether a petitioner abused the
writ has a proper record before it when making the decision.
268. See LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 1, § 28.4b, at 1206-07.
269. See Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 164-66 (1996) (holding that procedural
default is an affirmative defense which is waived if not raised by the state); Granberry v.
Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 135 (1987) (holding that, if the state fails to raise a nonexhaustion
defense in the district court, then the court of appeals may consider the defense waived in
order to avoid unnecessary delay in granting relief that is plainly warranted due to a
miscarriage of justice). While the Supreme Court has held that circuit courts may sua sponte
raise the exhaustion defense, see iaL, 481 U.S. at 133-34, it has specifically declined to decide
whether circuit courts may raise the procedural default defense sua sponte, see Trest v. Cain,
522 U.S. 87, 90 (1997).
270. See LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 1, § 28.3c, at 1175-76 & nn.57-58 (citing cases).
The Second Circuit has held that not only may a district court raise the abuse of the writ
defense sua sponte, but additionally that a district court may sua sponte dismiss an application
for abuse of the writ without prior notice if it is clear that the petitioner cannot demonstrate
actual prejudice. See Femia v. United States, 47 F.3d 519, 523 (2d Cir. 1995). While the
Second Circuit's ruling conflicts with the decisions of other circuits, the court's ruling is
consistent with its decisions in general civil cases that a district court may sua sponte dismiss a
complaint as frivolous based on an affirmative defense even if the defense may be waived.
See Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995). Liebman and Hertz, by contrast, have
suggested that the Supreme Court's decision in McCleskey implies that a district court may
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has yet reevaluated whether, after the enactment of the AEDPA,
respondents continue to bear the burden of pleading that an application
is successive. However, it is recommended that respondents continue to
have the burden of pleading with particularity that an application is
successive. The Supreme Court clearly established this rule in
McCleskey, and nothing in the AEDPA explicitly changes it. While the
Act does establish special procedures for successive applications, it does
not address how a court is to determine whether an application is
successive in the first place.
A strong argument can be made that the structure of the AEDPA,
by establishing a new procedure for filing successive applications and
stating that authorization must be granted before a successive
application may be filed,' makes the issue of whether an application is
successive one for the courts to decide regardless of whether it is pled.
Specifically, if a successive application cannot be filed without
authorization, then it is for the district court to decide when a petitioner
attempts to file an application whether it is successive and thus requires
authorization. This is particularly the case if authorization is
jurisdictional, as courts can raise jurisdictional considerations sua sponte.
However, as under pre-AEDPA law, requiring the respondent to plead
abuse facilitates the development of a proper record on which a district
court can base its decision as to whether an application is successive. If
the respondent does successfully so plead, then the district court can
dispose of the successive application as discussed above. However, if
the respondent does not so plead or so pleads incorrectly, then the
application will proceed in district court.
D. Is Authorization Jurisdictional?
Another related consideration that should be addressed before
deciding how district courts should handle unauthorized successive
applications is whether circuit court authorization is a jurisdiction
requirement or only a statutory prerequisite for filing a successive
application. How this issue is resolved has important implications both
for the procedures, which a district court should follow to dispose of
not raise abuse of the writ sua sponte at all. See LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 1, § 28.3c, at
1173.
271. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) ("Before a second or successive application
permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the
appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the
application."); 28 U.S.C. § 2255 para. 8 ("A second or successive motion must be certified as
provided in section 2244 ... ").
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unauthorized successive applications, and for the issue of whether
proper authorization may be waived.
A number of circuits have indicated that authorization is
jurisdictional, finding that district courts lack jurisdiction to adjudicate
unauthorized successive applications.'m Furthermore, those circuit
courts that direct district courts to transfer successive applications filed
in the district court without authorization pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631
imply that authorization is jurisdictional, because the transfer is to cure
jurisdiction.'27 While an argument certainly can be made that proper
authorization, like a host of other procedural defenses to applications,
should not be jurisdictional and should be waivable by respondents, the
AEDPA itself uses the phrase "an order authorizing the district court to
consider the application."'274 This language describes the authorization
order as a document without which the district court is unable to
consider an application, indicating the authorization is jurisdictional.
Still, this issue certainly warrants more circuit court attention.
E. Can a Respondent Consent to Authorization?
As noted above, before the AEDPA was enacted, abuse of the writ
was as an affirmative defense which a respondent could waive either by
failing to plead abuse or through an explicit waiver.2 5 The AEDPA,
however, provides that a circuit court must authorize a successive
application before it is filed in the district court. Despite this
requirement, it may be that a respondent can consent to authorization
when a petitioner files an authorization motion in circuit court.
The Eighth Circuit, the only circuit court to have addressed this issue
276
so far, has held that a respondent cannot consent to authorization.
272. See Pease v. Klinger, 115 F.3d 763, 764 (10th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (holding that
the district court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate an unauthorized successive application);
Nunez v. United States, 96 F.3d 990, 991 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that a district court must
dismiss a successive application lacking proper authorization, as the AEDPA allocated
subject matter jurisdiction to the court of appeal for commencing a successive application);
see also Pratt v. United States, 129 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 1997) ("AEDPA's prior approval
provision allocates subject-matter jurisdiction to the court of appeals by stripping the district
court of jurisdiction over a second or successive habeas petition unless and until the court of
appeals has decreed that it may go forward."), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1123 (1998).
273. See supra Part III.B. However, even if proper authorization is a jurisdictional
requirement, the transfer of an application lacking proper authorization itself does not cure
the lack of jurisdiction. Only if the circuit court grants authorization would the jurisdictional
defect, namely the lack of authorization, be cured.
274. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).
275. See supra Part IV.C.
276. See Oxford v. Bowersox, 86 F.3d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. dismissed, 518 U.S.
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The court reasoned that the AEDPA fully defined under what
circumstances it has authority to grant authorization such that it cannot
grant authorization if the petitioner fails to meet the Act's explicit
standards. ' The Eighth Circuit's ruling appears to be correct.
Initially, even if proper authorization is a jurisdictional prerequisite
to the filing of a successive application in district court, and thus the
authorization requirement cannot be waived,s it may be that a
respondent can consent to authorization being granting when a
petitioner fies an authorization motion in a circuit court. This is so
because the question of whether a district court has jurisdiction to
entertain a successive application without proper authorization is
distinct from the question of whether a respondent may consent to a
circuit court granting authorization in the first place. With this in mind,
the actual barrier to a respondent consenting to a grant of authorization
is the language of the AEDPA itself. The Act clearly places a burden
on a petitioner to make a prima facie showing to the circuit court before
authorization can be granted.' 9 Pursuant to this provision, the Act has
written out any role for the respondent in the authorization decision.
Thus, a respondent should not be able to consent to authorization.
F. The Thirty-Day Decision Requirement
The AEDPA mandates that circuit courts rule on an authorization
motion within thirty days of the filing of the motion.' However, at least
in the non-death penalty sections of the Act,"s the Act does not
establish any consequence if a court fails to rule by this deadline.m
1031 (1996). But cf. id. (Heaney, J., dissenting) ("In light of the government's position [that
authorization should be granted], I would grant Oxford leave to file his petition in the district
court.").
277. See id.
278. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 26 (1989) and cases cited therein,
overruled on other grounds, Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
279. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C).
280. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3)(D) ("The court of appeals shall grant or deny the
authorization to file a second or successive application not later than 30 days after the filing of
the motion."), 2255 para. 8 (possibly incorporating § 2244(b)(3)(D) by reference; see supra
Part I.A).
281. The special death penalty sections of the AEDPA provide that states may file a writ
of mandamus in the circuit court to enforce the time limits on district court decisions, and
may file a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court to enforce the circuit court time limits.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2266(b)(4)(B), (c)(4)(B).
282. See In re Siggers, 132 F.3d 333, 336 (6th Cir. 1997) ("Congress has failed to specify a
consequence for noncompliance with the thirty-day time limit imposed by 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(3)(D).").
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Without such consequences, a number of circuit courts have established
procedures which can avoid this requirement.
Three circuit courts have established procedures which allow them
to extend the time to rule on an authorization motion beyond the thirty-
day deadline. The Second Circuit has held that the thirty days begins to
run only when "all papers required for a reasoned decision" have been
filed with the court,2m guaranteeing that the court will have the
necessary records when it rules on an authorization motion. The court
further held that it can rule after these thirty-days when the court will
publish an opinion "that cannot reasonably be prepared within 30
days," '  providing itself with further time to draft opinions when
necessary. The Sixth Circuit has adopted a court policy under which the
thirty days begins to run only when a staff attorney memorandum and
proposed order have been submitted to the motions panel that will rule
on the authorization motion.' This policy effectively provides the Sixth
Circuit with an indefinite amount of time to rule on any authorization
motion. In a subsequent decision, the Sixth Circuit stated that the
thirty-day time limit is "hortatory or advisory,' ' 2 an interpretation
which completely negates any legal effects of the time limit. The First
Circuit adopted this latter decision.
These decisions and policies which extend the thirty-day deadline
appear to contravene the explicit requirements of the AEDPA. In
addition, a circuit court may also avoid the thirty day deadline by
denying an authorization motion and then sua sponte granting a
rehearing to reconsider the denial of the motion.m However, as noted, a
circuit court faces no special consequence for using these alternative
procedures. Without any consequences, circuit courts can effectively
bypass the thirty-day requirement.
G. Should Circuit Courts Authorize Specific Claims or an Entire
Application?
When a petitioner seeks authorization to file a successive
application, he or she may attempt to obtain authorization for more
283. Galtieri v. United States, 128 F.3d 33,37 (2d Cir. 1997).
284. Id.
285. See In re Sims, 111 F.3d 45,48 n.1 (6th Cir. 1997).
286. Siggers, 132 F.3d at 336.
287. See Rodriguez v. Superintendent, 139 F.3d 270, 272-73 (1st Cir. 1998); see also
United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 34,42 n.2 (1st Cir. 1999).
288. The circuit court authority to sua sponte grant a rehearing is discussed below. See
infra Part III.I.1.a.
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than one claim. The AEDPA, however, does not specify whether a
circuit court authorization should only apply to specific claims in an
application or to the entire application. Even though it makes sense for
circuit courts to limit authorization to only those claims which satisfy the
authorization standard, because the language of the AEDPA does not
limit authorization to specific claims, when authorization is granted, it
should be for the entire petition.
The Ninth Circuit, the only circuit to have addressed this issue, has
held that a circuit court's grant of authorization entitles a petitioner to
file in the district court the entire application submitted for
authorization.' In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the
AEDPA only refers to a court's authority to grant or deny "an
application. 2"o By contrast, the Act establishes rules governing specific
claims in an application in two places, namely in its provisions governing
a district court's disposition of an authorized successive application and
establishing the new certificate of appealability requirement.2 1 The
court further noted that courts will often grant authorization without
explanation, 29 which indicates that the court may have considered a
requirement that it consider each claim in an authorization motion
individually to be too burdensome a procedure.
Although the Ninth Circuit's holding appears to correctly interpret
the AEDPA, the implicit policy reasons which the court relied on are
unpersuasive. When a circuit court adjudicates an authorization motion,
the court ordinarily must consider whether each claim satisfies the
authorization standard. To the extent that it may be unclear as to which
claims merit authorization, the court could grant authorization only to
those claims that might meet the standard and deny authorization for
the other claims. However, the Ninth Circuit correctly held that the
language of the AEDPA indicates that authorization should be granted
for the whole application when authorization should be granted for at
least one claim.
In the § 2255 context, allowing petitioners to file a § 2255 motion
raising all of the claims presented in a successful authorization motion
289. See Nevius v. McDaniel, 104 F.3d 1120, 1121 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Woratzeck v.
Stewart, 118 F.3d 648,650 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Nevius, 104 F.3d at 1121).
290. Nevius, 104 F.3d at 1121 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)).
291. See id. ("A district court shall dismiss any claim presented in a second or successive
application.. .. ")(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (emphasis added); see id. ("A certificate of
appealability.., shall indicate which specific issue or issues satisfying the showing .... )
(quoting § 2253(c)(3) (emphasis added)).
292. See i at 1121-22.
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may allow some petitioners to bypass the AEDPA's successive
application substantive restrictions. As discussed below, although the
AEDPA establishes a strict standard for granting authorization to file a
successive § 2255 motion, it does not explicitly place any restrictions on
how a court should adjudicate an authorized successive § 2255 motion
itself. In other words, the AEDPA has not changed how a district
court should adjudicate a successive § 2255 motion after the motion has
been authorized. Because of this omission, a petitioner may be able to
include in an authorization motion a claim otherwise barred by the
AEDPA's successive application provisions with a claim for which
authorization may be granted, obtain authorization for the entire
motion based on the latter claim, and then raise both claims in the
district court without the AEDPA's restrictions applying to either claim
in that proceeding. Using this procedure, a petitioner may be able to
bypass certain AEDPA restrictions.
H. Where Should a Petitioner File?
One practical question that a petitioner must confront is where he or
she should file if it is unclear whether his or her application is
successive.' This problem becomes more severe in light of the one year
period of limitations, as filing an application in the wrong court could
delay filing in the proper court until after the limitations period has
expired.
In those circuits that follow the procedure of having district courts
transfer second or successive applications to the appropriate circuit
court and count the filing in the district court as the filing date, it would
be most prudent for a petitioner to file his or her application in the
district court. If the district court determines that the application is
successive, then the court would transfer it to the circuit court for
consideration. This would allow immediate circuit court review of the
293. See infra Part IV.E.2.
294. The Seventh Circuit has questioned the effectiveness of the division of authority
between district and circuit courts based on the uncertainties in some situations of whether an
application is actually successive:
A prudent legislature may wish to consider, therefore, whether the statutory division
of authority between tribunals is appropriate. Assessing the wisdom of § 2244(b) as
it stands is not our function, but copies of this opinion will be sent to the appropriate
officials in Congress so that the legislature is made aware of the potential for
duplication and delay.
Benton v. Washington, 106 F.3d 162, 165 (7th Cir. 1996).
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issue, with an application wrongly transferred as a matter of law being
transferred back to the district court. Filing just in the circuit court is
not advisable because, if the circuit court denies the authorization
motion as unnecessary because the application is not successive, then
the petitioner will have to file in the district court and will presumably
be unable to take advantage of an earlier filing date. Of course, a
petitioner could file both in the district court and the circuit court. This
would be the most prudent course in those circuits which do not toll the
period of limitation if a petitioner initially files in the wrong court.
I. Challenges to a Denial of an Authorization Motion
Even though the AEDPA's requirement that a petitioner obtain
circuit court authorization in order to file a successive application in
district court generally makes an authorization order essential for a
petitioner to obtain any relief through a successive application, the
AEDPA severely restricts how a petitioner may challenge an adverse
authorization decision. In particular, the AEDPA provides that an
authorization decision is not appealable, subject to a petition for
rehearing, or subject to a petition for a writ of certiorari. 95 Thus,
generally, a petitioner seeking to obtain authorization has only one
opportunity to present her or his case to a court, namely when initially
seeking authorization before the appropriate circuit court. However,
while Congress may have intended to preclude any court review of an
authorization decision, certain limited avenues of review remain
available. In fact, the Supreme Court, the circuit court which
adjudicates an authorization motion, and the appropriate district court
may all to some extent review an initial circuit court authorization
decision. This section explores the scope of review available in each of
these courts.
Before discussing the procedures available for reviewing a circuit
court authorization decision, it should be noted that although the
AEDPA restricts the review of both the denials of authorization and the
grants of authorization,' the restrictions on challenges to the grants of
authorization motions are essentially meaningless, at least in the § 2254
295. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3)(E) ("The grant or denial of an authorization motion by
a court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not be appealable and shall
not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari."), 2255 para. 8
(possibly incorporating § 2244(b)(3)(E) by reference; see supra Part IILA).
296. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E).
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context. While the denial of an authorization motion generally
concludes a petitioner's attempt to file a successive application, a grant
of authorization merely allows the petitioner to file an application
without controlling how the district court will adjudicate the
application.298  In other words, when a petitioner files an authorized
successive application, it does not matter whether the circuit court
erroneously grants authorization because that consideration has no
effect on the district court's decision as to whether the petitioner is
entitled to relief. Although a circuit court has determined that a
petitioner has made a prima facie showing of being entitled to relief, a
respondent need not challenge this determination because the
respondent can simply argue in the district court in response to the
application that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.' Thus, the
AEDPA's restrictions on reviewing an authorization motion decision in
practice are only relevant to a denial of an authorization motion.
1. Review in the Circuit Court
a. Sua Sponte Rehearings
As noted, the AEDPA prohibits an authorization decision from
being "the subject of a petition for rehearing."' Litigants ordinarily
may petition the panel that reached an adverse decision for rehearing on
the grounds that the panel overlooked or misapprehended certain law or
facts ' O The AEDPA clearly precludes these petitions. However, a
297. In the § 2255 context, a district court may have broader authority to grant relief on
a successive motion than a circuit court has to grant authorization. See infra Part IV.E.2. If
this is the case, then allowing a district court to review a circuit court grant of authorization to
file a successive § 2255 motion could limit the court's broader authority in those
circumstances in which a circuit court should not have granted authorization. In other words,
it appears that the AEDPA allows petitioners to obtain relief in some cases in which a circuit
court granted authorization in error.
298. Circuit courts have acknowledged that the grant of an authorization motion is not
an adjudication on the underlying merits of the application by noting this when granting
authorization. See, e.g., Nevius v. Sumner, 105 F.3d 453, 462 (9th Cir. 1996) (granting
authorization "[w]ithout intimating any view concerning the merits of [the] claim").
299. While a respondent may wish to have the option to immediately challenge a grant
of authorization either in the circuit court that rendered the decision or the Supreme Court,
the unavailability of this option does not prevent the respondent from arguing that a
petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.
300. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E); see 28 U.S.C. § 2255 para. 8 (possibly incorporating §
2244(b)(3)(E) by reference; see supra Part III.A); see, e.g., Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d
1045, 1065 (9th Cir. 1997) (Hall, J., dissenting), rev'd in part, 521 U.S. 1140 (1997); United
States v. Lorentsen, 106 F.3d 278,279 (9th Cir. 1997).
301. See FED. R. APP. P. 40(a).
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circuit court panel may also sua sponte order a rehearing, and this
authority was not affected by the AEDPA.
The Second Circuit in Triestman v. United States' held that a circuit
court may sua sponte order a rehearing despite the AEDPA's
restrictions on petitions for rehearing.' In reaching this decision, the
court first noted that it was well-established that circuit courts have the
authority to sua sponte order a rehearing.' The court then reasoned
that, by its plain language, the provision of the Act prohibiting a
rehearing only applies when a party seeks the rehearing because the
provision prohibits "petitions" for rehearing, rather than rehearings
generally. 5 Thus, the Second Circuit held that the Act did not affect its
authority to sua sponte order a rehearing.'3
The Second Circuit's decision is certainly sound. As the court noted,
the AEDPA does not contain a blanket prohibition on rehearings, but
instead only prohibits petitions for rehearing.' Furthermore, on a more
practical level, the Second Circuit's holding does not compromise the
Act's purpose of restricting the review of authorization decisions. When
a panel of a circuit court denies a petitioner's authorization motion, the
petitioner still may not request that the panel rehear the case and thus
may not himself or herself challenge the denial of authorization through
a rehearing. Only the panel which denied authorization can order a
rehearing.
One consequence of the ability of a circuit court to sua sponte grant
a rehearing is that the court may use this procedure to extend the thirty-
day deadline for reaching a decision on an authorization motion.' This
can ensure that circuit courts are able to orderly reach decisions on
authorization motions. A circuit court which grants a rehearing can give
itself much needed time to seek responses from the parties, obtain the
necessary records, and fully consider the issue of whether authorization
should be granted. These benefits are well illustrated by the Triestman
302. 124 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 1997).
303. Id at 367.
304. See iL The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure do not specifically authorize a
sua sponte rehearing. See FED. R. APP. P. 40.
305. See Triestman, 124 F.3d at 367.
306. See id.
307. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E). When it drafted the AEDPA, Congress might not
have realized that circuit courts have authority to sua sponte order a rehearing because this
authority is not found in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. However, as with other
provisions of the AEDPA, when the Act does not explicitly restrict the available relief, courts
should not read these restrictions into the statute.
308. See supra Part III.F.
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case, which involved a complicated and novel issue arising out of the
AEDPA's restrictions on successive applications.' The Triestman
panel denied the authorization motion within the thirty-day limit, but
then sua sponte granted a rehearing to further consider the merits of the
motion so that it could reach a more reasoned decision.
b. Rehearings En Banc
In addition to rehearings by the circuit court panel that previously
decided a case, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure also authorize
a circuit court to rehear a case en ban.310 A circuit court may order a
rehearing en banc either sua sponte or at the suggestion of a party.31" '
Despite its clear availability, the provision of the AEDPA limiting the
review of authorization decisions does not mention rehearings en
ban.312 It may be that Congress intended to foreclose this avenue of
relief through its general prohibition on petitions for rehearing.
However, because the Act does not specifically prohibit rehearings en
banc, this procedure should still be available, both at the suggestion of a
party and sua sponte"'
The Sixth and Ninth Circuits are the only circuits so far to have
touched on the issue of whether the AEDPA prohibits rehearings en
banc. The Ninth Circuit adjudicated this issue first when, in an
addendum to a decision denying an authorization motion, the court
dismissed as unauthorized a petitioner's suggestion for rehearing en
banc.s ' As support for this action, the court simply quoted the
AEDPA's provision restricting review of authorization decisions
without analyzing the issue."1 5 Subsequently, the Sixth Circuit also held
that the AEDPA prohibits rehearings en banc, reasoning that a
rehearing en banc simply is a type of rehearing, and that such rehearings
are prohibited by the AEDPA's prohibition on appealing circuit court
rulings on authorization motions. 16
309. See infra Part IV.C.l.a.i (discussing whether a petitioner may obtain authorization
to file a successive § 2255 motion which asserts a claim based on Bailey v. United States, 516
U.S. 137 (1995)).
310. See FED. R. APP. P. 35.
311. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a) & (b).
312. See LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 1, § 28.3d, at 1194-95 & n.119.
313. See id. (suggesting that the AEDPA does not preclude rehearings en banc).
314. See United States v. Lorentsen, 106 F.3d 278,279 (9th Cir. 1997).
315. See id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E)).
316. See In re King, 190 F.3d 479, 481 (6th Cir. 1999). The Sixth Circuit also specifically
rejected the reasoning from the Liebman and Hertz treatise suggesting that the AEDPA does
not preclude rehearings in banc. See id.
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Contrary to the Sixth and Ninth Circuits' rulings, a petitioner should
still be able to file a suggestion for rehearing en banc despite the
AEDPA's restrictions. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
establish two methods for a losing party to challenge a circuit court
decision within the circuit, namely by filing either a "petition for panel
rehearing" ' or a "suggestion" of a rehearing en banc.118 As noted by
the Second Circuit, however, the Act only prohibits petitions for
rehearing.319 Because the AEDPA only applies to petitions, by its plain
language it does not preclude a "suggestion" for rehearing en banc. In
addition, the Act does not specify that it applies to rehearings en banc at
all.
The AEDPA's restrictions on review also should not preclude a
circuit court from sua sponte ordering a rehearing en banc for two
reasons which have been previously discussed. The Ninth Circuit has so
held, relying on the Second Circuit's decision that the AEDPA did not
preclude a three judge panel from sua sponte ordering a rehearing.' °
This ruling makes sense. First, the restrictions do not preclude the court
from acting sua sponte. Second, as just noted, the restrictions simply do
not state that they apply to rehearings en banc.
As with allowing a court to sua sponte order a rehearing, allowing a
suggestion for a rehearing en banc also does not undermine the
effectiveness of the AEDPA's restrictions on review of authorization
decisions. In contrast to a petition for rehearing, a circuit court need not
take any action after a petitioner files a suggestion for rehearing en
banc.' Thus, allowing petitioners to make such suggestions would not
unduly burden a circuit court. Furthermore, the ability of a circuit court
to order a rehearing en banc is essential for sound circuit procedures. A
rehearing en banc generally is the only method for the full circuit court
to reconsider a panel decision rather than be bound by the decision.'
317. FED. R. APp. P. 40.
318. FED. R. APp. P. 35.
319. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E).
320. See Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Triestman v.
United States, 124 F.3d 361, 367 (2d Cir. 1997)).
321. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(b) ("[A] vote need not be taken to determine whether the
cause shall be heard or reheard in bane unless a judge in regular active service or a judge who
was a member of the panel that rendered a decision sought to be reheard requests a vote on
such a suggestion made by a party.").
322. Most circuit courts have established the rule that a panel generally is bound by a
prior panel's decision. See United States v. Seals, 130 F.3d 451, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cerL
denied, 524 U.S. 928 (1998); United States v. Call, 129 F.3d 1402, 1404 n.2 (10th Cir. 1997),
cerL denied, 524 U.S. 906 (1998); Okoro v. INS, 125 F.3d 920, 925 (5th Cir. 1997); Cargill v.
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Without the ability to order a rehearing en banc, the full circuit court
will never have the opportunity to consider an issue that its members
disagree over, opening up the possibility of creating unresolvable intra-
circuit splits.
c. Successive Authorization Motions
While the AEDPA substantially limits successive applications, it
does not address how circuit courts should adjudicate successive motions
for authorization to file a successive application. Although, in the
context of same claims, the successive application provisions prohibit
claims "presented in a prior application,"' 2' the Act is completely silent
as to whether a successive authorization motion should be treated any
differently from a first authorization motion. It is recommended that
successive authorization motions not be subject to any stricter standards
than first motions, given the AEDPA's silence on the issue and, as will
be demonstrated, the likelihood that placing restrictions on successive
authorization motions would not substantially curtail the ability of a
petitioner to obtain authorization based on a successive authorization
motion.
The Seventh Circuit, the only circuit court so far to address how a
circuit court should treat a successive authorization motion, has held
that a claim raised in a prior authorization motion should be treated as if
it had been presented in a prior application, even if the petitioner never
actually raised the claim in a prior application filed in district court.24 In
reaching this decision, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that this was
not the literal or natural reading of the AEDPA, but reasoned that a
literal reading could not be the correct one because it would result in
those who had been granted authorization based on the prior
authorization motion being worse off than those who previously had
Turpin, 120 F.3d 1366, 1386 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1101 (1998); Indus.
Turnaround Corp. v. NLRB, 115 F.3d 248,254 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Gay, 967 F.2d
322, 327 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 506 U.S. 929 (1992); Wright v. United States Parole Comm'n,
948 F.2d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1009 (1992); United States v. Ianniello,
808 F.2d 184, 190 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987); United States v. Babich,
785 F.2d 415, 417 n.2 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 833 (1986); Timmreck v. United
States, 577 F.2d 372, 377 n.15 (6th Cir. 1978), revd on other grounds, 441 U.S. 780 (1979); cf
Nat'l Cycle, Inc. v. Savoy Reinsurance Co., 938 F.2d 61, 64 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing a court rule
which states that one panel may not overrule another panel except if the panel has circulated
the decision to the full court).
323. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)-(2) (emphasis added).
324. See Bennett v. United States, 119 F.3d 470,471 (7th Cir. 1997).
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been denied authorization.m In particular, those who had been granted
authorization and thus were able to present their claims in an
application filed in the district court would not be able to seek
authorization to raise the same claim again, whereas those who were
denied authorization and thus were unable to present their claims in an
application could raise the claim again. The Seventh Circuit therefore
held that when a circuit court denial of an authorization motion is "on
the merits," rather than for reasons unrelated to the merits of the
authorization motion,6 the claims in that motion have been "presented
in a prior application." m
The Seventh Circuit's decision that a claim raised in a prior
authorization motion should be treated as if it had been presented in a
prior application should not be followed. The most obvious reason for
disagreeing with this decision is that the court read into the AEDPA a
restriction on raising claims in a successive application which clearly is
not in the statute. A petitioner who merely has sought in an
authorization motion to raise a claim in a successive application simply
has not "presented" the claim in an application.3 8 As discussed in the
introduction, restrictions on relief which are not explicit should not be
read into the AEDPA to the detriment of the petitioner.'f
In addition, the literal reading of this provision is not so absurd as to
reject it. Although the Seventh Circuit found that the literal reading of
the AEDPA could not be right, the way in which the court read the Act
may have only a minimally different affect than the reading which it
rejected. In particular, these provisions readily can be interpreted to
require that the law or fact must have been unavailable at the time of
the prior authorization motion.' Under this interpretation, the only
325. See id
326. The Seventh Circuit provided three examples of circumstances in which the denial
of an authorization motion is unrelated to the merits of the motion: failure to pay the filing
fee, failure to exhaust state court remedies, and failure to submit all of the required
documents. See id at 471. However, at least the first two examples might never occur in the
authorization motion context: courts have held that petitioners need not pay a filing fee to
move for authorization, see, e.g., Liriano v. United States, 95 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1997), and
the question of whether a petitioner has exhausted state court remedies might not be at issue
for purposes of deciding whether authorization should be granted, see infra Part IV.D.
327. Bennett, 119 F.3d at 471.
328. A different case may be presented when a petitioner initially files a successive
application in a district court and the court transfers the application to a circuit court. It is
arguable in such a situation that the petitioner "presented" the claims in the application to the
district court.
329. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
330. Interpreting the requirement that the law or fact was previously unavailable to
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practical difference between these two readings may be in their
application to claims raised in a prior authorization motion in the § 2254
context. In this situation, the Seventh Circuit's approach would
completely preclude the claim, while the rejected interpretation would
only substantially limit these claims to situations in which there was an
intervening change in law or new facts were discovered. As to other
claims, in the § 2254 context for new claims, for a claim to be authorized
it must be based on either a new rule of law which "was previously
unavailable" or a factual predicate that could not have been previously
discovered. 31 Similarly, in the § 2255 context, all claims must be based
on a new rule of constitutional law or newly discovered evidence to be
authorized.3n For these claims, both the Seventh Circuit's reading and
the reading that it rejected require either new law or newly discovered
evidence.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit failed to address the fact that the
successive § 2255 motion authorization provisions of the AEDPA do
not, on their face, place a blanket prohibition on successive same claims.
In the § 2255 context, whether a claim was previously presented is
irrelevant to determining whether to grant authorization. Because the
Seventh Circuit was considering a motion for authorization to file a
successive § 2255 motion, the court incorrectly read the law.
2. Review by the Supreme Court
The AEDPA precludes review of an authorization decision through
a petition for a writ of certiorari, 3 the ordinary method by which
litigants seek Supreme Court review of circuit court decisions.3 As
noted in the introduction, the Supreme Court upheld this restriction
against a constitutional challenge in Felker v. Turpin.33 In so doing, the
Court held that the AEDPA's revocation of its certiorari jurisdiction did
not violate Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution because the Court
could still review the circuit court authorization decisions through a
habeas petition filed directly in the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
mean that the law or fact was unavailable at the time of the prior authorization motion is not
a necessary reading of the AEDPA. However, this reading does allow the denial of an
authorization motion to have some preclusive effect.
331. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B)(i).
332. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 para. 8.
333. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3)(E), 2255 para. 8 (possibly incorporating §
2244(b)(3)(E) by reference; see supra Part III.A).
334. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254.
335. 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
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§ 2241.3
While the Supreme Court has established that review of
authorization decisions is available in the Court, this review is extremely
limited. Without deciding whether the AEDPA's substantive
restrictions on successive applications apply to petitions filed directly in
the Supreme Court, the Court in Felker noted that these restrictions
"certainly inform our consideration of original habeas petitions."'3
Thus, the AEDPA's restrictions circumscribe the review available in the
Supreme Court. Furthermore, the Court noted that under its own rules
established prior to the AEDPA, a petitioner must demonstrate
"exceptional circumstances" in order for the Court to grant an original
writ.' Thus, a petitioner whose authorization motion was denied by a
circuit court may get relief in the Supreme Court only in limited and
exceptional circumstances. Even with such restrictions, filing an original
writ with the Supreme Court remains open as a method for seeking
relief once a circuit court has denied authorization.
A petitioner can obtain Supreme Court review of a circuit court
denial of authorization through certiorari if the circuit court erroneously
found that the application is successive. In Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal,
the Supreme Court held that it could review, through the certiorari
process, a circuit court decision that authorization is not required.339 The
Court indicated that it reached this decision because the restriction on
certiorari review only applies to actual successive applications.' This
holding presents the problem of the Supreme Court not knowing
whether it has authority to review a circuit court decision through the
certiorari process until the Court first determines, through an
examination of the substance of the circuit court decision, whether the
application at issue actually is successive.
3. Review by the District Court
A petitioner may also seek review of an authorization decision by
filing an application directly in the district court without authorization.
A petitioner may use this procedure to challenge a circuit court decision
336. See i at 661-62.
337. Id at 663.
338. Id. at 664-65. Supreme Court Rule 20.4(a) states, in relevant part: "To justify the
granting of a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner must show that exceptional circumstances
warrant the exercise of the Court's discretionary powers and must show that adequate relief
cannot be obtained in any other form or from any other court. This writ is rarely granted."
339. See 523 U.S. 637,640-44 (1998).
340. See id.
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that an application is actually successive?" When a petitioner files an
application without authorization, the district court must make a
decision at that time whether the application is successive. If the court
determines that the application is not successive, then the petitioner
does need authorization to file it and the application will proceed.
Unfortunately for the petitioner, if a district court does find that an
application is not successive, this decision is reviewable by the circuit
court which denied authorization if either party takes an appeal after
the district court's ultimate adjudication of the application.M2
In addition, to the extent that a respondent bears the burden of
pleading that an application is successive," a petitioner may try to file
an unauthorized successive application in the district court with the
hope that the respondent will fail to plead that the application is
successive. However, if the respondent does so plead and the
application is truly successive, then the district court will be unable to
review the authorization decision as the AEDPA clearly states that a
petitioner must first receive authorization to file a successive
application. Furthermore, if the district court can sua sponte raise the
issue of whether an application is successive, then any unauthorized
successive application will be unsuccessful, and the circuit court denial
of authorization will be unreviewed.
IV. STANDARDS FOR GRANTING AUTHORIZATION
After having discussed the issues of whether an action is a successive
application and what procedures govern adjudicating motions for
authorization to file a successive application, this Part explores the
standards governing a circuit court's decision on whether to grant or
deny an authorization motion. In doing so, this Part first explores the
requirement that a petitioner make, in his or her authorization motion, a
prima facie showing that the successive application proposed to be filed
in district court satisfies the requirements for obtaining relief in order
for the circuit court to authorize the application. Next, this Part briefly
describes the substantive restrictions on granting authorization as to
both same claims and new claims, compares these restrictions to those
341. A challenge to a decision that an application is successive is not technically a
challenge to the authorization decision. Instead, this is a challenge to the circuit court
decision that authorization is necessary for the application to be filed.
342. Any initial decision by a circuit court denying authorization ordinarily would not be
the law of the case concerning the issue of whether the proposed application is actually
successive because the denial would not be a ruling on the application itself.
343. See supra Part III.C.
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under pre-AEDPA law, and highlights some of the issues raised by
these restrictions. This Part then discusses whether a circuit court may
or must consider certain defenses not mentioned in the AEDPA's
substantive successive application restrictions when adjudicating a
motion for authorization to file a successive application. Finally, this
Part explores what restrictions the AEDPA's successive application
provisions place on authorized successive applications adjudicated in the
district court.
A. What Is A Prima Facie Showing?
The AEDPA provides that a circuit court may only grant a motion
for authorization to file a successive application if it finds that "the
application makes a prima facie showing that the application satisfies
the requirements of this subsection [section 2244(b)]."' However, as
with the term "second or successive application," the AEDPA does not
define the term "prima facie showing." " Thus, as with other issues, the
Act has left the courts with the task of resolving what exactly a
petitioner must demonstrate to make a prima facie showing.
The Seventh Circuit has held that the prima facie showing is "a
sufficient showing of possible merit to warrant a fuller exploration by
the district court" and that a petitioner has made such a showing when
"it appears reasonably likely that the application satisfies the stringent"
successive application requirements.3" The court specifically noted that
it reached this conclusion "without guidance in the statutory language or
history or case law."347 The First and Ninth Circuits have followed the
Seventh Circuit's standard.m Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit's
standard, like the statutory standard itself, is not very informative. In
this light, this Article will consider whether the prima facie showing
standard should be stringent or minimal.
There are a number of considerations that weigh in favor of
requiring that a petitioner make only a minimal showing in order to
make a prima facie showing. The first is the finality of the authorization
344. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3)(C), 2255 para. 8 (possibly incorporating § 2244(b)(3)(C) by
reference; see supra Part H.A). To the extent that § 2255 does not incorporate this provision,
an application presumably need only cite the new rule of constitutional law or newly
discovered evidence to obtain authorization.
345. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C); LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 1, § 28.3d, at 1193.
346. Bennett v. United States, 119 F.3d 468,469-70 (7th Cir. 1997).
347. Id at 469.
348. See Rodriguez v. Bay State Corr. Ctr., 139 F.3d 270, 273 (1st Cir. 1998); Woratzeck
v. Stewart, 118 F.3d 648,650 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
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decision. As discussed above, although there are some avenues
available for a petitioner to challenge the denial of an authorization
motion, these avenues are extremely circumscribed.' 49 Thus, in the
ordinary case a circuit court denial of an authorization motion will
terminate a petitioner's attempt to file a successive application. Because
the authorization decision has such finality, a court should not deny an
authorization motion unless it is clear that the petitioner will be unable
to obtain relief if allowed to file the successive application in the district
court.
The second consideration weighing in favor of a minimal showing is
the time constraints which the AEDPA places on circuit courts
adjudicating authorization motions. As noted, the Act generally
requires that circuit courts render a decision on an authorization motion
within thirty days of the filing of the motion.' 5 This is a very short time
for a circuit court to obtain a record of the prior proceedings, familiarize
itself with the record, seek a response from the respondent, and render
an informed decision on the motion. Given this abbreviated time frame,
a circuit court may be unable to probe deeply into the merits of the
authorization motion. While some circuit courts may use certain
procedures to avoid deciding authorization motions within the requisite
thirty days,"' this time limit imposes significant constraints on those
circuit courts which adhere to it.
The third consideration weighing in favor of a minimal showing is
that traditionally district courts are the courts of first impression,
whereas circuit courts are the courts of review within the federal
judiciary. With the proper procedures and experience, district courts
are better equipped than circuit courts to resolve any disputed issues
that may be relevant to the successive application. By contrast, circuit
courts are less familiar with the role of deciding cases in the first
instance. In addition, any substantial scrutiny into the merits of a
successive application by a circuit court could render any subsequent
district court proceeding if authorization is granted essentially
superfluous.
Given these considerations, it is better for circuit courts to not hold
petitioners to too high of a standard when adjudicating authorization
motions. 5 In this respect, it is important to emphasize that the grant of
349. See supra Part III.I.
350. See supra Part III.F.
351. See supra notes 283-288 and accompanying text.
352 Cf. LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 1, § 28.3d, at 1193-94 (suggesting that the prima
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an authorization motion does not entitle a petitioner to any relief.
Instead, it simply allows the petitioner to file the successive application
in the district court, which must then independently review the merits of
the application to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to relief.53
Furthermore, if a district court does grant a petitioner relief after
authorization is granted, then the circuit court that authorized the
successive application will almost certainly be able to review the
decision on appeal in a much more considered fashion.
B. Substantive Standards Governing Same Claims
Prior to the enactment of the AEDPA, a petitioner could not raise a
claim in either a successive § 2254 petition or a successive § 2255 motion
that the petitioner had raised in a prior petition or motion unless raising
the claim served "the ends of justice. ''3  Although the Supreme Court
had not settled on the scope of the ends of justice exception, the Court
had decided that this exception at least allowed a petitioner to raise a
colorable claim of factual innocence. 5  The AEDPA, however,
completely eliminated this ends of justice exception in the § 2254
context. This section briefly discusses same claims in the § 2254 context
and the issue of whether the AEDPA eliminated this exception in the §
2255 context.
1. Section 2254 Petitions
In the § 2254 context, the AEDPA completely bars a petitioner from
raising a claim that he or she raised in a prior petition.356 This blanket
prohibition eliminated the previous authority of courts to entertain a
same claim when it served the ends of justice.3 Although this change
raises constitutional concerns that this Article will not address, two
facie showing is a showing that "there is some reasonable likelihood that the petitioner...
will thereafter be able to satisfy the new successive petition standard").
353. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1), (2), (4); Bennett, 119 F.3d at 470. However, to the
extent that district courts are not constrained by the AEDPA's successive application
provisions when adjudicating an authorized successive § 2255 motion, stricter circuit court
review may be warranted.
354. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15 (1963).
355. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) (plurality); see generally
LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 1, § 28.4f, at 1213-22 (discussing Kuhlmann and its progeny).
356. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) ("A claim presented in a second or successive habeas
corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application shall be
dismissed").
357. Cf. In re Siggers, 132 F.3d 333, 338 (6th Cir. 1997) (declining to decide whether the
AEDPA eliminated the ends of justice standard).
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circuit courts have upheld this provision against various constitutional
challenges. 8 Other circuits have simply applied this provision without
discussing its constitutionality 9
To the extent that the prohibition on same claims is constitutional, it
has a relatively straightforward application. Once a court determines
that a petitioner has previously raised a claim, then the court cannot
grant authorization based on the claim. This leaves only the initial
consideration of whether the claim actually is the same claim as one that
was previously raised. Under the law prior to the AEDPA, the
question of whether a claim was a different claim was governed by the
"substantial similarity" test. 1 Given its established meaning prior to the
enactment of the AEDPA, it is recommended that the same claim
language in the AEDPA be interpreted in accordance with its prior
usage.'
2. Section 2255 Motions
Unlike the AEDPA's provisions governing successive § 2254
petitions, its provision governing successive § 2255 motions does not
distinguish between same claims and new claims in its standard for
whether a circuit court may grant authorization.3 Instead, the § 2255
provision generally applies whether or not the motion contains claims
358. See In re West, 119 F.3d 295,296 n.3 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that the Supreme Court
in Felker held that the restrictions on successive petitions did not suspend the writ, but
declining to decide whether they violate due process or equal protection); Denton v. Norris,
104 F.3d 166, 167-68 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the restrictions on successive applications
did not suspend the writ, citing Felker, 518 U.S. 651 and declining to decide whether the
restrictions violated due process as that claim lacked merit); cf. In re Waldrop, 105 F.3d 1337,
1338 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (declining to decide "whether a claim of actual innocence
may be raised either in a successive habeas petition.., or as a separate and independent
constitutional claim").
359. See Vancleave v. Norris, 150 F.3d 926, 929 (8th Cir. 1998); In re Jones, 137 F.3d
1271, 1273 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert denied, 523 U.S. 1041 (1998); In re Mills, 101 F.3d
1369, 1371 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Felker v. Turpin, 101 F.3d 95, 97 (11th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 989 (1996); Hatch v. Oklahoma, 92 F.3d 1012, 1016 (10th Cir.
1996) (per curiam).
360. See Bennett v. United States, 119 F.3d 470, 471-72 (7th Cir. 1997); LIEBMAN &
HERTZ, supra note 1, § 28.4a, at 1205.
361. See LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 1, § 28.4a, at 1205.
362. Thus, for example, the Seventh Circuit has held that a petitioner's presenting new
evidence to support a claim does not make the claim a new claim. See Felder v. McVicar, 113
F.3d 696, 698 (7th Cir. 1997).
363. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 para. 8; LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 1, § 41.7d, at 1609.
Paragraph eight of § 2255, the only paragraph in § 2255 governing successive motions, makes
no mention of a distinction between same claims and new claims.
[Vol. 84:43
SUCCESSIVE HABEAS CORPUS PETITIONS
which were raised previously. Thus, the AEDPA has not established
any additional restrictions specific to same claims in successive § 2255
motions. Since the § 2255 general restrictions are similar to the
restrictions on new claims in the § 2254 context, the § 2255 restrictions
will be discussed in that section.
Despite the clear statutory difference between how the AEDPA
treats § 2254 and § 2255 same claims, only the Second Circuit appears to
have recognized this distinction." The Seventh Circuit, by contrast, has
held that § 2255 incorporates the substantive restriction on same claims
that applies to § 2254 petitions.6 This argument, however, is
unpersuasive. Section 2255 incorporates procedures for granting
authorization, not the standards for granting authorization.'
Furthermore, because § 2255 contains its own substantive standard for
granting authorization, incorporation of a § 2244 substantive standard
would not make sense. Finally, because the substantial pre-AEDPA
restrictions on same claims still apply to claims raised in the district
court if a circuit court does grant a petitioner authorization to file a
successive § 2255 motionY7 the Act's failure to completely preclude
same claims at the authorization stage does not broaden relief available
to a petitioner.
C. Substantive Standards Governing New Claims
Prior to the enactment of the AEDPA, a petitioner could raise a
new claim in a successive § 2254 petition or § 2255 motion if the
petitioner could demonstrate either (1) cause for failing to raise the
claim previously and prejudice from failing to consider the claim or (2)
that a miscarriage of justice would result from the failure to consider the
claim. Cause could be shown where the factual or legal basis for the
claim was not reasonably available at the time of the prior application. 9
However, cause was not limited to these two situations, but instead
364. See Galtieri v. United States, 128 F.3d 33, 35 n.1 and accompanying text (2d Cir.
1997) (noting that the standard for successive § 2255 motion certification is "a slightly
different standard applicable to second 2254 petitions").
365. See Alexander v. United States, 121 F.3d 312, 314 (7th Cir. 1997). The Seventh
Circuit in Alexander cited as support a prior circuit decision denying an authorization motion
because the claim in the proposed § 2255 motion had been raised previously. See id. (citing
Bennett, 119 F.3d at 471).
366. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 para. 8.
367. See infra Part IV.E.
368. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,493-95 (1991).
369. See id. at 493 (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)).
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hinged on the broader question of whether there was an objective factor
external to the petitioner which prevented the petitioner from raising
the claim previously.' Prejudice could be demonstrated through a
showing that the error resulted in a trial which was fundamentally
unfair." Finally, the miscarriage of justice exception played a role
similar to that of the ends of justice exception in the same claim context,
namely "guaranteeing that the ends of justice will be served in full."'I r
These standards provided courts with some flexibility in determining
whether to entertain a claim in a successive application. The AEDPA,
however, replaced this flexibility with only two situations in which a
petitioner may present a claim in a successive application: the claim
must be based on either (1) a rule of constitutional law, which the
Supreme Court has made retroactively applicable on collateral review,
and which was previously unavailable; or (2) newly discovered evidence,
which at least in the § 2254 context, supports a claim of a constitutional
error, and if proven, would demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This section discusses each
component of the authorization requirements for claims based on new
law and new evidence, and then comments on the elimination of the
miscarriage of justice exception.
1. Claims Based on New Law
Allowing a petitioner to present a claim based on a change in law
when the legal basis for the claim was not available at the time of the
prior application was one of the grounds for establishing cause prior to
the enactment of the AEDPA.33 The AEDPA narrowed this ground in
two respects. First, the Act limits the type of change in law which can
justify raising a claim in a successive application to new rules of
constitutional law, a limitation which appears to severely restrict the
types of claims that can be brought in a successive § 2255 motion.
Second, the Act appears to require that the Supreme Court have made
the new law retroactively available on collateral review, a condition
which severely restricts when a petitioner can take advantage of a new
rule in a successive application. This section explores the three
requirements for raising a claim based on new law under the AEDPA.
370. See hi (citing Murray, 477 U.S. at 488).
371. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494 (1986).
372- McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 495.
373. See id. at 494-95.
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a. Rule of Constitutional Law
The AEDPA restricted claims based on a change in law to those
based on a "new rule of constitutional law." The Act borrows this
phrase from the Supreme Court case of Teague v. Lane,374 which limited
the circumstances under which a petitioner could rely on a new rule of
constitutional law in a collateral challenge to a conviction. The Court in
Teague defined a new rule of constitutional law as a rule that was not
previously dictated by the then-existing Court precedent.' The Court
in Teague further held that a petitioner may only rely on a new rule in a
collateral proceeding if the rule either places a class of private conduct
beyond the power of the state to proscribe or is a "watershed" rule of
criminal procedure that implicates fundamental fairness and accuracy of
a criminal proceeding and is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'
In contrast, a petitioner can raise claims in applications which are not
based on a "new rule of constitutional law" without regard to the
Teague bar.3
Although the change in law restriction may make sense in the § 2254
context, this change is not appropriate in the § 2255 context. Section
2255 generally provides relief both for constitutional and certain non-
constitutional claims based on a change in law.378 One example of a non-
constitutional claim based on new law is when the Supreme Court places
conduct outside the scope of a criminal statute by limiting the scope of
the statute. While the AEDPA does not limit the relief available in the
first § 2255 motiongit does limit the grounds for raising a claim in a
374. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
375. See id. at 301. The Court alternatively defined a new rule as one that "breaks new
ground or imposes a new obligation on the States of the Federal Government." Id.
376. See id. at 311.
377. See, e.g., United States v. McPhail, 112 F.3d 197, 199 (5th Cir. 1997), and cases cited
therein; cf Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 619-21 (1998) (holding that Teague is
inapplicable to a claim based on a judicial construction of a criminal statute, which is a
substantive rather than a procedural claim).
378. Section 2255 provides that:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress
claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was
without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of
the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may
move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the
sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255 para. 1; see also Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424,428 (1962).
379. The AEDPA appears to have limited appellate review of the denial of a § 2255
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successive § 2255 motion to a new rule of constitutional law. Thus, there
are circumstances in which a petitioner could not raise a claim in a first
petition because of then-existing law, but when the law changes, the
AEDPA precludes the petitioner from raising the claim in a successive
application. This section now discusses two prominent examples of
specific claims that previously could be raised in successive § 2255
motions but now no longer can, and briefly explores how courts have
and should resolve this problem.
i. Bailey v. United States
In 1995, the Supreme Court in Bailey v. United States' limited the
definition of "use" in the criminal statute which proscribes using a
firearm "during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime.., for which [the defendant] may be prosecuted in a
court of the United States."3' ' In particular, the Court defined "use" as
"actively employ[ing] the firearm during and in relation to the predicate
motion to constitutional claims by instituting the certificate of appealability requirement. See
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). Since in order to obtain a certificate of appealability, a petitioner must
make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. See id. A petitioner may
not be able to obtain a certificate of appealability to challenge the denial of a non-
constitutional claim raised in a § 2255 motion. Compare Holm v. United States, 99 F.3d 892,
893 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that a petitioner cannot obtain a certificate of appealability based
on a non-constitutional, Bailey claim), vacated on other grounds, 524 U.S. 236 (1998) with
United States v. Gobert, 139 F.3d 436, 437-39 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that a petitioner can
obtain a certificate of appealability based on a Bailey claim since although Bailey is a
statutory case it implicates constitutional concerns).
This restriction poses a potential Article III violation because, on its face, a petitioner may
not appeal to the circuit court the denial of a non-constitutional claim properly raised in a §
2255 motion and thus cannot raise the claim in the Supreme Court through direct review.
Also, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(a) precludes renewal in the circuit court: "If an
application is made to... the district court and denied, renewal of the application before a
circuit judge shall not be permitted." FED. R. APP. P. 22(a). However, as in Felker, it may be
that such a petitioner still can seek relief in the Supreme Court through filing a habeas
petition directly with the Court. However, this is not a particularly effective remedy. See
supra Part 111.1.2 (discussing the limited review available in a habeas petition filed directly in
the Supreme Court).
This restriction also poses an equal protection problem. The Rules of Appellate Procedure
provide that, if the district court grants relief based on a non-constitutional claim and the
government appeals, the government need not obtain a certificate of appealability. See FED.
R. APP. P. 22(b) ("If an appeal is taken by the State or its representative, a certificate of
appealability is not required."). Thus, when a petitioner raises certain non-constitutional
claims in a § 2255 motion, the petitioner may not appeal if he or she loses, but the
government may appeal if he or she does get relief.
380. 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
381. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1994)(amended 1998).
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crime. ' Prior to the Bailey decision, some lower courts employed a
broader definition of "use."3' Because the Bailey decision limited the
definition of "use," after the decision was rendered, petitioners who had
been convicted in circuits which had subscribed to the broader definition
sought relief on the ground that the Supreme Court decision placed
their conduct outside the scope of the criminal statute. Such a claim is
cognizable if brought in a first § 2255 motion.3 However, those
petitioners who had already filed a first § 2255 prior to the Bailey
decision and then raised the Bailey claim in a motion filed after the
enactment of the AEDPA had to confront the AEDPA's successive
application provisions.
All of the circuits which have addressed the issue have held that a
petitioner may not obtain authorization to file a successive application
based on a Bailey claim. These courts based their decisions on the
conclusion that Bailey did not announce a new rule of constitutional law,
but rather simply announced a new rule of statutory construction.8
Thus, a claim based on Bailey does not fall within the AEDPA's
statutory requirement that authorization be granted based on a new rule
of constitutional law.
Although all of the circuits to have held that authorization may not
be granted based on a Bailey claim, three have held that a petitioner
may raise a Bailey claim using an alternative procedural vehicle. The
Ninth Circuit first suggested a petitioner unable to obtain authorization
to file a successive § 2255 motion raising a Bailey claim may be able to
382. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 150.
383. See, eg., United States v. Torres-Rodriguez, 930 F.2d 1375, 1385-86 (9th Cir. 1991)
(holding that mere possession is sufficient to constitute use).
384. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614,619-621 (1998).
385. See Gray-Bey v. United States, 209 F.3d 986, 989 (7th Cir. 2000) (per curiam);
Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361,371-72 (2d Cir. 1997); In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245,
248 (3d Cir. 1997); In re Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1195-96 (4th Cir. 1997); Coleman v. United
States, 106 F.3d 339 (10th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); United States v. Lorentsen, 106 F.3d 278,
279 (9th Cir. 1997); In re Blackshire, 98 F.3d 1293, 1294 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Nunez
v. United States, 96 F.3d 990, 992 (7th Cir. 1996); cf. In re Hanserd, 123 F.3d 922, 930 (6th Cir.
1997) (stating that the petitioner could pursue a Bailey claim under § 2241 if § 2255 were
unavailable, but holding that § 2255 was available because the AEDPA did not apply to the
petition).
386. See Gray-Bey, 209 F.3d at 989; Triestman, 124 F.3d at 372; In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d
at 247-48; In re Vial, 115 F.3d at 1195-96; Coleman, 106 F.3d at 341; Lorentsen, 106 F.3d at
279; In re Blackshire, 98 F.3d at 1294; Nunez, 96 F.3d at 992.
In addition, the Fourth Circuit held that preventing a movant from raising a Bailey claim in a
successive § 2255 motion does not constitute a suspension of the writ. See In re Vial, 115 F.3d
at 1197-98. The Fourth Circuit reached this conclusion based on the Supreme Court's
discussion in Felker of the AEDPA's limitations on successive applications. See id.
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successfully raise such a claim in a § 2241 petition.' The Second and
Third Circuits went further, and in detailed opinions, held that a
petitioner who is precluded from raising a Bailey claim in a successive §
2255 motion may in fact raise such a claim in a § 2241 petition." These
courts held that in such circumstances the AEDPA's successive
application restrictions rendered relief by way of a § 2255 motion
"inadequate or ineffective," because relief pursuant to a § 2241 petition
is available when a § 2255 motion is "inadequate or ineffective," relief
could be available under § 2241 for a Bailey claim.m However, because
§ 2241 generally is not available simply because a petitioner has failed
on the merits in a § 2255 motion,39 the Second Circuit limited the
availability of § 2241 to situations in which denying a petitioner any
relief would raise serious constitutional concerns. 9' These decisions are
important because they allow a petitioner to obtain relief when such
relief is explicitly precluded by the AEDPA's successive application
restrictions."
Because certain circuit courts have held that § 2241 is available for
petitioners to pursue relief that the AEDPA has made unavailable
under § 2255, raises the question of the scope of § 2241." The Second
Circuit has indicated that § 2241 is available when the unavailability of
any other avenue of relief "raise[s] serious constitutional questions."3
The Third Circuit stated that § 2241 is available when the unavailability
of § 2255 would result in a "complete miscarriage of justice."'39 The
Seventh Circuit has indicated that § 2241 is available to pursue claims
involving a fundamental defect in a conviction or sentencing that could
not have been raised in the prior § 2255 motion due to an intervening
change in law.' The Eleventh Circuit has held that § 2241 is available
for claims that circuit court law previously foreclosed, but are based on
new law that the Supreme Court has made retroactively applicable and
that makes the offenses for which the petitioner was convicted
387. See Lorentsen, 106 F.3d at 279.
388. See Triestman, 124 F.3d at 373-80; Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 248-52.
389. See Triestman, 124 F.3d at 380; Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251.
390. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
391. See Triestman, 124 F.3d at 377.
392. These decisions raise too many issues for a full discussion here.
393. See Ellis et aL, supra note 239, at 17-18; Deborah L. Stahlkopf, Note, A Dark Day
for Habeas Corpus: Successive Petitions under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996,40 ARIZ. L. REv. 1115, 1123-25 (1998).
394. Triestman, 124 F.3d at 377.
395. Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251.
396. See In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998).
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nonexistent." The First Circuit has noted § 2241 remains available in
limited circumstances, but declined to elaborate on the scope of such
circumstances.3" The Sixth Circuit has indicated that only a claim of
"actual innocence" could be pursued through § 2241."9 This variety of
readings of the scope of § 2241 indicates that the AEDPA has created a
new and important § 2241 jurisprudence, which most likely will have to
be ultimately defined by the Supreme Court.
ii. Rutledge v. United States
In Rutledge v. United States, the Supreme Court held that
convicting a defendant of both conspiracy to distribute narcotics and
conducting a continuing criminal enterprise violated double jeopardy. 1
Prior to Rutledge, the practice in two circuits when a defendant was
convicted of both offenses was to combine the two convictions such that
the defendant would only be punished for one of the two convictions,'
whereas a third circuit authorized concurrent sentences for the two
convictions.' The Court in Rutledge, however, held that one of the
convictions must be dismissed.V ' As with a Bailey claim, a petitioner
generally is able to raise a Rutledge claim in a first § 2255 motion, but
it does not appear that authorization can be granted on an application
based on a Rutledge claim.
The Second Circuit, a circuit that had followed the practice of
combining the two convictions, has held that a petitioner may not obtain
authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion based on a Rutledge
claim.' The court reasoned that because any challenged sentencing
error involved in combining the convictions was "merely cosmetic," a
petitioner could not obtain relief on collateral review.w The only
practical affect of this combination was the imposition of an extra $50
397. See Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236,1244 (11th Cir. 1999).
398. See United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 34,52 (1st Cir. 1999).
399. See Charles v. Chandler, 180 F.3d 753,757 (6th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
400. 517 U.S. 292 (1996).
401. See id. at 306-07.
402. See United States v. Fernandez, 916 F.2d 125,128-29 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500
U.S. 948 (1991); United States v. Osorio Estrada, 751 F.2d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 1984), modified
on reh'g on other grounds, 757 F.2d 27 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 474 U.S. 830 (1985).
403. See United States v. Rutledge, 40 F.3d 879, 886 (7th Cir. 1994), revd, 517 U.S. 291
(1996).
404. Rutledge, 517 U.S. at 306-7.
405. See, e.g., United States v. Lloyd, 983 F. Supp. 738,743-44 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
406. See Underwood v. United States, 166 F.3d 84,87-88 (2d Cir. 1999).
407. See id. at 87.
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special assessment, and the court found that the petitioner could have
raised a challenge to the $50 special assessment on direct appeal.
Furthermore, the court found that an unjustified $50 assessment does
not rise to the level of fundamental miscarriage of justice.4w The Second
Circuit, without much additional discussion, then held that § 2241 relief
was not available based on the same considerations that § 2255 relief
was not available.
Despite the Second Circuit's decision, it is arguable whether a
Rutledge claim is sufficiently similar to a Bailey claim such that similar
alternative remedies should be available as in the Bailey context. A
Rutledge claim is similar to a Bailey claim in that both are claims by a
convicted petitioner that a change in law has placed her or his conduct
outside the scope of what is legitimately criminal. The Bailey decision
accomplished this by narrowing the scope of a criminal statute such that
a conviction outside of the scope violates due process. The Rutledge
decision accomplished this by finding that a conspiracy to distribute
narcotics accompanied by a continuing criminal enterprise conviction
violates double jeopardy. While the Second Circuit focused on the
practical consequences of the error in law, it was nonetheless an error of
law. Thus, as with Bailey claims, even though the terms of the
AEDPA's successive application provisions preclude petitioners from
obtaining authorization to raise a Rutledge claim in a successive § 2255
motion, some avenue of relief, such as a § 2241 petition, should still be
available.
b. Made Retroactive
The literal terms of the AEDPA require the Supreme Court to make
the new rule of constitutional law retroactively applicable to cases on
collateral review for a petitioner to rely on the rule as a basis for a
successive application. This provision is most obviously problematic
because it requires action by the Supreme Court, whose docket is for the
most part discretionary and is extremely limited. In addition, few new
rules will meet the standard for being retroactively applicable, namely
either placing a class of private conduct beyond the power of the state to
proscribe, or being a "watershed" rule of criminal procedure.411
408. See id. at 87-88.
409. See id. at 88.
410. See id.
411. In Teague v. Lane, the Court stated that "we believe it unlikely that many such
components of basic due process have yet to emerge." 489 U.S. 288, 313 (1989). See
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An argument can be made that the AEDPA does not require that
the Supreme Court actually decide that a new rule is retroactively
applicable for authorization to be granted based on the rule.412 Under
this argument, a circuit court could grant authorization if the court finds
that the Supreme Court would hold the new rule to be retroactively
applicable based on its precedent.413  However, this argument, is
precluded by the AEDPA's plain language. Thus, the First, Fourth,
Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have all required a Supreme
Court decision for authorization to be granted as to a new rule.414
It should be noted that this conclusion raises a serious issue when the
successive application provisions combine with the new period of
limitations provisions. In particular, the period of limitation provisions
require an application to be brought within one year after a new law is
made retroactively applicable on collateral review without regard as to
whether the Supreme Court itself has held that the law is retroactively
applicable.4' This means that if a lower court finds a new rule of
constitutional law to be retroactively applicable, the period of limitation
will begin to run even though the petitioner is unable to obtain
authorization until the Supreme Court so holds. Thus, it may be if the
Supreme Court does not find the right to be retroactively applicable
within one year, a petitioner would be completely precluded from
raising the claim in a successive application, thus raising constitutional
concerns.
c. Previously Unavailable
The third requirement for a circuit court to grant authorization
based on a new rule of constitutional law is that the rule be previously
unavailable. This simply means that the rule was not available when the
petitioner filed his or her previous application.416 This unavailability
LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 1, § 25.7, at 1018-29.
412. See LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 1, § 28.3e, at 1198-99; see also In re Vial, 115
F.3d 1192,1196-97 (4th Cir. 1997) (discussing and rejecting this argument).
413. See In re Vial, 115 F.3d at 1196-97.
414. See Rodriguez v. Bay State Corr. Ctr., 139 F.3d 270,274-75 (1st Cir. 1998); Bennett
v. United States, 119 F.3d 470, 471 (7th Cir. 1997); In re Vail, 115 F.3d at 1196 (specifically
rejecting the argument that authorization may be granted if "Supreme Court precedent
establishes that the new rule is of the type available to those proceedings on collateral
review"); In re Hill, 113 F.3d 181, 184 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); United States v.
Lorentsen, 106 F.3d 278, 279 (9th Cir. 1997); Nunez v. United States, 96 F.3d 990, 992 (7th
Cir. 1996); cf Triestman, 124 F.3d at 372 n.16 (declining to address this issue).
415. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(C), 2255 para. 7(3).
416. Alternatively, the previously unavailable requirement can mean that the new rule
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requirement is the same as under pre-AEDPA law, under which a
petitioner could not rely on a legal theory in a successive application
which was available when he or she filed the previous application.17
Thus, this third requirement of the AEDPA does not restrict the
previously available relief.
d. Prejudice
Under the law prior to the AEDPA, a petitioner was required to
demonstrate both cause and prejudice for failing to raise a new claim in
a prior application for a court to consider the claim. However, neither
the § 2254 nor the § 2255 successive application provisions of the Act
establish a prejudice requirement for authorization to be granted based
on a new rule of constitutional law .4 " Because the Act does not mention
a prejudice requirement, prejudice should not be a requirement for
granting authorization. 19 It would appear that a petitioner need only
cite to the new rule of constitutional law which was previously
unavailable to obtain authorization. Although the Act requires that a
claim "rely on" a new rule, this requirement should be read simply to
mean that the rule cited has some bearing on the challenged conviction.
Of course, the prejudice requirement would remain in place when the
district court considers whether to grant relief in an authorized
successive application.4 °
2. Claims Based on New Evidence
Relying on newly discovered evidence was another of the
established grounds by which a petitioner could establish cause prior to
the enactment of the AEDPA. 1 The AEDPA established the following
three requirements for authorization to be granted on a claim based on
newly discovered evidence: (a) the evidence must be newly discovered;
was announced after the prior application was decided. See In re Hill, 113 F.3d 181, 183 (11th
Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (holding that a claim was previously available if the petitioner had the
opportunity to amend the previous application to include the claim even if the claim was
unavailable at the time that the petitioner filed the previous application).
417. See LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 1, § 28.3c, at 1178-80.
41& See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(2)(A), 2255 para. 8(2); LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 1,
§ 28.3e, at 1198.
419. Furthermore, the drafters of the AEDPA certainly knew that the Act could
establish a requirement that a movant demonstrate prejudice to obtain authorization, as the
Act includes this requirement in its provisions governing newly discovered evidence. See
infra Part IV.C.2.c.
420. See infra Part W.E.
421. See supra notes 368-69.
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(b) the claim that is supported by the evidence must establish a
constitutional error, at least in the § 2254 context; and (c) the evidence,
if proven, would demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that no
reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. While the first two requirements
reflect pre-AEDPA law, the third requirement is substantially stricter
than the pre-AEDPA prejudice requirement.
a. Newly Discovered
The first requirement for a claim based on new evidence is that the
evidence be newly discovered. This requirement is a codification of the
pre-AEDPA law under which the evidence underlying a claim in a
successive application must have been unavailable at the time of the
earlier application to justify raising the claim in a successive application.
Thus, applying the AEDPA's requirements, the Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits have held that a factual predicate that appears on the face of
the record of the direct criminal proceedings is not newly discovered.4 '
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit has held that evidence is not newly
discovered if both the petitioner and the petitioner's counsel had
personal knowledge of the evidence during the original criminal
proceeding,'7 and that in order for a petitioner to obtain authorization
he or she may not merely allege a prior lack of knowledge but also must
demonstrate that a reasonable investigation would not have uncovered
the evidence."
b. Constitutional Error
The second authorization requirement for a claim based on newly
discovered evidence is that the claim, at least in the § 2254 context, rely
on a constitutional error. ' This requirement is simply a codification of
the requirement that a claim be grounded in a constitutional error.426
The § 2255 successive application provision, however, does not include
the constitutional error requirement.' This omission may reflect anacknowledgment that a petitioner can raise certain non-constitutional
422. See Hatch v. Oklahoma, 92 F.3d 1012, 1015 (10th Cir. 1996) (per curiam); Felker v.
Turpin, 83 F.3d 1303,1306 (11th Cir. 1996), cert dismissed, 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
423. See In re Magwood, 113 F.3d 1544,1548 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
424. See In re Boshears, 110 F.3d 1538, 1540 (11th Cir. 1997) (by the panel).
425. See In re Magwood, 113 F.3d at 1548.
426. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993).
427. See LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 1, § 41.7d, at 1609-10.
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claims in a § 2255 motion.4
c. But For / Prejudice
Prior to the enactment of the AEDPA, a petitioner could establish
prejudice by demonstrating that he or she was denied fundamental
fairness at trial.429 The AEDPA, however, substantially heightened this
prejudice requirement. In both the § 2254 and § 2255 contexts, the Act
requires that the newly discovered evidence demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the
petitioner guilty of the challenged offense.4' This requirement,
essentially that but for the unavailability of the evidence at trial the
petitioner would not have been convicted as a matter of law, represents
a substantial departure from the prior standard of demonstrating that
the error resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial. In fact, this restrictive
standard is similar to the pre-AEDPA requirements governing the
circumstances in which a petitioner could raise a claim previously raised
or a claim for which the petitioner could not establish cause and
prejudice."
The AEDPA's restrictions also appear to prevent petitioners from
challenging any aspect of a sentence in a successive application based on
newly discovered evidence. In particular, a petitioner can only be
granted authorization by demonstrating that a jury would find him or
her innocent of the offense, and any claim as to a sentence has no
bearing on a conviction. Thus, the Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits have all held that authorization could not be granted for a claim
challenging a sentence."2 Similarly, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits
have held that authorization cannot be granted for a claim of innocence
of the death penalty because this is a sentencing claim, not a challenge
428. See supra note 378 and accompanying text.
429. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,494 (1986).
430. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii), 2255 para. 8(1).
431. See LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 1, § 28.3e, at 1199-200; see also Mark M. Oh,
Note, The Gateway for Successive Habeas Petitions: An Argument for Schlup v. Delo's
Probability Standard for Actual Innocence Claims, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 2341, 2346 (1998)
(arguing that the AEDPA's "clear and convincing evidence" standard violates due process);
Woolley, supra note 4, at 422-24. Even with its restrictiveness, at least one court has found
that a petitioner satisfied the newly discovered evidence standard. See In re Boshears, 110
F.3d at 1541 ("the application clearly proves that the applicant could not have been
convicted").
432. See In re Jones, 137 F.3d 1271, 1274 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert denied, 523 U.S.
1041 (1998); Hope v. United States, 108 F.3d 119, 120 (7th Cir. 1997); Greenawalt v. Stewart,
105 F.3d 1268, 1277 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1102 (1997).
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to a conviction.'m  The Ninth Circuit, however, has held that
authorization can be granted for a claim of innocence of the death
penalty, reasoning that the challenged underlying offense is the capital
aspect of the offense.4m Despite these rulings, restrictions on challenges
to sentences raise constitutional problems if there is no other available
procedure to raise such claims.
3. Claims Based on a Miscarriage of Justice
Prior to the enactment of the AEDPA, a petitioner who could not
demonstrate both cause and prejudice for failing to raise a claim in a
prior application could still raise a claim by showing that a "fundamental
miscarriage of justice would result from a failure to entertain the
claim. " 4 This exception served a similar purpose as the ends of justice
exception that allowed a petitioner to raise a same claim in a successive
application, namely to allow a petitioner to raise a claim when justice so
required.416 The AEDPA, however, eliminated this exception to the
general cause and prejudice requirement. It is yet to be seen whether
the courts will find that this exception has survived the AEDPA's
successive application restrictions!"
D. Other Potential Defenses
For a circuit court to grant a petitioner authorization to file a
successive application, the AEDPA only explicitly requires that the
application make a prima facie showing that the application satisfies the
substantive authorization requirements discussed above. There may,
however, be other reasons unrelated to the merits of the claim that a
claim raised in a successive application may ultimately be unsuccessful.
In particular, the claim may be unexhausted, 43 procedurally barred,439
premature,' or untimely."' However, because these defenses are not
433. See Burris v. Parke, 116 F.3d 256, 258 (7th Cir. 1997); In re Medina, 109 F.3d 1556,
1565-66 (11th Cir. 1997); Hope, 108 F.3d at 120.
434. See Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918,923-24 (9th Cir. 1998).
435. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,495 (1991).
436. See supra note 372 and accompanying text.
437. As with the elimination of the same-claim ends of justice exception, the elimination
of the miscarriage of justice exception may suspend the writ or violate due process or equal
protection.
438. See supra Part II.B.7.
439. See supra Part ll.B.8.
440. See supra Part II.B.9.
441. See supra Part H.B.10.
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part of the AEDPA's substantive standards for granting authorization,
it is recommended that circuit courts not consider these issues when
deciding whether to grant authorization motions."2
Two circuit courts have addressed the issue of whether circuit courts
may or should consider defenses not explicit in the AEDPA's successive
authorization provisions when adjudicating an authorization motion.
The Tenth Circuit has held that the issue of whether a petitioner has
exhausted all of her or his claims is not properly before the court when it
is adjudicating an authorization motion.43 The court reasoned that the
AEDPA simply did not make exhaustion a prerequisite of its granting
authorization in performing its gatekeeping function." The First Circuit
has relied upon the Tenth Circuit's holding without discussion.' 5
There are a number of reasons for circuit courts to not consider the
issues of exhaustion, procedural bar, and timeliness when deciding an
authorization motion. First, following the reasoning of the Tenth
Circuit, the AEDPA does not include these issues in its substantive
standard for granting authorization. Second, given a circuit court's
already difficult task of determining whether authorization should be
granted within thirty-days and often times with a minimal record, it
could be additionally burdensome for a circuit court to consider these
potential defenses that may present complicated questions better
resolved by the district court. Third, the failure to exhaust, procedural
bar, and untimeliness defenses may all be waived by the respondent.
4" 6
Because a petitioner who is authorized to file a successive application
despite the availability of these defenses may ultimately get relief, a
circuit court should not prevent such a petitioner from filing an
application in the first instance. '7
Although it may be tempting for a circuit court to deny
authorization based on any one of these defenses if it is clear that the
defense, if asserted, would preclude relief, it is nonetheless
442. See LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 1, § 28.3b, at 278-79 (1997 Supp.) (concluding
that the AEDPA "evidently render[s] irrelevant other possible grounds for dismissal such as
ultimate lack of merit, nonexhaustion, procedural default, and the like").
443. See Hatch, 92 F.3d at 1016.
444. See id.
445. See Dickinson v. Maine, 101 F.3d 791, 791 n.1 (1st Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
446. See supra note 196 (exhaustion and procedural default); Calderon v. United States
Dist. Court, 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the period of limitation, as with
other statutes of limitations, is not a jurisdictional bar).
447. If a respondent states in its opposition to an authorization motion that it intends to
raise one of the defenses then a circuit court may be more justified in considering the issue.
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recommended that courts decline to do so. The primary benefit of such
a practice is judicial efficiency, as it may be a waste of judicial resources
to authorize the filing of a successive application which ultimately
cannot get the petitioner the desired relief. However, such efficiency
should not outweigh the importance of orderly litigation and the rights
of petitioners to file successive applications that meet the explicit
authorization requirements.
E. Post-Authorization Standards
If a circuit court actually grants a petitioner authorization to file a
successive application, then the petitioner must proceed to the
appropriate district court, which will then decide whether the petitioner
is entitled to relief. Despite all of the above pages devoted to the
question of when authorization should be granted, authorization is just
the preliminary step in the successive application process. The second
step is the traditional district court disposition of a successive
authorization motion. This section will briefly describe what restrictions
the AEDPA places on successive applications once they are filed in the
district court.
1. Authorized Section 2254 Petitions
The AEDPA mandates that district courts independently review
whether the claims in an authorized successive § 2254 petition meet the
authorization requirements.' This provision is particularly important
when a petition contains multiple claims, as a circuit court may grant
authorization for the entire petition even if only one of the claims
satisfies the authorization standard. 9 Under this provision, district
courts should dismiss claims which do not satisfy the authorization
standard. As to the claims that satisfy the authorization requirements,
the pre-AEDPA successive application law should apply, including any
defenses to the petition and any restrictions on relief available in a
successive application. Rather than replacing the underlying law, the
AEDPA simply added new restrictions on relief.
2. Authorized Section 2255 Motions
In contrast to the AEDPA's successive § 2254 petition provisions,
448. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(4) ("A district court shall dismiss any claim presented in a
second or successive application that the court of appeals has authorized to be filed unless the
applicant shows that the claim satisfies the requirements of this section.").
449. See supra Part M.G.
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the Act's successive § 2255 motion provision does not include any
restrictions on successive § 2255 motions. Read literally, once a circuit
court has granted authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion, the
AEDPA's successive application provisions place no restrictions on the
district court's consideration of the motion. While this omission may be
unintentional and present another example of the AEDPA's poor
draftsmanship, since the Act does not include a restriction, none should
apply. 4M In other words, the AEDPA simply does not apply to
authorized successive § 2255 motions. Thus, pre-AEDPA successive
application law should govern authorized successive § 2255 motions.
An argument could be made that the reference in § 2255 that a
successive motion "must be certified as provided in section 2244" refers
to § 2244(b)(4), the provision of § 2244 which applies to district courts.
However, the reference is to circuit court authorization, whereas §
2244(b)(4) governs district court disposition of an authorized
application. Another argument is that the district court should be able
to review whether the circuit court should have granted authorization.
However, there is no authority in the Act or anywhere else for such
review. Thus, the Act simply does not affect the disposition of
authorized successive § 2255 motions.
V. CONCLUSION
As is evident from the discussions in this Article, the successive
application provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 substantially changed both the procedures and substantive
law governing successive § 2254 petitions and § 2255 motions in a
manner that has engendered a host of issues. The final resolution of
these issues will take years, if not decades,45' just as the role of the Great
Writ has been evolving for decades. In resolving these issues, rather
than simply mechanically applying the provisions of the Act, courts,
commentators, and litigants acting under this regime must keep in mind
the ultimate purposes of the writ: relief for those who are actually
innocent and a guarantee of fundamental fairness at trial and in direct
criminal proceedings.
450. See supra notes 60-62, 329 and accompanying text.
451. See, e.g., Woolley, supra note 4, at 416.
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